740.00119 PW/9–2745:
Telegram
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan
(Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, September 27,
1945.
[Received September 29—1
p.m.]
3. Following memorandum submitted to SCAP as representing only
initial impressions admittedly and necessarily based upon quick
survey of conditions and opinions in Tokyo and immediate
environs:
- “(a) Although one senses a
certain dazed feeling on the part of many of the
populace, the general reaction among the people is
one of great relief that the war is finished, of
resignation to defeat and of anxiety in regard to
the treatment to be given Japan.
- (b) There is practically
universal acceptance of the fact of defeat. This
acceptance is not, however, accompanied by a
universal sense of guilt or shame. Pride in Japanese
race, mores, and culture remains widespread.
(Properly handled, this factor may be valuable in
implementing United States policies.)
- “(c) Leadership appears to
fall into two categories;
- 1st,
- that of government and administrative
officials who seem to limit their activities
largely to general administration and execution of
orders of the occupation forces; and
- 2nd,
- that of certain individuals who are busily
engaged in what is felt to be opportunistic
scrambling to create a surface appearance of
democratic activity in Japanese political life. It
is too early to determine whether government
officials and leaders of these highly vocal
proponents of new democratic social and political
practices can or will develop sound basic programs
for the gradual evolution of a peaceful and
reliable Japan.
- “(d) As was to be expected,
there has not yet emerged a clear pattern of
leadership which could reasonably be relied upon to
develop the changes which must take place in Japan
during the next one or two generations. Similarly,
with the military backbone of the government
destroyed, there have not yet come forward the
individual leaders who can give life to such
leadership. Uncertainty in regard to Japan’s future
seems to loom large in preventing the emergence of
such leaders. Factors such as necessary recovery
from shock and sudden elimination of long standing
militaristic direction and domination
[Page 725]
of all
National affairs, and the extreme difficulty of bare
existence, make it unlikely that the vacuum in
progressive and intelligent leadership will be
filled for a considerable period of time. On the
other hand, there is wide evidence of a spirit of
determination to recover Japan’s position through
diligence and cooperation with the occupying
forces.
- “(e) All observations
reemphasize the fact that creation of a new Japanese
economic and social structure must necessarily be a
gradual process wisely initiated and carefully
watched and fostered for many years. It cannot be
accomplished suddenly. It would appear undesirable,
in the initial stages of occupation, to attempt to
accelerate, perhaps to the point of disintegration,
the desired social and economic changes. Such
measures as the immediate complete eradication of
all responsible leaders who may formerly have been
implicated in decisions of high policy which led to
war or were concerned with war, might be highly
disturbing at this particular juncture and should be
proceeded with gradually and as local circumstances
dictate.”
