Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume IV

860F.00/10–3145: Telegram

The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]⁹³

Praha, October 31, 1945—midnight.
[Received November 3—1:15 p.m.]

509. President Beneš invited me to lunch alone with him today to discuss various matters and as he put it “to bring me up to date”. The substance of his remarks in the course of a 2–hour talk is as follows:

1. In spite of the fact that the Provisional Assembly has met⁹⁴ it will not be possible for Beneš to reconstitute the Cabinet, as he had hoped to do before the elections,⁹⁵ by eliminating some of the Communist members, as the leaders of the six parties have been unable to come to an agreement. The Czech and Slovak Communist parties recognizing that they are overrepresented in the present Cabinet have taken advantage of the agreement that all changes in the Cabinet prior to the elections must be by unanimous agreement among the parties by refusing to surrender any of their posts in the Cabinet. A compromise has been reached to increase the Cabinet by three posts until the elections. The new posts will go to members of the Resistance groups so that the Cabinet which has heretofore been balanced evenly between the “London and Moscow groups” will now be controlled, as the President put it, by the “London and Resistance groups”. I judge from the general nature of the President’s remarks that the three new members of the Cabinet will be Moderates.

2. Beneš is seriously concerned with the course being pursued by Kopecky, Communist Minister of Information. While disturbed at the policies of some of the other Communist Ministers he considers them to be patriotic Czechs or Slovaks who while they may be misguided or too radical to suit his taste, have nevertheless acted in accordance with their dictates as patriots rather than as instruments of Soviet policy. As to Kopecky, however, the President is in possession of what he regards as satisfactory proof that Kopecky has been acting as a tool to further Soviet aims. As soon as the elections have taken place Kopecky will be replaced by a Moderate as Minister of Information and the entire Ministry purged.

3. The President is aware of the criticism to which UNRRA operation in Zecho have been subjected. In placing UNRRA distribution in the hands of a Moderate, Majer, Minister of Food, with Loebel, Communist, as his assistant, Beneš believed that Majer would be able to control the distribution. He has ascertained, however, that Majer has been so occupied with the functions of his office as Minister that Loebel has in effect been supervising UNRRA distributions. In view of the probability of greatly increased UNRRA deliveries in the near future Beneš has under consideration the designation of some outstanding individual to assume complete charge of UNRRA distributions throughout Zecho with an independent Zecho staff.

4. The President stated that the negotiations with the Soviet Govt for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Zecho have led to no reduction in the total number of Soviet troops within the country. When I asked him to estimate the total number of Soviet troops now in Zecho he said he had received so many conflicting reports he was at a loss to know which to believe. He observed however, that the Soviet request for food for 300,000 men was some indication of the approximate number that must be in the country. He confirmed reports received by the Embassy that additional Soviet troops have recently entered Bohemia from Germany and Austria but stated that there had also been some withdrawals. He remarked that little value would be attached to Soviet statements and promises on this subject as he had received a definite assurance from Stalin that all of Malinovsky’s Mongolian troops would be withdrawn from Zecho before the end of July. As he had received reports a few days ago of the presence in Bratislava of a considerable number of Mongolian troops he had sent Clementis, a Slovak Communist, to Bratislava to make a personal investigation and report to him. On his return to Praha Clementis had confirmed the presence of Mongolian troops in Bratislava.

Beneš then stated that the Provisional Assembly now afforded him an opportunity to air the prevalent discontent at the presence of the Soviet Army in Zecho and said that several speeches would shortly be made in the Assembly complaining of the continued presence of the Soviet and American armies on Zecho soil. He added that, of course, we would understand the necessity for mentioning both armies so that the remarks would not be too pointedly directed at the Soviet Union and specifically requested me to inform the Dept that the presence of American troops in Zecho would be brought into the discussions in the Assembly primarily with the object of bringing about a simultaneous withdrawal. He then said that he had under consideration addressing a request to the four great powers for the evacuation of Zecho by both foreign armies. He said that one of the reasons he would give for desiring an immediate evacuation was the Zecho’s monetary reform⁹⁶ would be useless unless the Soviet and American armies withdraw in the near future. He pointed out that the recent monetary reform reducing the currency in circulation to a reasonable amount would be intermixed within a few months as the Soviet Army has requested 850 million crowns and the American Army 120 million crowns monthly. I gained the impression that Beneš will refrain from presenting such a request until there is a meeting of the great powers.

Insofar as concerns the reorganization of the Czeehoslovakian Army, the President stated that considerable progress is being made. He hopes that in the relatively near future it will be possible to station Czech garrisons in the vicinity of large Soviet concentrations so as to encourage the local population to refuse supplies to the Soviet forces. He said that as food was now being furnished the Soviet troops through the appropriate Czech Ministries, the local population had been instructed to refuse Soviet demands or requisitions but that they hesitated to do so in the face of the customary show of force and that a Czech garrison in the neighborhood might induce greater popular resistance to seizures of food and livestock which he said were extensive.

. . . . . . .

The President is leaving Praha tomorrow for a short vacation.

Steinhardt

93. For the remaining portions of this telegram, see p. 555, p. 939, and vol. ii, p. 1304.
94. The Czechoslovak Provisional National Assembly opened on October 28.

95. Elections for a Provisional National Assembly were held on October 14. See footnote 14, p. 458. In his telegram 467, October 16, 1945, 5 p.m., the Ambassador in Czechoslovakia commented on these elections as follows:

    “The so-called elections to the Provisional National Assembly are in effect hand-picked appointments by the various political groups including parties, trade unions and local committees. The assembly will consist of 100 Slovak and 200 Czech Moravian-Silesian members. While on paper the membership of 300 is almost evenly balanced between Leftist and Moderate elements, informed observers believe that the Leftist groups can count on not more than 135 to 140 votes because the Social Democratic Party is not closely knit and its Moderate wing cannot be relied upon to support radical measures.” (860F.00/10–1645)

96. By Presidential decree of October 20, 1945, previous Czech and Slovak crown currencies ceased to be legal tender and were replaced, as of November 1, by a new Czechoslovak crown currency. The reform was aimed at drastically reducing the amount of currency in circulation.