Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

740.0011 P.W. /5–1645

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

Washington, May 16, 1945.

With respect to General de Gaulle’s message of May 15²³ concerning his extreme desire to have French forces participate in the fight of American forces in the decisive campaign against Japan, a copy of which is enclosed, the following considerations are offered for possible use in your conversation with the French Foreign Minister and General Juin²⁴ now scheduled for tomorrow, May 17, for Mr. Bidault, and May 18 for General Juin.

The question of the participation of both French military and naval forces in the Far East was raised by the Chief of the French Naval Mission in the United States²⁵ on March 20. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred the matter to the Department for an expression of views the Secretary of State replied on April 5 that acceptance of the proposals in principle was considered to be desirable from the point of view of relations with the French Provisional Government, subject of course to military requirements in the theatre of operations. It is understood that from the military point of view the use of French forces in that theatre has relatively little if any value. Until further indications of the nature of the assistance France can provide are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff you may wish to avoid making any reply to the proposal of the French Government except in very general terms along the lines of the following procedure which is in harmony with the known views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(a) While avoiding so far as practicable unnecessary or long-term commitments with regard to the amount or character of any assistance which the United States may give to French resistance forces in Indochina, this Government should continue to afford such assistance as does not interfere with the requirements of other planned operations. Owing to the need for concentrating all our resources in the Pacific on operations already planned, large-scale military operations aimed directly at the liberation of Indochina cannot, however, be contemplated at this time. American troops would not be used in Indochina except in American military operations against the Japanese.

(b) French offers of military and naval assistance in the Pacific should be considered on their military merits as bearing on the objective of defeating Japan as in the case of British and Dutch proposals. There would be no objection to furnishing of assistance to any French military or naval forces so approved, regardless of the theatre of operations from which the assistance may be sent, provided such assistance does not involve a diversion of resources which the Combined or Joint Chiefs of Staff consider are needed elsewhere.

Joseph C. Grew

[Annex]

Text in translation of message from General de Gaulle to the President conveyed in note from French Embassy dated May 15, 1945²⁶

M. Bidault, who is going to have the honor of seeing you, is to speak to you, among other questions, concerning our extreme desire to have French forces participate at the side of American forces in the decisive campaign against Japan.

I realize that this participation raises difficult technical problems. But at a moment of capital importance to the two countries, I must tell you that their effective cooperation in the struggle in the Pacific after the victory in Europe could have very important political, moral and military consequences.

It is for this reason that I feel obliged to draw your personal attention to this matter. General Juin will remain in Washington until the departure of M. Bidault. He is in a position to discuss the technical side of the question.

I send you my best wishes.

General de Gaulle

23. Annex to this memorandum.
24. Gen. Alphonse Pierre Juin, French Chief of General Staff.
25. Adm. Raymond Fenard.
26. Note from French Embassy not found in Department files.