During this conversation Mr. Sakomizu pointed out that the first
question taken up by the Prime Minister (Suzuki) was a review of
the actual situation of the war; that during the latter part of
June the Emperor called an Imperial conference and asked that
steps be taken to end the war; that about July 10 an approach
was made to the Soviet Government to ask that a special envoy
(Prince Konoye)59 be received; that the
Japanese had in mind using Soviet Russia’s good offices; that no
reply was received from the Soviet Government prior to issuance
of the Potsdam Declaration; that certain members of the Cabinet,
especially the Prime Minister, Navy Minister60 and Foreign
Minister61
said that the Potsdam Declaration was a suitable basis for
Japanese surrender if an understanding could be reached that the
Emperor need not be “abolished”; that other members of the
Cabinet favored acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration only under
two conditions, no military occupation of Japan and voluntary
recall of all Japanese troops abroad; that on August 9 the
Emperor personally directed that the Potsdam Declaration be
accepted with the above mentioned understanding and that again
on August 14 the Emperor directed that an Imperial Rescript
terminating the war be prepared on the basis of the Potsdam
Declaration and the reply of the Allied Nations to the Japanese
query concerning the ultimate form of the Japanese
Government.
Mr. Kenneth Galbraith of the Strategic Bombing Survey has
informed me that Marquis Kido told members of the Strategic
Bombing Survey group that the Japanese Government telegraphed
its first proposal to Moscow on June 6, and suggested at that
time that Konoye proceed to Moscow.
There are enclosed copies of memoranda of my conversations with
Mr. Kase and Mr. Galbraith.
[Enclosure 1]
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Max W.
Bishop of the Office of the Political Adviser in
Japan
[Tokyo,] November 9,
1945.
| Participants: |
Mr. Sakomizu Hisatsune,
Former Chief Secretary of the Suzuki Cabinet (April
7 to August 15, 1941); |
|
Mr. Kubo; |
|
Mr. Bishop |
Mr. Sakomizu said that at Mr. Kubo’s suggestion he had come
to tell Mr. Bishop the details of developments in Japan
leading up to the surrender which was announced on August
15. In order that the relationship of personal friendship
and close association between the Emperor and Suzuki would
be clear, he explained that Prime Minister Suzuki had been
the Emperor’s Aide-de-Camp from 1930 to 1936; that Suzuki
had been assaulted and wounded in the military revolt or
“incident” on February 26, 1936; and that Suzuki had later
in 1936 upon his recovery, been made Vice President of the
Privy Council, and in 1940 had become President. He said
that the relationship between such Prime Ministers as
Tojo66 and Koiso67 and the Emperor had been an
official one, and that, therefore, with the appointment of
Suzuki as Prime Minister, the Emperor was able for the first
time since the outbreak of war to express his true feelings
through the Prime Minister. Following is Mr. Sakomizu’s
narrative:
The first question to be taken up by the Suzuki Cabinet was a
complete re-examination of the real situation of the war.
The Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai, and Prime Minister Suzuki,
working closely together and in complete secrecy from the
Army, reached the conclusion that to continue the war would
mean utter destruction of Japan
[Page 703]
and the Japanese people, and would
also, each day it continued, be further destructive of world
civilization.
During the last ten days of June, the Emperor of his own will
and without official advice from anyone, although it was
undoubtedly true that he had discussed the matter with the
Prime Minister, called an Imperial Conference (Gozenkai). Six persons attended this
Conference before the Emperor—the Prime Minister, the War
Minister,68 the Navy Minister, the Foreign Minister,
the Chief of Staff for the Army69 and the
Chief of Staff for the Navy.70 At this meeting the Emperor
asked that steps be taken to bring about an end to the
war.
In the discussion which followed it was decided that there
were two ways in which the Emperor’s wishes could be met:
- 1)
- To open direct communications with the Allied
nations, or
- 2)
- To approach the Allies indirectly and through the
mediation of a third party or neutral
country.
It was decided in the first part of July, around the 10th
actually, to make an approach to the Allies through Russia.
(It has been learned from another source that Foreign
Minister Togo was principally responsible for this
decision.) A message was sent to the Japanese Ambassador in
Moscow asking Russia to accept a special envoy from Japan.
