740.00119 Control(Japan)/8–2345: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received 12:25 p.m.]
3017. I am personally most anxious to see you at as early a time as is practicable. I want on the one hand to report to you on developments in Moscow since Potsdam, and also to discuss my personal plans. When President Roosevelt asked me to come to Moscow 2 years ago, I undertook to remain until the Russians came into the war against Japan.
At the moment I believe I should stay on until the control machinery for Japan has been agreed to. I have a feeling that we may have some trouble with the Soviets over the setup which I understand we intend to establish particularly in regard to Soviet forces used for occupation of Japan under General MacArthur as Supreme Commander.
I believe it was useful that I took issue with Molotov at the time he suggested the possibility of a joint Supreme Command consisting of General MacArthur and Marshal Vasilevski. I told him that I was sure we would always be ready to consult the Soviet authorities but could not in my opinion agree to give them a veto. This led to his withdrawing his proposal that night. On the other hand, I feel that the Soviets will come up again with further proposals that the Soviets have a zone of occupation with independent command or in some other way obtain for themselves a position where they can block our program if it does not meet with their approval. I sincerely hope that we will stand firm on what I understand is our plan and if we do, I am confident the Soviets will accept it. The Russian pattern set in Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania is a good precedent although I assume we would always consult them in advance on any questions of policy.
I expect also that we will have some difficulty in Korea as it is my impression the Russians want to dominate this country in spite of Stalin’s agreement that it should develop its independence through a four-power trusteeship. I believe the Russians are feeling their way [Page 690] out with us to see how far they can go with their unilateral objectives in the Far East. Soong’s negotiations were of interest in that Stalin gave in when he found that we were firm on certain issues.
I suggest, therefore, that I meet you in London when you go for the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting. The flight from Moscow is only 9 hours and I could return to Moscow any day that I was needed here. There are other matters, too, which will come up at the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting about which I believe it would be useful for me to report on the Soviet attitude. Incidentally, the British Ambassador35 here has been asked to be in London for this meeting.
I would appreciate being informed so that I can make my plans.
- Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr.↩