860F.01/10–1745
The United States Political Adviser for Germany
(Murphy) to the Secretary of State
No. 1197
Frankfurt, October 17,
1945.
Sir: With reference to my top secret telegram
No. 146, October 17, 6:00 p.m.,88 regarding the question
of the retention of United States forces of occupation in
Czechoslovakia, I have the honor to enclose a paraphrase of the USFET
telegram to the War Department which sets forth General Eisenhower’s
recommendation to General Marshall on this subject.
The Department is informed that at General Eisenhower’s request,
accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Bull, I proceeded to
Pilsen and Prague on October 14. At Pilsen a thorough review of the
situation from the Army point of view was had. At Prague General Bull
and I thoroughly canvassed the situation with Ambassador Steinhardt and
members of his staff. I enclose for the Department’s information a copy
of my report to General Eisenhower dated October 16.
A supplemental report will be made to the Department regarding other
features of our conversations with Ambassador Steinhardt, particularly
with reference to the subject of restitution of property looted by the
Germans in Czechoslovakia and which is now subject to claim
[Page 498]
by the Czechoslovak
Government. I believe that our visit was fruitful in developing closer
cooperation between American authorities in Czechoslovakia and those in
Germany and a better understanding of mutual problems developed. The
Department is assured that every effort will be made by this office to
support and assist Ambassador Steinhardt in his delicate mission.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure 1—Telegram]
The Commanding General, United States Forces,
European Theater (Eisenhower) to the Chief
of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)
[Frankfurt, 17 October, 1945.]
S–28266. When I visited Prague recently I conferred with General
Harmon, Ambassador Steinhardt, and others with regard to the
problems connected with the continued maintenance of occupational
forces in Czechoslovakia or alternatively to the withdrawal of US
Forces. When I returned to Frankfurt I immediately directed General
Bull and Ambassador Murphy to visit Prague and Pilsen with a view to
making a detailed study of a withdrawal and all its implications.
After carefully considering their reports, I am transmitting
herewith the following comments and recommendations for your
consideration.
Previous cables have outlined the situation existing in the part of
Czechoslovakia occupied by US Forces. The two understrength
divisions now in occupation, it is emphasized, are strung out along
the US/Russian boundary for approximately 266 miles, with all units
disposed on operation of road blocks and border patrol except for
one battalion. General Harmon has successfully completed all
missions given him when he entered Czechoslovakia. Law and order has
been established under the Czechoslovakian Government. The
population is tranquil, the enemy has been defeated and disarmed,
the bulk of enemy captured material has been disposed of, and United
Nations Displaced Persons have been repatriated. General Harmon’s
troops at present are placed in the position of protecting German
minorities against Czech aggression and of blocking the movement of
Soviet troops into the US sector of the country.
Expansion to a strength of approximately 150,000 Czechoslovak Forces
is being made and within a month it is believed that they will have
partially equipped and trained 50,000 men who can assume duties of
occupation.
Desire was expressed by Ambassador Steinhardt to retain the US troops
to influence Czechoslovakian development in a manner sympathetic to
the Western Democracies and as a stabilizing influence, but now he
does not believe that it is intention of
Soviet authorities to
[Page 499]
occupy Czechoslovakia permanently but do intend to quarter and feed
a considerable number of troops there during the coming winter and
to exploit the country’s resources.
In view of foregoing, I recommend the following:
- A.
- Due to the necessary transfer of a vast number of Sudeten
Germans to the American Zone of Germany, there should be
retained in Czechoslovakia the present strength of 1 corps
of 2 divisions augmented by authorized strength
replacements, under [until?] we are
assured of the orderly evacuation of Sudeten Germans. (Our
presence in Czechoslovakia, it is believed, will materially
contribute to an orderly evacuation, all to our
advantage.)
- B.
- That in agreement with the Czechoslovak Government, our
government inform the Soviets that there seems to be no
necessity for further occupation of this friendly country by
the military and request agreement by the Soviets for the
withdrawal of occupational forces, stating a specified date
when such withdrawal is to be completed. (Simultaneous
withdrawal of US and Russian Forces need not be necessary).
- C.
- That US troops be withdrawn, in cooperation with
Czechoslovak authorities, in the event that Soviet agreement
to the proposed withdrawal is not
obtained. Withdrawal is to be initiated and completed within
a two week period after the orderly evacuation of Sudeten
Germans is assured. (It is recommended by Mr. Murphy that
our proposal to the Soviet Government and the effective
withdrawal date be announced publicly prior to this
unilateral withdrawal.)
- D.
- That our troops be withdrawn in accordance with A above in
the event that the Soviet authorities agree on the
withdrawal by a specified date.
- E.
- Upon withdrawal of our forces, we should precede and
accompany the move by an appropriate and effective publicity
campaign describing the contribution we have made to the
liberation and welfare of Czechoslovakia and the friendly
cooperation we have maintained.
State Department is being informed by Murphy.
[Enclosure 2]
Memorandum by the United States Political Adviser
for Germany (Murphy) to the Commanding
General, United States Forces, European Theater (Eisenhower)
[Frankfurt,] 16 October 1945.