The Russians replied by asking for a full explanation of the
purposes of sending such an envoy and of the powers which it
was proposed to give to the special envoy. The Japanese
replied that they desired to send a special envoy for two
purposes:
- 1)
- To improve Russo-Japanese relations, and
- 2)
- To discuss the use of Russia’s good offices in
bringing about an end to the war.
The fundamental purpose was, of course, to seek Russia’s good
offices in terminating the hostilities. It was decided that
Prince Konoye would be the special envoy. (As an explanation
of the selection of Prince Konoye, Mr. Sakomizu stated that
when Prince Konoye had resigned as Prime Minister in October
of 1941, he had promised the Emperor that if he were needed
at any time thereafter, he would do whatever he could. Mr.
Sakomizu explained that selection of Konoye was rather
difficult to explain as it involved a personal promise made
by Konoye to the Emperor.)
Before any reply to the Japanese message was made, Mr. Stalin
and Mr. Molotov had to leave Moscow for the Potsdam
Conference. It was stated that the Soviet reply would be
forthcoming upon their return. Although it seemed apparent
to the Japanese that obtaining of
[Page 704]
Soviet Russia’s good offices was
hopeless, the Japanese Government nevertheless continued to
press Ambassador Sato for an answer.
On July 26, the Potsdam Declaration was issued and was
carefully scrutinized by the Japanese Cabinet which came to
the conclusion that this Declaration constituted an
acceptable basis for Japanese surrender. Although the Army
itself had lost confidence in its ability to continue the
war, the force of militarism and the momentum which was
carrying the war along were like a “bicycle rolling down
hill without brakes”: there was no way to stop it and the
Army itself did not know how to give up. It was therefore
necessary for the Cabinet to discover some development or
event on which to capitalize in order to force the
militarists to halt and to bring about surrender. At this
juncture the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The
Cabinet felt that it had found a suitable peg on which to
pin its surrender movement; but the Army asserted that the
explosion at Hiroshima was not really an atomic bomb but was
merely a super-bomb using already known explosives. To
settle this argument a scientific staff of experts was sent
to Hiroshima. On August 9 the scientists submitted proof
that it was actually an atomic bomb. Early on the same
morning Russia entered the war.
Prime Minister Suzuki decided that the war must be stopped
immediately and that the atomic bomb and Russia’s entry were
sufficient “excuse” devices. He went to the Emperor about
8:00 a.m. The Emperor agreed that the war should be brought
to an end and on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. After
leaving the palace, the Prime Minister gathered together at
9:30 a.m. the same six men who had attended the Imperial
Conference in the latter part of June. (This meeting in the
morning of August 9 was not an Imperial Conference). At this
time it was decided that:
- (a)
- The Potsdam Declaration could be accepted with the
understanding that it does
not include abolishing the Emperor, or
- (b)
- That it could be accepted with two conditions:
- 1)
- That Allied troops not occupy Japan;
- 2)
- That Japan be allowed to call back all its
soldiers from abroad under its own orders and that
surrender not be effected abroad.
The Prime Minister, the Navy Minister and the Foreign
Minister favored the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration
with the understanding that the Emperor not be abolished.
The War Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Army and the
Chief of Staff of the Navy favored acceptance of the Potsdam
Declaration only with the above two conditions. There was a
Cabinet meeting called the same afternoon, August 9, about
two o’clock. The consensus expressed was in agreement with
the views of the Prime Minister, the Navy Minister
[Page 705]
and the Foreign
Minister. However, some ministers were not “big enough” to
express clearly their own individual opinions and to accept
responsibility for those opinions; they merely stated that
they would agree with the Prime Minister. No clear decision
was reached at the Cabinet meeting and the Prime Minister
then went to the Emperor and an Imperial Conference was
called at eleven o’clock the night of August 9.
The same six key men and the President of the Privy Council,
Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro, and Mr. Sakomizu were present.
Baron Hiranuma joined with the Prime Minister and his group
making the vote four to three. The Emperor was then told
that, as he could see, it was impossible for an agreement to
be reached by the conference, that they could not make a
decision and that it was therefore necessary for them to
follow whatever the Emperor decided. The Emperor then
expressed his concurrence with Baron Hiranuma, the Prime
Minister and the Navy and Foreign Ministers. Always before
it had been the custom for a Conference to reach a decision
without directly involving the Emperor—one side or the other
yielding so that an agreement could be reached. But, in this instance neither side
would yield until the Emperor spoke.
