741.92/11–1245
The Department of State to the British Embassy
Aide-Mémoire
The Department of State welcomes the information in the British Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of November 2, 1945 that the British Government proposes to insert before the word “principles” in Clauses D 2 and D 3 of the proposed Heads of Agreement with Siam the words “reciprocal application of the” so as to remove any doubt as to the meaning and intent of those Clauses.
It notes with appreciation also the willingness of the British Government as indicated in the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of November 12, 1945 to delete the reference to this Government in the proposed revision of Clause 15 (now 14) of the Military Annex.
[Page 1372]On October 9 the Department offered further comments on Clause 14 (now Clause 13) of the Military Annex. The assurances of the British Government with regard to the application and intent of that Clause were subsequently received the same day.19 In view of those assurances and the proposed change set forth in the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of November 2, the Department withdraws its request for further amendment to or for the treatment of this Clause in a different manner from Clause 11.
This Government welcomes the confirmation of its understanding that the free contribution of Siamese rice demanded by the British Government is intended not to exceed the surplus rice stocks accumulated in Siam during the war, and that the British Government has no wish to levy on future Siamese production. The Department notes that the British Government, while agreeable to the suggestion that the amount of such accumulated surplus be determined by the Rice Commission, now believes the amount of such surplus rice accumulated during the war to have been approximately two and one-half million tons of paddy or the equivalent of 1,700,000 tons of rice; considers that if the levy were to be fixed at the exact accumulated surplus the amount might therefore be greater than the present demand; and accordingly would prefer to confine its demand to the original estimate of 1,500,000 tons.
In view of the estimate made by British personnel in Siam this Government can appreciate the view expressed by the British Government. The Department has, however, within the past few days received from Mr. Yost in Bangkok an estimate, based on an American survey, which indicates that the total amount of surplus rice available for export from Siam from November 1945 to November 1946 will be less than 800,000 tons. This figure, furthermore, includes not only the surplus stocks accumulated prior to the Japanese surrender, but also the proceeds of the coming crop.
In view of the great discrepancy between the British and American estimates, each estimate may properly be considered open to some doubt and it would seem that the actual amount of surplus Siamese rice accumulated during the war should be determined as accurately as possible by an impartial body such as the proposed Rice Commission. If the principle is accepted by the Siamese that they should make a free contribution of the surplus rice stocks accumulated during the war, it would not be reasonable for them to object if the facts disclosed an amount somewhat in excess of the original British estimate. On the Other hand, if the recent American estimate is proved to be more nearly in accordance with the facts, the British Government will not [Page 1373] wish to insist on a free contribution in excess of the actual accumulated surplus stocks as that would involve a levy on future production. Accordingly, this Government again earnestly requests the British Government to adopt the foregoing procedure rather than to base its demand on its original estimate of 1,500,000 tons. The British Government may rest assured that Mr. Brookhart20 and Mr. Willich,21 the proposed American members of the Rice Commission, would approach any finding as to the amount of such surplus rice stocks with complete impartiality and objectivity.
The Department notes the concern of the British Government that this procedure might be prejudicial to the Siamese should such finding establish that the accumulated surplus in fact exceeded 1,500,000 tons. This Government concurs in the view that this would not be desirable and suggests that it could be obviated by limiting the maximum amount of free rice demanded to 1,500,000 tons. Such a ceiling would in no way endanger the British demand if the British estimate is later established as correct, and it would avoid the uncertainty of a later increase in the demand if the accumulated surplus is found to have been larger than that figure. This Government would warmly welcome action by the British Government in adopting such a ceiling.
There remains only one point regarding the terms of the proposed Heads of Agreement and Military Annex on which this Government has commented and as to which as yet no reply has been received. As explained orally to an officer of the British Embassy on October 11, this Government appreciated the change in Clause C 2 of the Heads of Agreement set forth in the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire dated October 6, but was still concerned that Clause C 1 standing alone and unrelated to its corollary in Clause C 2, might be subject to possible misconstruction or misinterpretation at some future date. The Department urged therefore that Clauses C 1 and C 2 be conjoined in a single clause. Such change would be quite in accordance with the views and objectives set forth in the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of October 9 and the earlier statements of Mr. Eden referred to in the Department’s Aide-Mémoire of September 26. At the same time such change would obviate the possible danger which this Government considers inherent in the present arrangement of the two Clauses standing separately and unrelated. This Government again earnestly requests, therefore, that these two Clauses be conjoined in a single clause.