740.00119 Control (Italy)/9–645: Telegram
Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State
[Received September 6—7:30 p.m.]
3540. At SAC’s political committee meeting this morning Alexander agreed to recommend immediately to (Combined Chiefs of Staff) CCS that Bolzano Province should be handed back to Italian administration with remainder of north Italy except Udine and Venezia Giulia on Sept 30 (refer our 3480 of Sept 1, midnight).47 He stated that he could not, however, agree at this time to return Udine Province to Italian Govt because of necessity of maintaining security in northeast Italy and undesirability of having any direct contact between Italians and Yugoslavs on frontier in that area. We reiterated to SAC views set forth in first paragraph Dept’s 774, August 24, 6 p.m. and SAC after the discussion stated he could not comply with our request, but if it would be of any assistance to Italian Govt, he might agree to hand back certain parts of Udine Province and will maintain the situation he wishes vis-à-vis the Yugoslavs. Would Dept consider that such action might be construed as prejudicing future decision with regard to Yugoslav claims as presented by Yugoslavs to British Ambassador Belgrade during negotiations before signature of Belgrade agreement?48 (Refer our 2490, June 5, 5 p.m.)47
In this connection British Ambassador at Rome49 visited Trieste yesterday and telegraphed our British colleague this morning that he dined with Gen. Harding last evening at which time he explained to Harding the desirability of transferring Udine Province to Italian Govt soon as possible. He stated that Gen. Harding understood situation perfectly and was sympathetic with Charles’ views. He added that Harding stated that if some formula can be devised whereby his military requirements could be taken care of he would be glad to agree to handing over of Udine Province to Italian Govt. Foregoing was conveyed to Alexander this morning in our presence by [Page 1048] Broad51 and SAO commented “Harding may wish to hand back Udine Province but I do not”.
Message today from Gen. Harding to Chief of Staff refers to last evening discussion with Ambassador Charles and states further that while political desirability of bolstering morale of Italian Govt is appreciated Harding cannot properly maintain security of military communications through Udine Province and control on Morgan Line unless he retains in fact all powers for maintenance of law and order and security now invested in AMG (Allied Military Govt) including prompt removal and replacement of unsatisfactory civil officials. Harding’s message suggested following pattern of face-saving formula as limit to which he would be prepared to go to meet political considerations: “Italian rights in Udine Province are recognized and administration of province will progressively pass to Italian control. Meanwhile Allied military forces are dependent on rail and road communications through this province and on available military accommodation. Allied Military Command acting through AMG (Allied Military Govt) officers in administration will remain responsible for maintenance of law and order in the province and no Italian troops will be located in the province without previous Allied military command agreement.”
Careful consideration of all factors involved in connection with Alexander’s decision to retain Udine under AMG (Allied Military Govt) for an indefinite period in spite of offer of Italian Prime Minister, as set forth in Rome’s 2403 of Aug 21, leads us to believe that Alexander’s action is based primarily on political grounds rather than military aspects of the case. We discussed this matter privately with SAC and his CoS (Chief of Staff) again this morning and both flatly stated they considered it essential to retain Udine under AMG (Allied Military Govt) because of presence of Yugoslav forces on border and desirability of not antagonizing Yugoslavs at this time.
Since SAC is persisting in his refusal to accept Harding’s proposal Dept may wish to give urgent consideration to enlisting support of Foreign Office for joint demarche to CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff) with view to SAC being instructed to accept formula proposed by General Harding.