(Mr. Sakomizu described the extreme tension and emotion at
this important meeting.) Everyone present was impressed with
the feeling that the “curtain” which had heretofore hung
between the Emperor and the people was drawn aside, and that
for the first time since the Meiji Restoration, the Emperor
actually stepped from behind this “curtain” and came
directly and personally before the people and on the side of
the people. The experience was so intensely emotional that
“tears flowed freely”. All present sensed the “great
historic importance” of the occasion. By using the figure of
a “curtain” between the Emperor and the people, Mr. Sakomizu
had reference to the fact that it had been customary for
someone or a group to stand between the Emperor and any
important action or decision and for that person or group to
accept responsibility for the decision or act.
The Emperor went on to give his reasons for his decision (Mr.
Sakomizu said that because of the emotion of the moment, he
could not remember every word as it had been uttered by the
Emperor, but that three points were especially clear.) The
Emperor said:
- 1)
- That from the very start of the war, the plans and
information of the military had been far removed
from the facts of the true situation;
- 2)
- that to continue the war would mean the
destruction of the Japanese people and the country
and would also be disastrous to world civilization;
and
- 3)
- that although it was sad and moving to recall the
sacrifices which had been made and the suffering
which had been endured, nevertheless
[Page 706]
the termination of the
war in this manner and at this time was in
accordance with the will of God and the destiny of
the world.
(Speaking parenthetically and as an example of the real
feeling of the Emperor, Mr. Sakomizu pointed out that in the
original draft of the Imperial Rescript at the beginning of
the war, there had been a period after the statement that
war with the United States and Great Britain had become
inevitable, but that the Emperor had himself inserted the
phrase “How far this is removed from my true wishes!”)
The Imperial Conference closed at 3:00 a.m. on August 10 and
a telegram to the Allied Nations was dispatched at 7:00 a.m.
the same morning. On August 13 at 5:00 a.m. the reply was
received from the Allied Nations in which it was stated that
the ultimate form of government in Japan would depend upon
the freely expressed will of the Japanese people. This reply
was hotly debated—certain Japanese insisting that it was
only the Emperor himself who could decide the ultimate form
of government in Japan, other Japanese insisting that the
Emperor’s will and the people’s will were the same thing,
and that the Emperor’s will encompassed the people’s will
and vice versa. The latter group urged immediate acceptance
of the Allied reply.
Mr. Sakomizu himself advised the Prime Minister to follow
this course. The Prime Minister already had the same view
and at once urged Japan’s immediate surrender. The War
Minister and the militarists were unalterably opposed. The
Navy was divided with the Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai, on
the side of the Prime Minister. Failure of these officials
to reach an agreement among themselves made it necessary to
hold another Imperial Conference. However, to petition for
an Imperial Conference required the signature of three
persons; the Prime Minister, the Chief of Staff of the Army
and the Chief of Staff of the Navy. The Navy Chief of Staff,
Admiral Toyoda, and the Army Chief of Staff refused to sign
and it was therefore required that some extra-ordinary means
of circumventing their refusal be found. (Ordinarily a
signed petition to call an Imperial Conference is submitted
to the Emperor before such action is taken.) Prime Minister
Suzuki then consulted the Emperor, and the Emperor on his
own initiative, summoned the six key officials and all other
members of the Cabinet to an Imperial Conference on August
14, at 10:30 a.m.
The War Minister, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy
expressed the view that the Allied reply should not be
accepted unless Japanese conditions were met. The Emperor
thereupon addressed the Conference and stated that he would
express at that point his opinion and that he would require
all to agree with his views. He said that his opinion was in
no way different from that which he expressed at the
Imperial Conference on August 9, that in the future, Japan
[Page 707]
would entirely
be separated from the means to wage war and would be without
any arms or armament, and that Japan would in this way enjoy
true eternal peace, completely separated from any form of
militarism and would thus contribute to world peace as a
country enjoying peace not maintained by arms. The Emperor
thereupon ordered the Cabinet immediately to draft an
Imperial Rescript terminating the war.
