Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume IV

611.5131/11–1445: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 14, 1945—noon.
[Received 10:30 p.m.]

6586. In connection with the projected comprehensive negotiations with the French on financial questions and on commercial policy I believe the Dept will find useful the following summary of views expressed to me and members of my staff in past week by Bidault, Pleven,⁹⁵ Monnet, Alphand and other French officials.

1. The French regard substance of top set of letters exchanged on commercial policy in connection wth Ex-Im Bank loan (see my 6495 November 8) as decision of major import. They have stated that it was reached by de Gaulle⁹⁷ and Cabinet in full knowledge that it involved long range orientation away from self containment and toward multi-lateral trade with all its domestic economic implications.

2. The French are desirous of comprehensive full dress bilateral negotiation with US comparable to current British negotiation. Time is visualized as late winter (see my 6561 November 13⁹⁸).

3. They regard successful conclusion of such negotiation as indispensable to any constructive United Nations conference on world trade. Their argument runs that France’s decisions rather than the UK’s will predominately control the foreign trade policies of western Europe. “It is not enough to have secured only England’s advance agreement to a policy, etc, etc”

4. French imply with delicacy that question of US credits to France must be viewed in terms of enabling a major partner to join our great endeavor to swing world trade away from blocs, bilateral deals, etc. Moreover, new partner will bring family business with him. For these reasons one should infer that the discussion of credits should be maintained on high plane unrelated to mundane quid pro quo.

5. I believe French strategy emerges from foregoing as seeking to establish 2 tenets. First, is recognition of France by US as economic power entitled to same consideration as the UK. Second, is effort to substitute generalities as the quid pro quo for loan rather than specific actions or concessions which we desire and which by linking to credit negotiations I believe we can secure (see my A–1494 October 31⁹⁸ and previous messages on same subject).

6. On first point I support French desire for bilateral talks prior to United Nations Conference, not for prestige considerations but because we should not delay settlement of open issues with the French. Furthermore, French adherence in advance to our general objectives (their adherence I believe can also be obtained in bilateral negotiation) will be useful support to carry into United Nations Conference.

7. On second point I again urge that as quid pro quo for any further loans to France we should present the entire list of specific benefits actions and concessions which we wish to obtain from France including in the list, if interim efforts are fruitless, a reasonable settlement on surplus property. Accordingly, I recommend that discussions envisaged in second set of letters reported by the French to have been exchanged (my 6495 November 8 and final paragraph of your 4957 October 25⁹⁹) be scrupulously limited to the technical examination of the credit needs of France in terms of reconstruction and modernization. It would, of course, be fatal to give a commitment for a loan during the preliminary negotiation and as a result enter our commercial policy negotiation stripped of that bargaining power.

Phelps¹ has seen this telegram and concurs fully.

Caffery

95. René Pleven, French Minister of Finance.
97. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, Head of the French Provisional Government.
98. Not printed.
98. Not printed.
99. Latter not printed; it reported tentative agreement with the French to enter discussions with them with respect to their needs for reconstruction and modernization of their agricultural and industrial economy prior to the initiation of commercial policy negotiations (851.50/10–1645).
1. Vernon L. Phelps, Assistant Chief, Division of Commercial Policy.