740.00119 Control(Japan)/8–3045
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary: Mr. Balfour came in this afternoon and handed me the attached Aide-Mémoire50 on the subject of control machinery for Japan.
I told Mr. Balfour that the whole fabric of the arrangements for the control of Japan had been built upon the Potsdam Declaration and the communication by you of August 11th to the Japanese Government through the Swiss Government. Particular reference in your communication of August 11th is as follows:
“From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers who shall take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.”
The next step taken was the communication of August 11th from the President to the Prime Minister stating that the President proposed to nominate General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied forces “to accept, coordinate, and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese armed forces”. This designation was agreed to by the Prime Minister. It was not the intention of this Government to have a Control Council in Japan, as the control of Japan would be effectuated by the Supreme Allied Commander based on the above agreements.
I told Mr. Balfour that it was the policy and sincere desire of the President and the Secretary of State that our allies be consulted with respect to the policies to be carried out in dealing with Japan, [Page 698] and this was the reason why the Secretary of State immediately circulated to the other three major Allies the United States proposal to set up a Far Eastern Advisory Commission. It was the idea of this Government that all matters having to do with policies and methods of carrying out these policies could be discussed in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission; that it would be perhaps a few months in any event before it would be possible for any other than military commanders and their forces to go into Japan, as the business of securing the surrender was a very serious one and was a strictly military operation, but there was no reason, if this Far Eastern Advisory Commission were immediately set up, why it could not begin to discuss many matters relating to the application of the surrender of Japan.
I told Mr. Balfour that this explanation would seem to me to dispose of the British suggestion for discussion of the Control Commission, in other words that this would be a proper subject to discuss in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission but that we hoped that the Far Eastern Advisory Commission would be the first body which would be set up in order to head up all these discussions in one place.
As far as concerned the communication of the British proposals for a Control Council to other governments, that was a matter which they would have to decide themselves, although I expressed the hope that in view of the proposed establishment of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission the British Government might find it appropriate to withhold discussion of this matter until the Far Eastern Advisory Commission was set up.
As far as the British proposal that India be added to the proposed Advisory Commission, I said this was a matter which would have to be decided by the higher authorities of our Government and that I would bring this whole matter to the attention of the Secretary of State for his consideration.
- Supra. ↩