711.61/11–2245
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)14
[Subject:] Suggested Frank Discussion with Stalin over American-Soviet Political and Economic Problems.
In view of the continued unilateral actions being taken by the Soviet Government in various areas of the world (Iran, China, Korea, Balkans, etc.) which add to the public misgivings in the United States and elsewhere as to the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Government, and in view of the fact that these actions tend to drive our respective countries in opposite directions, it is believed that it would be most helpful to take the opportunity of Ambassador Harriman’s impending departure to have him discuss these disquieting developments with Stalin. Mr. Harriman could explain that before returning to the United States15 he felt that he would like to review in a most frank manner the favorable developments and differences which have taken place during his tour in the Soviet Union in an effort to clarify our respective positions. Such a step is further indicated on the basis of Mr. Harriman’s recent conversation with Litvinov who expressed anxiety over the deterioration in our relations (Moscow’s 3930, November 22).
Ambassador Harriman should be instructed to reiterate our wholehearted desire to cooperate with the Soviet Government. He should [Page 925] frankly explain, however, that since the Yalta conference the Soviet Government has taken several unilateral steps which have been contrary to the letter and spirit of most of the agreements reached for the handling of the many political and economic problems arising in the post-war period. The Ambassador should point out that while the Soviet Government professes to desire to cooperate with the United States Government in all matters, it has not, in all frankness, given any important concrete evidence to confirm this desire. On the contrary, it has taken steps which make it difficult, if not impossible, for the United States Government to convince the American people that it is in fact the desire of the Soviet Government to reach mutually satisfactory agreements in the political and economic fields.
In this connection, the Ambassador should be instructed to point out the many specific examples of Soviet unilateral action, such as the establishment of the Groza Government, the refusal to assist in assuring the holding of democratic elections in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the unilateral trade arrangements made with Eastern European countries, the situation developing in Manchuria and Korea, the failure to reach a uniform policy regarding Germany, etc. It might be well for the Ambassador to tell Stalin quite frankly that we are fully aware of the continued activities of the Comintern, despite the fact that technically it has been dissolved, and explain to him that these continued activities make it almost impossible for us to cooperate wholeheartedly with the Soviet Government.
The Ambassador should also be instructed to tell Stalin that he would appreciate receiving from him his most frank opinion as to what actions he feels the United States Government has taken which the Soviet Government feels have made it difficult to reach mutually satisfactory agreements and understandings.
In such a discussion the Ambassador should be instructed to point out in a most frank manner that it is difficult to see how, if the Soviet Government persists in taking unilateral action in many areas in the world, it will be possible to interpret these actions other than as concrete indications of a policy of non-cooperation which can only lead to further distrust on all sides and might bring about most unfortunate and undesired results. In explaining this, the Ambassador should point out that if this is the policy the Soviet Government is intent on following, despite our desires to the contrary, we of course must take cognizance of it and act accordingly.
The Soviet Government is fully aware of our point of view in regard to the many differences which have arisen between our two governments since we have in almost every case expressed our point of view in regard to developments as they arose. Ambassador Harriman has presented the American point of view to the Soviet Government [Page 926] in the last two years and therefore it is felt that it would be most appropriate and opportune for him just prior to his departure to have such a talk with Stalin and make an earnest effort to get to the heart of the problem in the hope that he can convince the Soviet Government of our sincerity and explain to Stalin that if the Soviet Government continues, on its present path, there is little possibility of our reaching a sound, lasting and fundamental basis in our relations. It is felt we would lose nothing by making this effort. On the contrary, the fact that Mr. Harriman has enjoyed a somewhat unique position in having dealt directly with Stalin more than most other foreigners, offers an excellent opportunity for him to speak most frankly with Stalin on these subjects.
- Addressed to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, John D. Hickerson, and to the Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. Mr. Hickerson wrote a notation as follows: “I agree that it would be advisable for Harriman to have a talk along these general lines with Stalin unless our position on these matters reaches the Russians on a higher level. Harriman is in a good position to be used for this purpose. J. D. H.”↩
- Ambassador Harriman left Moscow by train for Bucharest at 11 p.m., December 28, en route home; his resignation was accepted by President Truman on February 14, 1946, and his nomination as Ambassador to the United Kingdom was confirmed by the Senate on March 27, 1946.↩