The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 32
912. 1. Thank you for your No. 718 of 16 [15] March. I am most relieved that you do not feel that there is any fundamental divergence between us and I agree that our differences are only about tactics.
You know, I am sure, that our great desire is to keep in step with you and we realise how hopeless the position would become for Poland if it were ever seen that we were not in full accord.
2. Just before getting your telegram, I received from Clark Kerr the draft of the communication he thinks we should make to Molotov. This was drawn up after long talks with Averell but, of course, does not commit him.
[Page 171]We are instructing Halifax to show Clark Kerr’s proposed communication immediately to Stettinius and if possible to you. I like Clark Kerr’s draft and must earnestly beg you to consider whether you cannot accept our proposals in this modified form. I hope that when Stettinius has been through it with Halifax you will see your way to instruct Averell to put in the same, or at least a very similar, communication.
3. Halifax will explain to you in detail our views upon the various points the inclusion of which I still consider essential. I welcome your agreement on point (a).
With regard to point (b), what happens if Molotov vetoes every one of our suggestions? And secondly, what is the use of anyone being invited who has no freedom of movement and communications? We had in fact not understood that Molotov had disputed this latter point when it was raised with him earlier but Mikolajczyk has made it a condition of going to Moscow and I gravely doubt whether we could persuade him to leave unless we had some definite assurance to convey to him.
Equally it is in order to reassure the anti-Lublin Poles whom we want to see invited that I should like to come to an agreement with Molotov in regard to the character of the discussions and the commission’s arbitral capacity (my point (c)).
If you feel strongly against mentioning the matter of the presidential function at this stage I will give way although it is a matter of great practical importance which the Poles must not be debarred from discussing.
In regards point (d) I fear I cannot agree that your truce plan would achieve the desired result. How can we guarantee that nothing will be said or done in Poland or by the Polish Government’s supporters here, which the Russians could not parade as a breach of the truce?
I fear that the truce plan will lead us into interminable delays and a dead end in which some at least of the blame may well be earned by the London Polish Government. I fear therefore that it is impossible for us to endorse your truce proposal, for we think it actively dangerous.
I beg you once more most earnestly to consider whether you cannot accept the revised version of (b) included in Clark Kerr’s draft. This would give us something on which to base the work of our observers (point (e), on which I am very glad to see that we are in agreement).
4. At present all entry into Poland is barred to our representatives. An impenetrable veil has been drawn across the scene. This extends [Page 172] even to the liaison officers, British and American, who were to help in bringing out our rescued prisoners of war. According to our information the American officers as well as the British who had already reached Lublin have been requested to clear out.
There is no doubt in my mind that the Soviets fear very much our seeing what is going on in Poland. It may be that apart from the Poles they are being very rough with the Germans. Whatever the reason, we are not to be allowed to see. This is not a position that could be defended by us.
- Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.↩