Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

761.00/11–2745: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 27, 1945—4 p.m.
[Received 5:20 p.m.]

3973. I have been attempting to obtain some understanding of the real effect of the atomic bomb on Soviet attitude and have come to the following tentative general interpretations.

It must be borne in mind that high Soviet Governmental and party leaders have lived throughout their lives in almost constant state of fear or tension beginning with the days when they were conspirators in a revolutionary movement. They attained their objectives through determination and aggressive tactics as well as intrigue and bluff. As they have never felt fully secure either for themselves personally or for the revolution they have been constantly on the alert and suspicious of all opposition. This atmosphere continued throughout the period when they seized control of the Government and faced internal and external forces attempting to expel them. They feared capitalistic encirclement and dissension within the ranks of the party, leading to two ruthless purges: and later when Hitler came to power¹⁰ they faced the menace of German aggression. The invasion came¹¹ and all but destroyed them. When the tide of the war turned, there must have been a feeling of tremendous relief. With victory came confidence in the power of the Red Army and in their control at home, giving them for the first time a sense of security for themselves personally and for the revolution that they have never had before.

It will be recalled that in September 1941, Stalin told me¹² that he was under no illusions, the Russian people were fighting as they always had “for their homeland, not for us”, meaning the Communist Party. He would never make such a statement today. The war has assisted in the consolidation of the revolution in Russia. They determined the Red Army should be kept strong and industry developed to support it so that no power on earth could threaten the Soviet Union again. Political steps were taken to obtain defense in depth, disregarding the interests and desires of other peoples. The strength of the Red Army would ensure that these policies could be carried out regardless of opposition.

Suddenly the atomic bomb appeared and they recognized that it was an offset to the power of the Red Army. This must have revived their old feeling of insecurity. They could no longer be absolutely sure that they could obtain their objectives without interference. As a result it would seem that they have returned to their tactics of obtaining their objectives through aggressiveness and intrigue. It is revealing that in early September in the Bulgarian elections campaign the Communist Party used posters to the effect that “we are not afraid of the atomic bomb”. This attitude partially explains Motolov’s aggressiveness in London. I have confirmation of this from a former member of the Communist Party. It is not without significance that Molotov, in his November 7th [6th] speech bragged about bigger and better weapons. The Russian people have been aroused to feel that they must face again an antagonistic world. American imperialism is included as a threat to the Soviet Union.

This message is in no sense intended to suggest any course of action but only as a partial explanation of the strange psychological effect of the atomic bomb on the behavior of the Soviet leaders.¹³

Harriman

10. Adolf Hitler became German Chancellor on January 30, 1933, and Chief of State on August 2, 1934.
11. June 22, 1941.
12. Ambassador Harriman then was President Roosevelt’s special representative to facilitate material aid to the British Empire and was on a mission to the Soviet Union. For documentation on this mission, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, pp. 825–851, passim.
13. The Consul General at Vladivostok. O. Edmund Clubb, advised the Department in telegram 104, November 14, 1945, that the local diplomatic representative of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Dmitry Mikhailovich Ryzhkov, had inquired whether he could be supplied with any pictures treating the subject of the atomic bomb. The Consul General was of the opinion that this request was so direct that it “would seem to indicate that Soviet representatives and agents everywhere may have been instructed somewhat urgently to obtain from every source possible all available information which would be sifted for clue to desired secret by Soviet scientists.” (811.2423/11–1445)