Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

711.90/12–1345: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

Bangkok, December 13, 1945—3 p.m.
[Received December 22—4:11 p.m.]

63. Reference Dept’s 23 November 28³⁷ received 6 December. Careful study will be made as rapidly as possible but following preliminary views on Southeast Asia (not India) submitted on basis: (1) Close observation of Thais, FIC and NEI³⁸ developments during 6 weeks at SACSEA HQ in Kandy, (2) US [Many] conversations with S[trategic] S[ervices] Unit personnel and American newspaper correspondents only [who] have been stationed in or visited those territories, (3) Treatment of developments in those areas by Indian, Ceylonese and Thai press, (4) Personal contacts in Bangkok during past month.

1. So-called “reservoir of goodwill” of United States at end of war was very great, though expectations were much higher than United States could hope to fulfill, United States was looked upon as champion of democracy and of liberation of subject peoples and as sponsor of Atlantic Charter.³⁹ Nationalist parties in FIC and NEI and Thai Govt expected, at least hoped, that United States would follow positive policy of assisting them to resist foreign pressure, restore war-ravaged economies and in the case of subject people obtain treatment analogous to that accorded Philippines.⁴⁰ When we took no such action, disillusionment was correspondingly great and view now finds increasing credence that United States hardly interests itself in Southeast Asia except for limited commercial purposes and intends to leave region wholly to disposition of British, French and Dutch. This shift in view has not produced hostility toward United States which is still looked upon as the most disinterested of great powers but has engendered attitude of skepticism toward our stated aim and ideals and growing conviction the peoples of this region failing support from America must either throw themselves upon mercy of British or seek liberation by force. American abstention therefore does not seem likely to contribute to long term stability in Southeast Asia as it makes probable temporary restoration of prewar arrangements which in fact are often unsuited to present-day conditions and cannot for that reason long be maintained except by force.

2. Factors which are contributing in Thailand to this shift of view towards United States policy are the following: (a) US reluctance to act independently on resumption of diplomatic relations. Our delay is widely interpreted as indication we will not recognize until Thailand has signed agreement satisfactory to Britain. (b) US silence on British peace terms many of which Thais feel infringe this [their] sovereignty. General public is, of course, unaware that we have taken a strong position in conversations with British and if our pressure should result in moderating British terms, British not ourselves would get credit, (c) US failure promptly to [send to] Thailand medicines and rehabilitation supplies and to establish stable rate of exchange between baht and dollar. Thai public has little conception of tremendous demands on US shipping and resources, (d) Negative US policy regarding aspiration toward freedom of peoples of FIC and NEI and [failure to] intervene to prevent forcible reimposition of what peoples of this area consider oppressive alien rule. Unfavorable impression is enhanced by use of US vessels to transport British, French, and Dutch troops and use of American equipment by these troops as well as by Mountbatten’s retention of title “Supreme Allied Commander”, US being generally assumed to be one of the Allies in question.

3. This mission fully realizes that the above is a distorted and one-sided picture and that it contains many basic misconceptions in regard to US policy. We are taking every opportunity to correct these misconceptions in Thailand. We believe it important, however, that the Dept realize that these views are finding increasing acceptance in Southeast Asia. We shall report on this subject in more detail by airmail dispatch along lines of Dept’s instructions.⁴¹

Yost

37. Not printed; it repeated telegram 918, November 28, 8 p.m., to New Delhi, which stated: “An increasing number of reports is reaching the Dept to effect that peoples in India and Southeast Asia are rapidly gaining the impression that there is some kind of an understanding to which U.S. is a party whereby this Govt, tacitly or otherwise, is supporting the policies of Brit and other European powers towards their dependencies in that part of the world. It is further reported that as a result of this impression American prestige in that area is seriously deteriorating.” The telegram, requesting evaluation of the situation, was sent also to Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Rangoon, Colombo, Singapore, and Batavia (711.90/11–2845).
38. French Indochina and Netherlands East Indies.
39. Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.
40. The granting of independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946, was authorized under the Tydings-McDume Act, approved March 24, 1934, 48 Stat. 456. The President of the United States was authorized to advance the date of independence prior to July 4, 1946, under Public Law 380, approved June 29, 1944, 58 Stat. 625; see Department memorandum of March 9, 1944, sent to the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs (Bell), Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. v, p. 1301.
41. In despatch 11, January 4, 1946, the Political Adviser in Siam stated that evidences of the timely and beneficial intervention by the United States in the British-Siamese negotiations “had the most salutary effect in arresting a trend in opinion which bade fair seriously to weaken United States prestige in Siam and in restoring that prestige to a very high level”. (711.92/1–446)