Since August 10, Mr. Sakomizu had been working on a draft for
such an Imperial Rescript, following the general outline of
the Emperor’s remarks at the Imperial Conference on August
9–10. It was therefore necessary merely to insert the
additional ideas which the Emperor had set forth at the
meeting on the 14th.
(Mr. Sakomizu at this point said he wanted to emphasize two
especially important phrases in the Imperial Rescript
terminating the war. They were: “Our wish to bring into
realization great peace for the benefit of all future
generations” and “We are always together with our good and
loyal subjects.” He went on to point out that there had been
some criticism in the foreign press for the reason that in
the first Imperial Rescript there had been no use of the
word “surrender”. He said that in drafting he had
consciously avoided using the word. He added it should not
be difficult to understand the intense emotional feeling
under which he and all Japanese were laboring at that time.
This depth of emotion made it impossible to use specifically
the word surrender which he believed would have detracted
from the solemnity and dignity of the document and therefore
would have lessened its powerful effect on all Japanese. He
was consciously attempting to put as much dignity and force
into the document as he could. He added that on September 2,
at the time of the signing of the surrender, the word
“surrender” was used in the Imperial Rescript and that the
Japanese people by then had come to understand the true
situation and were prepared for the use of the word
“surrender.” In the first rescript he felt that the two
words “extra-ordinary measure” actually meant surrender and
had so intended.)
The first Imperial Rescript was completed and approved at
11:00 p.m. August 14. The Emperor himself made the decision
to broadcast directly to the people.
At this time there was great fear that the Army would attempt
some sort of coup d’état. Every
effort was therefore made to deceive the rabid militarists.
General Anami, the War Minister, also did all in his power
to prevent an incident. However, he alone could not have
forestalled action by the militarists, and all who favored
peace worked strenuously during the week before surrender.
(Mr. Sakomizu described his efforts as being like those of a
skilled fisherman who plays the fish until it is exhausted.)
There were only minor disturbances.
[Page 708]
From midnight of August 15 until 8:00
in the morning, the Army placed soldiers in the front of all
entrances to the Palace and prevented anyone from going in
or coming out, in an effort to forestall the broadcast of
the Emperor. General Tanaka of the Eastern Defense Command
finally went to the gates and personally persuaded the
soldiers to depart. Other groups of militarists attacked the
Prime Minister’s residence with machine guns. Prime Minister
Suzuki’s and Baron Hiranuma’s home were burned by the
militarists.
On August 15 at 4:00 a.m. the War Minister committed suicide.
(Mr. Sakomizu gave a rather interesting explanation of this
suicide. He stated that the War Minister personally had no
confidence in continuing the war and wanted it to stop, but
because of loyalty to the Army the War Minister felt that he
had to be on the militarists’ side and could find no way to
put an end to the force of militarism which, as Mr. Sakomizu
had said earlier, was like a “bicycle rolling down hill
without brakes”. The War Minister therefore felt that in
order to “apologize” to the militarists, he had to commit
suicide. Mr. Sakomizu added that the War Minister was the
only one who truly followed the Samurai tradition of suicide.)
Prime Minister Suzuki who was in poor health and exhausted,
desired release from the Cabinet. He felt that it would not
be advisable for a Cabinet to sign the surrender and then
immediately resign. In view of his health which would not
allow him to continue in office for any length of time,
Prime Minister Suzuki seized upon the occasion of the
suicide of the War Minister as a good opportunity to present
his resignation. (It would have been necessary for him to
obtain a new War Minister and re-organize his Cabinet had he
continued as Prime Minister.) Accordingly on August 15 at
3:00 p.m. the Suzuki Cabinet submitted its resignation to
the Emperor.
Note: The following were important members in the government
during this period:
| Prime Minister |
Suzuki Kantaro |
| Foreign Minister |
Togo Shigenori |
| Navy Minister |
Yonai Mitsumasa |
| Army Minister |
Anami Korechika |
| Chief Secretary |
Sakomizu Hisatsune |
| President of Privy Council |
Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro |
| Chief of Staff of the Army |
General Umezu Yoshijiro |
| Chief of Staff of the Navy |
Admiral Toyoda Soemu |
