Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

740.00119 FEAC/9–1245

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State, Then in London⁹⁰

[London,] 12 September, 1945.

Dear Mr. Byrnes: The present uncertainty about the policies to be followed in the treatment of Japan, now that she has surrendered, is causing growing concern in this country and I should value an early opportunity to discuss with you personally the manner in which these policies are to be formulated and applied. It will perhaps facilitate our discussion if I set out briefly in this personal letter the points which I should like to elaborate.

2. The United States have suggested the establishment in Washington of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission with limited powers of recommendation to the participating Governments in regard to the formulation of policies, principles and standards for the fulfilment of the Instrument of Surrender,⁹¹ the machinery necessary to ensure this fulfilment, and any other matters which may be referred to it.⁹² Our understanding is that, in the view of the United States Government, the Commission should consist of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, France, the Philippines, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands.

3. Just before this suggestion was made, we had put forward some tentative proposals for the establishment in Japan itself of an Allied Control Council representing the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Australia, and of an Allied Advisory Committee composed of representatives of these five countries together with representatives of Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, India, France, the Netherlands and the Philippines.⁹³ The intention of these proposals was to leave the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers free to take all decisions in the military sphere but to assist him in the exercise of his responsibilities by providing an Allied Control Council which would guide him more particularly in political, economic and financial matters; and an Advisory Committee which would consider matters referred to it by the Control Council and would make recommendations to the Control Council.

4. In answer to the United States proposal we have felt bound to stipulate that if an Advisory Commission is set up in accordance with their proposals it should include India. But before accepting the United States proposal we should like to know more about the kind of machinery which the United States Government contemplate for the actual control of Japan, and to be satisfied that this machinery is likely to be such as to give us a voice in the control commensurate with what we have suffered from Japanese treachery, with our contribution to Japan’s defeat and with our responsibility towards our own peoples for preventing any renewal of Japanese aggression.

5. Our interest in Japanese affairs is such that we shall wish in any circumstances to be strongly represented in Japan by a Political Representative with a suitable staff.

6. We are prepared to recognise that the execution of policy in Japan itself should, vis-à-vis the Japanese, be the sole responsibility of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. But this in our view should not imply any derogation, as between the major Allies on whose behalf the Supreme Commander is acting, from the principle of collective responsibility for the policies which he is to apply.

7. It seems highly doubtful whether sufficiently rapid decisions on the many problems which will arise, and which indeed are already arising, can be reached through the medium of a large Advisory Commission sitting in Washington. We suggest that such decisions can only be reached with sufficient rapidity and sufficient knowledge of the local situation through the agency of a Control Commission in Japan itself.

8. It seems to us that the major responsibility should be shared by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China as the parties to the Moscow Declaration of October 30th, 1943⁹⁴ and by Australia by reason of the magnitude of her direct interest and the part which she has played in the war. It is for this reason that we have suggested a Control Commission consisting of representatives of these five countries. Our hesitation in agreeing to entrust the elaboration of control machinery to the Advisory Commission which the United States Government have proposed is that it seems unlikely that such a Commission of eleven countries would easily agree to delegate responsibility to a Control Commission consisting of only five of their number.

9. We have every desire to act in this matter in the closest agreement with the United States Government, and the discrepancies between our proposals and yours are perhaps more apparent than real. It is for that reason that I think that personal discussion at this stage would be so useful.

Yours sincerely,

Ernest Bevin

90. The Secretary of State was in London attending the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
91. Signed aboard the U.S.S. Missouri, Tokyo Bay, September 2, 1945; Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 493, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1733.
92. See telegram 7106, August 21, 8 p.m., to London, p. 638.
93. See annex to British Embassy’s communication of August 20, p. 679.
94. Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 755.