Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume V

860C.01/3–2345: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 23, 1945—5 a.m.
[Received 10 a.m.]

869. Polco. ReDeptel 640, March 18, 1 p.m. I have received an aide-mémoire from Molotov dated March 22 reading in paraphrase:

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following in connection with the work of the Moscow Commission, which has not been able to assure the carrying into effect of the decisions of the Crimea Conference concerning Poland.

1. An agreement was reached at the Crimea Conference between the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union to the effect that the present Polish Provisional Government (PPG) should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis which would include democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles from abroad. Thus, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference, a new reorganized Polish government which would be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be formed on the basis of the present provisional government existing in Poland. Any other interpretation of the decisions of the Crimea Conference would be a violation of these decisions. It is therefore fully natural that in the decisions of the Crimea Conference the Polish Emigré Government is not mentioned at all, whereas the PPG is considered in the decisions as the nucleus of the above-mentioned Government of National Unity. The Soviet Government sees in this a recognition on the part of the British and American Governments also of the fact that only the PPG, which is exercising state authority in the entire territory of Poland and has acquired great authority among the Polish people, by drawing in new democratic forces from Poland and from abroad, will become the government resting on a wider base which is also the goal of the three Allied Governments in their decisions on the Polish question at the Crimea Conference.

To consider after this that the PPG in Warsaw is only one of the three groups of democratic Poles, as is done in the memorandum of the American Ambassador of March 19,³⁴ would be entirely incorrect. This would be a violation of the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question with which the Soviet Government could not agree in any way.

2. The Polish Commission in Moscow created by the Crimea Conference should be guided in all its work by the decisions of this conference. The first task facing the Commission—i.e. the carrying on of consultations with the PPG and other democratic leaders from Poland and from abroad—should be carried out in accordance with this. Meanwhile, notwithstanding the efforts of the Soviet representative, the Commission has not done this.

In the published text of the Crimean decisions, as is well known, it is pointed out that the Commission is empowered “to consult in Moscow in the first instance” with members of the PPG and with other Polish democratic leaders within and without Poland. It follows from this that the Commission should consult in the first instance with the PPG. This was also accepted by the Moscow Commission in its first decisions of February 24 and 27 whereby it invited the PPG representatives to proceed to Moscow without delay for consultation. This invitation, however, was withdrawn after a few days on the insistence of the British representative on the Commission. The obligation to consult in the first instance with the PPG arises from the very sense of the decisions of the Crimea Conference inasmuch as the final goal of the consultation is the reorganization of the PPG into a government of national unity which, according to the decision of the Crimea Conference, should be formed on the basis of the provisional government now existing in Poland. According to the sense of these decisions, the consultation with other Polish democratic leaders should serve to supplement the consultation with the PPG with a view to the reorganization of this government on a wider basis through the inclusion in it of democratic leaders from Poland and Poles from abroad. Furthermore, according to the Crimea Conference, the Polish Provisional Government is to be consulted as such and also such other Polish leaders as can be considered to be democratic leaders. Since the members of the Moscow Commission should work as a commission, the fair decision of the question as to which particular Polish leaders should be invited for consultation would be that which is accepted by all three members of the Commission in accordance with the Crimea Conference resolution.

If the Moscow Commission acted otherwise, following the proposal of the American Ambassador in his memorandum of March 19, which at a number of points varies from the Crimea decisions, the Commission would not fulfill the obligations imposed upon it. Thus the adherents of the Polish Emigré Government, such as Arciszewski, Raczkiewicz, Anders, et al., who are clearly hostile to the Soviet Union and to the decisions of the Crimea Conference cannot be summoned for consultation even though they call themselves democrats. It is obvious that also other opponents of the Crimea decisions, such as for instance Mikolajczyk, do not fall within the category of Polish leaders consultation with whom could assist in the fulfillment of the Crimea decisions.

The Soviet Government expresses its confidence that the decisions concerning the conducting of the consultations unanimously accepted by all the members of the Commission will assure in the fullest measure the fulfillment of the resolutions of the Crimea Conference concerning Poland.

3. The Soviet Government has learned with amazement of the statement of the American Government concerning the intention to send British and American observers to Poland,³⁵ inasmuch as this proposal can sting the national pride of the Poles to the quick, the more so since in the decisions of the Crimea Conference this subject is not even touched upon. In any event the American Government could best explore this question if it were to address itself directly to the PPG.

4. In accordance with the consideration set forth above, the Soviet Government proposes in the interests of the successful work of the Moscow Commission that the following principles be unanimously recognized:

a. The Commission in its work should take as its point of departure the basic principle of the Crimea Conference that the PPG is the base for the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, which will include in its composition democratic leaders from Poland and Poles from abroad.

b. The Commission should urgently proceed to the holding of the consultations which it is directed to hold, for which it should first of all summon the PPG representatives.

c. The Commission should also urgently summon for consultation those Polish leaders from Poland and from abroad concerning whom there is already agreement on the part of all three members of the Commission.

d. Thereafter the Commission should decide the question of calling in other Polish democratic leaders from within and without Poland, consultation with whom should also be recognized by the Commission as desirable in the interests of the fulfillment of the Crimea decisions.

It is the opinion of the Soviet Government that the realization of these proposals would assure the fulfillment of the Crimean decisions concerning the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and the subsequent free elections in Poland. This is the duty of the Moscow Commission. It corresponds to the interests both of the Allied powers and of a democratic Poland. End paraphrase.

Molotov states he has sent an identic aide-mémoire to the British Ambassador.

Harriman

34. See footnote 33, p. 172.
35. At the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Yalta Conference, February 8, 1945, Stalin is reported to have said that “he did not see why Great Britain and the United States could not send their own people into Poland.” See Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 779 and 789.