711.61/11–2245: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 22—2:36 p.m.]
3930. At the theatre last night I had a most disquieting few sentence conversation with Litvinov.7 He told me that he was disturbed by the international situation, that neither side knew how to behave towards the other and that this was the underlying reason for the London Conference breakdown and subsequent difficulties. I suggested that time might cool the strong feelings that had been aroused. He replied that in the meantime however issues were developing. I again suggested that if we came to an understanding about Japan, it might clear the atmosphere. He replied that we would then be confronted with other issues.
I asked him what we, for our part, could do about it. He replied “Nothing”. I then asked “What can you do about it”. He interpreted this to mean himself personally and replied, “Nothing. I believe I know what should be done but I am powerless”. He made it clear that he was speaking about the situation within the counsels of the Soviet Govt. I then said “You are extremely pessimistic” to which he replied “Frankly, between us, yes”.
In evaluating this conversation it must be realized that Litvinov has been consistently during the past 2 years extremely disgruntled with his personal position, has been obviously antagonistic to Molotov, and the Soviet Govt has evidently been disregarding his advice.
In this connection all the reports I have recently received of conversations of Americans, including my own, with Soviet writers and other intellectuals, follow the same pattern “Why has America become so aggressive; why is she interfering with Soviet attempts to bring ‘democracy’ into the Balkans? She made no objection to the previous Fascist regimes. Why is she refusing to admit the Soviet Union into Japan? Why is she threatening the Soviet Union with the atomic bomb, etc?”. From the Soviet press and the party line which has been promulgated through the agitators, the Russian people are much disturbed by what they have been led to believe is the United States policy of aggression against the Soviet Union.
Adding up the above, together with Stalin’s comment that the Soviet Union may have to pursue an isolationist policy, it seems clear that since Molotov could not get what he wanted at London Conference [Page 922] the Soviet Govt under leadership of his group has been pursuing to the fullest extent possible a policy of unilateral action to achieve their concept of security in depth. Vyshinski and other Soviets have attempted to stiffen the lines in Bulgaria and Rumania. Tito has broken with Subasic.8 The Chinese National Govt has been double-crossed and Manchuria has been turned over to the Chinese Communists and revolt has been fostered under Red Army protection in Iranian Azerbaijan, renewed pressure has been brought on Norway and Turkey for bases.
On the other hand Molotov has still indicated that he wants to come to an agreement over Japan if he feels he has got all the traffic will bear. Stalin has indicated that the Foreign Ministers should meet again. Soviet reports on UNO appear to be cooperating in establishment of this organization.
It would appear that Molotov’s policy following the London breakdown has been to seize the immediate situation to strengthen the Soviet position as much as possible through unilateral action and then probably to agree to another meeting of the Foreign Ministers. We would at that time be faced with a number of faits accomplis and also entrenched Soviet positions.
I hope the above will be accepted only as our tentative interpretation of recent developments as they look from Moscow.9
- Maxim Maximovich Litvinov had been an Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union since 1943. Just before this he had been the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States from December 1941 until September 1943.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1208 ff. Dr. Ivan Subasich, former Yugoslav Prime Minister, had been a member of the provisional government representing the former Royal Government.↩
- In telegram 4040, December 3, 1945, 11 p.m., from Moscow, Ambassador Harriman reported that Litvinov showed himself as feeling “almost jubilant” since the Foreign Ministers were going to meet again at Moscow (711.61/12–345).↩