In accordance with your wishes, General Bull and I proceeded to
Pilsen and Prague. These are my impressions:
United States Army Occupational Forces
The XXII Corps with present strength of about 18,000 which is to be
increased to about 26,000 is operating under a mission which it
seems to me has expired. Since its arrival it has accomplished what
was required of it under its directive. The enemy has been
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subdued and disarmed, the
population is tranquil, the problem of United Nations DPs has been
liquidated, enemy materiel disposed of, a recognized Czechoslovakian
Government is in authority and its administration rapidly gaining in
efficiency and authority, a Czechoslovakian army with growing
strength and improved organization has come into being. If United
States forces are to remain, a new directive should be issued to
justify their continued presence. What can be said in support of
such deployment? These are arguments proffered by Ambassador
Steinhardt which undoubtedly reflect the personal sentiments of some
elements at least of the Czechoslovakian administration:
- (1)
- The presence of United States Forces serves to influence
Czechoslovakian development in a manner sympathetic to the
Western Democracies.
- (2)
- Their presence also serves as a stabilizing force and as a
deterrent to Russian excesses (requisitions, pillage,
disorder).
- (3)
- According to General Harmon and members of his staff an
additional reason for the retention of our forces in the
area would be that their presence may prevent Czech excesses
against the German minority which constitutes the bulk of
the population in the area. If our forces move out, Russian
forces undoubtedly will move in and in that case again the
German population may suffer severely at the hands of the
Russians as well as the Czechs.
- (4)
- I might add that it could also be argued that the United
States’ adherence to Article 13 of the Potsdam
decisions89 regarding the orderly transfer of
German populations could be invoked as an added reason for
the retention of United States Forces in Czechoslovakia. At
Potsdam the three Governments agreed to recognize that the
transfer to Germany of German population from Czechoslovakia
will have to be undertaken. They also agreed that any
transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly
and humane manner. As our forces in Czechoslovakia occupy
the area where the greatest number of Sudeten Germans
reside, it could be said that our forces are there to ensure
the execution of the Potsdam decision in the manner
prescribed.
Against the foregoing arguments the following considerations deserve
consideration.
- (1)
- The radius of influence of our forces on Czech thinking is
exceedingly limited. An insignificant number of our soldiers
speak the language or have relations of political value with
Czechs. Contacts are principally social of the boy meets girl
variety. However the majority of these contacts appear to be
with the German population which is in the vast majority in this
region. In Marienbad according to General Harmon, there are
about thirty thousand Germans as compared with only about one
thousand Czechs. Our soldiers frequent German women and are
welcomed by their families who see in such relationship
protection and advantages whereas similar association
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between our soldiers
and Czech women is often resented by Czech men.
- (2)
- According to our officers, our troops have developed a certain
hostility to the Czechs where they have witnessed rough
treatment by the latter of German evacuees. This develops the
possibility of incidents between our troops and the Czech
population.
- (3)
- Our troops continue to occupy the territory of a friendly
power without agreement or official invitation.
- (4)
- Ambassador Steinhardt admits that because of the adverse
effect which Russian conduct has had on the Czech population due
to excesses in the area of Soviet occupation, Communist
sentiment in that area, which was high at the beginning of the
occupation is dwindling with the months. However, we are told
that there is no similar decline in the zone of our occupation
where the population has not been in contact with the Russian
forces. Pilsen, for example, is a Communist stronghold.
- (5)
- It would be difficult and undesirable to attempt to justify
the deployment of U.S. forces in the territory of a friendly
power for the protection of the German minority.
- (6)
- If a question should be raised in Congress, for example,
regarding the necessity of United States forces in
Czechoslovakia, what reasons could be advanced in favor of it?
We could hardly say that we consider them necessary to offset
the political effect of the USSR and its forces of
occupation.
- (7)
- The danger of incidents between Soviet forces and our own is
not to be excluded. Similar incidents with the Czech population
are possible and should be avoided.
- (8)
- The Czech Government and the Czech Army should assume their
responsibilities and apparently are about ready and able to do
so.
On balance there would seem small profit, if any, in the indefinite
retention of our forces in Czechoslovakia. I would recommend that
once we have worked out with the Czechs a program covering the
evacuation of the remaining German DPs90 and the Sudeten Germans, and that
should happen shortly, that preparation for the departure of the
United States forces be authorized.
If our forces move out, the move should be preceded and accompanied
by an effective and appropriate publicity campaign describing our
friendly cooperation with Czechoslovakia and the contribution we
have made to its liberation and welfare. By analogy, the fact that
we leave and the Russian forces remain in the country should stand
out in contrast. In that connection, I suggested to Ambassador
Steinhardt that some thought should be given to the use of the
Munich radio transmitter to beam programs in the Czech language to
Czechoslovakia. Ambassador Steinhardt had complained that he was
unable to get sufficient coverage of American news in the Prague
newspapers.
Incidentally, Ambassador Steinhardt stated that the Czechs seem to
take a calmer view regarding the German minority. He said that the
Czech Government now discriminates between “good” and “bad”
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Germans (the former
wearing white armbands and the latter yellow). Of the former, the
Government wants upwards of 700,000 to remain because they are
useful citizens. The Government, he believes, will in the end be
willing to organize the evacuation of the remainder on a very
reasonable basis, and after the departure of a certain number over a
period of weeks, he thinks that the Czech fervor will die down, once
the principle is established, and it may well be that the Government
will end up by permitting a good many more than 700,000 to remain in
Czechoslovakia. But he would like to see an early start made in the
evacuation with our cooperation for its immediate political effect,
and in this I believe he should have our full support.
