860C.01/3–1845: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)
640. We have concerted with the British Embassy here the following instructions which supersede those contained in Department’s 537, March 8, 7 p.m. and last paragraph of Department’s 617, March 16, 9 p.m. We understand that after clearance in London identical instructions will be sent to Clark Kerr. When he has received them please communicate them to Molotov in the manner and at the time you deem best.33
In the event that it still proves to be impossible to agree upon the Poles to be selected you are authorized to put forward either or both of the first two alternatives suggested in your 667, March 7, 8 p.m.
1. United States Government is concerned at the difficulties which the Moscow Commission has encountered in its first efforts to carry out the terms of the Crimean decision on Poland. It is felt that a clear statement of the understanding of this Government not only as to the intent and purpose of the decision but also the role of the Commission itself would be of value in overcoming these difficulties which appear to be in large measure a question of interpretation.
The decision on Poland reached by the three heads of Government in the Crimea was based on the common declared policy of the three countries to facilitate in every way possible the emergence after this war of a strong, independent and democratic Poland with the free and unfettered right of the Polish people to choose for themselves the Government and institutions under which they are to live. [Page 173] This common objective was seriously prejudiced by the fact that there was a divergence in the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other as to what constituted the governmental authority of Poland. In addition the dangers to Allied unity inherent in such a situation were fully recognized by the three heads of Government at the Crimea. The problem confronting the three Governments at the Crimean Conference was thus related to the question of the provisional governmental authority of Poland during the interim period pending the establishment of conditions which would permit the holding of free elections inside Poland. The Crimean decision in the first place was designed to afford a practical solution of the problem of the provisional authority of Poland. The discussions in the Crimea made it obvious that neither the United States Government nor the British Government considered the provisional governmental authority now functioning in Poland as sufficiently representative to consider according it recognition as the Provisional Government of Poland. The Soviet Government for its part made it equally clear that it would not consider recognizing in that capacity the Polish Government in London. In the circumstances the only solution was the one reached, namely, that the three Governments would agree to assist in the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of national unity “which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland”. This new Government of national unity was to be made broadly representative of democratic elements of the Polish state by a reorganization of the existing provisional authority functioning in Poland with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad. An essential feature of the Crimean decision was that this new provisional government should be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three larger powers. In order to facilitate the formation of this interim government the Commission in Moscow was created. It would appear obvious that the Commission could not discharge responsibility placed upon it nor could the basic objectives as set forth above of the Crimean decision be achieved if any one of the three groups of Polish democratic elements from which the reorganized government is to emerge were permitted to dictate to the Commission which individuals from the other two groups were to be invited to Moscow for consultation. It would, therefore, appear logical that in the discharge of its responsibilities the Commission in Moscow should as a first step reach an agreement as to what Polish democratic leaders should come to Moscow to consult together with representatives of the Polish Provisional Government with a view to the formation [Page 174] of a new government of national unity. Agreement on this step would of course not involve any commitment on the actual composition of the new government.
In discussions which have already taken place in the Moscow Commission on Poland it has been suggested by the Soviet Government that terms of the Crimea Communiqué established for present Warsaw Administration a right to prior consultation. As British and United States representatives on Commission have already explained the text of the Crimea Communiqué cannot in the view of the United States Government bear this interpretation. The relevant passage of the Communiqué came from an English text originally proposed by American delegation. In the English text the words “In the first instance” come before the words “in Moscow” and could therefore only relate to the fact that consultations of the Commission were to begin in Moscow but could later be transferred elsewhere. The consultations were however clearly stated to be with three specified categories of Poles, one of which was “Members of present Provisional Government”. There is nothing in English text to suggest that they should take place with present Provisional Government before “other Polish Democratic leaders from within Poland and abroad”. The United States Government cannot therefore agree to Commission’s embarking upon prior consultations with members of present Provisional Government.
2. In the view of the United States Government all Poles nominated by any of the three Governments should be accepted for consultation unless conclusive evidence is produced to show that they do not represent the democratic elements in the country. It should be for the Commission alone and not for the Provisional Governmental authority now functioning in Warsaw to decide this matter. The United States Government would consider it contrary to the spirit of the Yalta meeting for any one of the Commissioners to exercise a veto and are confident that a unanimous decision of the three Commissioners will be possible. Every effort should be made to produce the Polish leaders whom they wish to consult at the earliest possible moment and the Commission should ensure to them the right to suggest to the Commission the names of other Poles who they think should be invited to any such proceedings. All Poles appearing before the Commission would by that very fact naturally enjoy the facilities necessary for communication and consultation among themselves in Moscow.
The United States Government wishes to repeat in this connection that it regards participation of Mr. Mikolajczyk in consultations as vital to the success of the work of the Commission. Mr. Mikolajczyk is generally regarded in the United States as the outstanding Polish [Page 175] Democratic leader whose whole record bears out his desire to facilitate a lasting settlement of Polish problems on terms of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union. The United States Government therefore regards as indispensable that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Mikolajczyk with other Polish Democratic leaders from Poland and abroad to join in Moscow consultations from the outset.
3. It is the understanding of the United States Government that Polish leaders invited for consultation should discuss among themselves with a view to reaching agreement on the composition of a Government fully representative of the various democratic sections of Polish opinion. The Commission should follow these discussions in the impartial capacity of an arbitrator.
4. In as much as it was agreed in the Crimea communiqué that the new situation of Poland called for the establishment of a new and more broadly based Polish Provisional Government pledged to holding of free elections as soon as possible it follows in the view of the United States Government that any arrangements for measures affecting the future of the Polish state should await so far as possible the establishment of that Provisional Government and be subject to final confirmation after the elections. As provided in the communiqué it is the opinion of the United States Government that there should be the maximum amount of political tranquility inside Poland during these political negotiations. The United States Government therefore assumes that no action will be taken by provisional authorities in Poland against any individuals or groups there or otherwise which might disturb the atmosphere in which the present negotiations are taking place and so prejudice their successful outcome. If as may be expected this is also the view of the Soviet Government the United States Government trusts this will be made clear to the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw. For its part the United States Government will similarly use its good offices with the Polish Government in London.
The United States Government wishes to revert to a suggestion first put forward by Mr. Molotov that British and American observers should visit Poland to report upon conditions there. It is convinced it is essential to the work of British and United States representatives on commission that they should be in a position to receive direct reports from their representatives in Poland. The United States Government must therefore urgently press Soviet Government to make the necessary arrangements to this end.
5. The United States Government believes that if in the first stage the Commission would adopt as a basis the considerations suggested above, the negotiations would begin in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Crimean decision. The execution of the agreement on [Page 176] Poland reached by the three heads of Government at the Crimea will be watched by the entire world as an indication of the reality of the unity there so successfully established between the three principal Allies.
- In his telegram 826, March 20, 1945, 7 p.m., Ambassador Harriman reported that the statement of U.S. views on the work of the Polish Commission had been forwarded to Molotov in the form of a memorandum under cover of a letter dated March 19 (neither printed). The British Ambassador had received similar instructions and had communicated the views of the British Government to Molotov. (860C.01/3–2045)↩