740.00119 Control (Rumania)/2–2845: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)
481. ReEmbtel 585 February 28.86 Molotov’s reply87 to your letter about Rumania88 indicates that the Soviet Government takes the view that the only “consultation” required of the Soviet Government is for the Soviet representatives on the ACC in Rumania to “continue to take measures to keep the Allies informed of the situation in accordance with the Commission’s obligations as set forth in the Armistice Agreement”. The Department is not willing to accept this statement as a satisfactory reply to our proposal for tripartite consultation on a matter which is of great concern to all three Allied Governments, particularly in the light of the Declaration on Liberated Europe recently signed at Yalta.
In line with these principles the Department instructed Berry on February 2889 to let Vyshinsky know that we hoped the Soviet authorities in Rumania would take no decisive action until apprised of the results of consultation on the matter among the three Allied Governments.
If you have not yet received a reply to your communication to the Soviet Government based on the Department’s 440 February 27, you are authorized to point out to Molotov personally the importance which this Government attaches to an immediate exchange of views among the three Allied Governments on the Rumanian situation in view of the rapid movement of events in Rumania. Since affairs have obviously not developed in an orderly way (reDeptel 417 February 24, final paragraph), in the judgment of this Government the situation requires that the three Governments concert with a view to reaching agreement on the fundamental questions involved, on which [Page 496] the Department’s position was set forth in Department’s 440 February 27. With respect to point (5) of the penultimate paragraph of that telegram, you may say that we proposed consultation among the chief representatives on the ACC not with a view to obtaining any change in the present division of responsibilities in the supervision of the execution of the armistice by the ACC under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, but because this was the only means by which a ready exchange of views on the spot by representatives of the three Allied Governments could be obtained. The question of Rumania’s form of government is not a matter pertaining to any clause of the Armistice Agreement and therefore is not within the jurisdiction of the ACC, but is a matter calling for direct consultation and agreement by the three Governments themselves.
In view of Molotov’s statement in his reply to your letter (reurtel 585 February 28) that the ACC in Rumania “would continue to keep the Allied representatives informed”, you may tell him that the Soviet Vice-Chairman of the ACC has not even kept General Schuyler informed of action taken by the ACC or by representatives of the Soviet Government in giving orders to the Rumanian authorities. In your discretion you may tell Molotov that the Department finds it difficult to reconcile Vyshinsky’s intervention in Bucharest, described in Berry’s telegrams 27,91 2892 and 3493 of February 28 and March 1, with the Allied policy of consultation agreed upon at Yalta or with Vyshinsky’s own statement to Berry (Bucharest’s 33 March 194) that there is very little difference between the Soviet and the American points of view.
With respect to the measures taken by the Soviet military authorities in Rumania (Berry’s 32 March 195), you may state that this Government is of course aware that the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of order in Rumania rests with the Soviet military authorities and that we presume that such measures as are being taken are directed to that end. We feel, however, that the series of steps by which the Soviet authorities, since last autumn, have weakened the forces at the disposal of the Rumanian Government while certain non-official factions were allowed to possess arms has contributed to the present crisis, and that a continuation of this policy will make it difficult for a new coalition government to avoid disorders similar to those of February 24 which inevitably interfere with Rumania’s concentration on the task of contributing to the Allied war effort and fulfilling the armistice conditions.[Page 497]
For your own information, we naturally find it impossible to accept Molotov’s argument that the Soviet Government’s unilateral intervention in the Rumanian political crisis is justified by the Rumanian government’s “inability to maintain order”, since the Soviet Government itself is in large measure responsible for the difficult situation in which the Radescu Government found itself.
Sent to Moscow, repeated to Bucharest and London.96
- Not printed, but see footnote 62, p. 484.↩
- Molotov’s letter to Harriman, February 27, p. 484.↩
- Harriman’s letter to Molotov, February 26, not printed, but see footnote 52, p. 478.↩
- Telegram 93, February 28, to Bucharest, p. 485.↩
- Same as telegram 144, February 28, from Bucharest; see last sentence of footnote 65, p. 485.↩
- Same as telegram 146, February 28, from Bucharest, p. 487.↩
- Same as telegram 150 from Bucharest; see footnote 81, p. 493.↩
- Same as telegram 151, March 1, from Bucharest, p. 489.↩
- Same as telegram 152, March 1, from Bucharest; see footnote 82, p. 493.↩
- As telegrams 103 and 1642, respectively.↩