860D.00/1–3045: Telegram
The Secretary of Mission in Finland (Higgs) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:06 p.m.]
25. 1. Situation as to Finnish war culprits is in a number of respects similar to that which existed in connection with the Finnish peace moves during which certain elements in Finland, perceiving that more than purely Finnish views and opinions had to be considered, advocated Finnish withdrawal from the war.13 These elements today are grouped around the Paasikivi Government. They were opposed in their peace efforts by Tanner,14 Ryti15 and others [Page 602] who now are seeking to continue to control as large a measure as possible of the Finnish economy and political life. The Paasikivi group feels that continuation of such control would jeopardize if not defeat their efforts to reorient Finnish policy toward trustful friendship and collaboration with the USSR but they feel they need support from the outside if Finnish people are to be prevented from making such serious mistakes as they made in supporting Tanner group during the war.
2. I have carefully weighed the possible motives of those Finns who have indicated to me a desire for an exercise of our influence in this situation. I feel their motives lie neither in a desire to involve us in Finnish-Soviet affairs nor in any personal political ambitions.
3. Considering, therefore, the wide influence of the US with Finnish public, particularly during this period when they are so anxious to reestablish themselves with us, the possibility thereby of demonstrating our solidarity with the USSR on a major Finnish issue, and the likely contribution such a move would make to future good relations between Finland and the USSR, I feel we would be justified upon the basis of the facts in the situation as known to me, in exerting our influence to effect withdrawal of the war politicians from the Finnish scene, provided, of course, such action is not construed as a deviation from our policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries.
4. If Department decides to take action in this situation we could do so by stating our views privately to members of the Government and others, or by a public statement either here or in Washington. I feel there is little to be expected from the former method as generally such persons already are in favor of the course of action we would be advocating, and it would not seem to provide the public pressure on war politicians necessary for success. A pronouncement along following lines would perhaps offer more hope of success for the objective in question:
[Here follows a suggestion for a public statement and discussion of the method for issuing it.]
Sent to Department as my 25. Please repeat to Moscow as my 14, January 30, 3 p.m.
- For documentation on this subject, see ibid., pp. 556 ff.↩
- Väinö A. Tanner, leader of the Social Democratic Party in Finland, former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, and in 1945 Chairman of the Bank of Finland.↩
- Risto H. Ryti, former President of Finland.↩