Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume IV

740.00119 EW/8–2445

Memorandum of Conversation Between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bidault) and the Secretary of State, Held in Washington August 24, 1945

Washington, August 24, 1945

[Translation]

1) Coal Question

As soon as he arrives M. Bidault is led by Mr. Byrnes to a large diagram chart showing the production and consumption of coal in Germany as it was in 1938 and as it is estimated for 1945. An officer makes a quick summary of the results of this comparison, from which it appears that one of the chief factors behind the inability of German production in 1945 to meet the needs of Western Europe is the fact that a part of this production cannot be transported over the present means of communication in Germany. The Secretary of State seems impressed by the fact that this is the only point on which it is possible to undertake immediate relief action, and he indicates his intention of giving instructions to this end.

As the chart shows an estimated annual production of 2,600,000 tons for the Saar, he asks the French Minister if this figure seems reasonable to him. M. Bidault replies that it seems low, even taking into account the reduced production capacity of the mines for various reasons arising out of the war and the insufficient diet of the miners. M. Bidault asks Mr. Byrnes what value he places on the estimates in the chart and from what source the elements thereof have been derived. Mr. Byrnes replies that they are figures furnished by American experts and by those of the European Coal Organization in London. He reiterates his intention of trying to improve transportation in Germany with a view to placing a greater amount of coal at the disposal of the economy of Western Europe.

2) Italian Colonies

Having returned to his office, Mr. Byrnes, without transition, takes up the question of the Italian colonies.

He again leads M. Bidault to a map, a large globe on which he asks to have explained to him the views of the French Government on the disposal of Italy’s colonies.

What do you want to do about Libya?

M. Bidault indicates that the British seem to want to create for themselves two strategic strongpoints (points d’appui) on each side of Egypt in order to protect their route to India and the Far East: one in Palestine and Transjordania; the other to the West of Egypt’s Western frontier in Cyrenaica, more particularly in the so-called “Marmarica” region around Tobruk. The regime which they are thinking of is not yet defined: it appears to be analogous to that of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, an autonomous state (which) might be built around the Moslem Senussi sect. Mr. Byrnes recalls that at Potsdam the Russians showed a keen interest in the Italian Colonies of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Somaliland. (Questioned more closely on Eritrea, he states he cannot remember.)

M. Bidault states that as far as the French Government is concerned, it would rather see Italy keep its old colonies, especially Tripolitania (he adds in this connection that the French Government is not anxious to have created a continuous zone of purely Arab influence reaching to the Tunisian border) and that in so far as Somaliland and Eritrea are concerned, which are contiguous to Ethiopia, he definitely believes that the best of all solutions would be to leave them in Italian hands. In any case, he says, the French Government will do nothing to favor their alienation.

3) Question of the Levant⁹⁷

. . . . . . .

There is a brief discussion of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting which is to take place in London soon. He (Mr. Byrnes) explains to M. Bidault that by inviting France to the Italian settlement and excluding her from the negotiation of peace treaties with the satellites of the USSR, the (Big) Three are merely applying to France the same rule that the United States has accepted: since a state of war has not existed between the United States and Finland, the United States will not take part in the negotiation of the Finnish peace treaty; in the same way France will not take part in the treaty settlement with the states of central and eastern Europe with which she has not been at war.

4) Question of the Ruhr

Mr. Byrnes asks M. Bidault what France’s plans are for the Ruhr. He indicates that as far as the American Government is concerned it does not favor an internationalization which would result in installing Russia, along with Great Britain, France and the United States along the Rhine. He points out that at the same time Russia has indicated her irrevocable opposition to the creation of a Western European control system with Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, over the Rhine-Westphalia area.⁹⁸ Since France rejects the idea of international control by the Organization set up at San Francisco because she is hostile to the idea of having an area so vital to her placed under the control of too many states most of whom have no real interest in the question, the American Government does not see what the practical solution is. Mr. Byrnes again brings up the plan Senator Vandenberg sponsored some months ago in a speech to Congress:⁹⁹ A 25-year guarantee by the United States, Great Britain, the USSR and France for the disarmament of Germany and for the delivery of a minimum amount of coal to countries, such as France, whose interest in such imports was recognized. M. Bidault indicates that he would be favorably inclined to such a plan.

In the course of the conversation M. Bidault emphasises once again the mistake made by the American Delegation to San Francisco when it contemplated submitting the Rhineland-Westphalian area to trusteeship. Mr. Byrnes replies that there is nothing in the San Francisco Charter which would prevent the realization of such a plan. M. Bidault makes the point that it would be inappropriate to apply this plan to the special case of the Ruhr. Mr. Byrnes pursues the subject no further.

In this connection M. Bidault recalled the reasons why France would like to be entrusted with the administration and control of an area stretching from Cologne to the Swiss border which has always been the route of German aggression. Mr. Byrnes does not disagree, but points out that the appearance of the atomic bomb has radically altered considerations of security. M. Bidault refers nonetheless to the desire of the military to have concrete guarantees of immediate security.

Mr. Byrnes concludes by saying that the creation of a regime in the Rhineland and in the Ruhr which was opposed to the wishes of the French people might well cause serious difficulties for General de Gaulle’s Government if it took place on the eve of the October elections. He therefore advises against our insisting, as we have heretofore, on the urgency of this problem which in his opinion could better be postponed until another meeting, say, in November.

97. For material which follows here on the question of the Levant, see enclosure to letter of October 2, 1945, from the Acting Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon, printed in vol. viii , first section under Syria and Lebanon.
98. For documentation on the question of the separation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr areas from Germany, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. i, entries in index under Germany: Rhineland, p. 1068; and ibid., vol. ii, entries in index under Germany: Rhineland and Ruhr, p. 1618. For the Russian attitude, see especially the Soviet proposal of July 30, 1945, ibid., p. 1000.
99. Reference is presumably to Senator Vandenberg’s Senate speech of January 10, 1945, in which he submitted a proposal for the permanent demilitarization of Germany and Japan; Congressional Record, vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 164–168.