860C.01/3–1645: Telgeram
The Chargé to the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 16—11:28 p.m.]
Poles 40. I saw Mikolajczyk today and discussed with him the possibility of his making a public statement to offset the effect in some quarters of his letter to the Daily Herald (my 16 February 1625). I explained the situation in accordance with your Poles 7, March 9, 9 [8] p.m., as modified by your Poles 8, March 12, 7 p.m., and your 1948, March 14, noon.
Mikolajczyk said he did not consider it wise to make such a statement at this time. He felt that his letter did not justify the interpretation put on it. In his opinion a public statement would not advance the general situation. It would be “political suicide” and it would do no good. The Russians would merely use it against him and would put him in an impossible position.
He, of course, considered the Crimea decisions as affording a basis for discussion. He knew that at any meeting with the Poles in Moscow Molotov’s first question would be: Were they prepared to accept the Curzon Line?26 He had been mentally prepared to go along with the idea at such a meeting provided that the true independence of Poland were assured and a broadly based democratic government was worked out. All of his efforts had been directed toward bringing about early action. Important sections of opinion in Poland itself also hoped for prompt action. But he knew no progress had been made.
He was very concerned by the delay. The Lublin Government were obviously seeking to delay matters. They had at first supported the Crimea decisions. Then their propaganda began to claim that they were to continue as the Polish Government with the addition of a few people. Mr. Eden, on the other hand, had made it clear in the [Page 169] House of Commons debate27 that there was to be a reorganized government.
A secret report received here was to the effect that Bierut, following his recent visit to Moscow,27a had said they would seek to delay the reorganization as long as possible. Meantime, they would remove as many leaders in Poland as possible and the rest they would try to bend to their will. They realized that in the end they would have to accept some new people but when consultations were eventually held they would thus be able to deal with the situation.
This report Mikolajczyk said, appeared to be borne out by what was actually happening. A report dated March 10 from inside Poland stated that five members of the Council of National Unity28 had been arrested. The message urged that the Polish authorities here take action with Britain and the United States, adding that if current practices continued the Moscow commission would in time find few leaders to invite for consultations. Mikolajczyk also referred to the reported arrest of Madame Walcowicz the wife of one of the four Ministers of the Polish underground government.29 This message urged that the Soviets be informed of her identity and of the names of the four Ministers. According to Mikolajczyk this has been taken up with the British and United States Governments and he understands the British have sent appropriate instructions to Ambassador Clark Kerr.
Mikolajczyk said that the actions of the Lublin group and the policy of the Arciszewski Government were producing the paradoxical situation where both were contributing to the same results, that is they were delaying the carrying out of the Crimea decisions. Lublin had in fact ceased to attack Arciszewski and had begun again to attack him.
The delay had also been unfortunate in its effect on some of the Polish groups in the United States who had at first taken a moderate [Page 170] attitude but had since grown more uncompromising. The delay had thus strengthened the position of the opponents of a settlement and reinforced those elements who had claimed that there was no goodwill on the part of the Soviets in seeing the Crimea decisions carried out. At the same time the position of those who had been working for a settlement was being weakened.
There was the further unfortunate result that the Poles were likely to be prevented from being represented at the San Francisco Conference. It would be regrettable if they were put in the same position as the Baltic States with Russia speaking for them. He thought this would cast a shadow over the conference.
I reverted to the possible value of a public statement and said that we attached the greatest importance to his being at the consultations and that in fairness to him we felt that he should be informed of the manner in which his earlier statement was being used against him. Mikolajczyk said he was aware that Marshal Stalin had said at the Crimea Conference that he (Mikolajczyk) was hard to deal with and made so many conditions. He felt that a public statement would not advance matters at this time. He remarked that the recent Bulgarian Premier had signed what he had been told to sign and had been executed anyway.30 He said he might himself be shot but he would have to act in accordance with his honest convictions.31
- Not printed, but see footnote 90, p. 135.↩
- See footnote 27a, p. 116.↩
- February 27–March 1, 1945. For record of the debate regarding the Crimea Conference, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 408, cols. 1267–1675 passim.↩
- See footnote 94, p. 141.↩
- The Homeland Political Representation of the Polish People (Krajowa. Representację. Politiczną. Narodu Polskiego) composing the leadership of the political groupings of the anti-German, non-Communist underground in occupied Poland, was transformed into a Council of National Unity (Rada Jedności Narodowej) by a decree announced on January 9, 1944 by the Delegate of the Polish Government in Exile at London. This Council of National Unity served as a clandestine “parliament” for the non-Communist, London-oriented underground within Poland and competed with the National Council of the Homeland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa) sponsored by the Soviet Union which had been established on January 1, 1944.↩
- Walkowicz was the pseudonym of Adam Bień, one of the four members of the non-Communist underground Council of Ministers of the Homeland (Krajowa Rada Ministrów) in German-occupied Poland, established on May 3, 1944 by a decree of the President of the Polish Government in Exile at London.↩
- For documentation regarding the arrest and execution by the Communist dominated Bulgarian government of former government leaders, see vol. iv, pp. 154–157.↩
- For Mikolajczyk’s explanation of his refusal to issue a declaration at this time as described in a document from his own private files, see Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy, pp. 363–364.↩