860F.01/9–1445: Telegram
The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received September 16—12:33 p.m.]
352. Department’s 214, September 11. I have had a talk this afternoon with President Beneš to ascertain whether Czechoslovak Government would be willing at this time to request US and Soviet Governments to effect a simultaneous withdrawal of their forces.
President gave me in strict confidence following detailed account of his efforts to have Soviets withdraw their forces from Czechoslovakia.
Beneš said he had sent Svoboda Minister of National Defense and Clementis State Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Vienna a week ago to see Marshal Koniev73 to:
- (1)
- Complain of behavior of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia;
- (2)
- Remind Koniev of Stalin’s promise made about 2 months ago that not more than 8 Soviet divisions would remain in Czechoslovakia after July 20 and that these divisions would be withdrawn to northern Czechoslovak frontier, and to ask him to reconcile recent Soviet request for food and supplies for over 300,000 men with Stalin’s promise. President said he had instructed Svoboda to inform Koniev that amount of food and supplies requested would not be furnished.
- (3)
- Inform Koniev that Czechoslovak Government would not permit the Soviet military authorities to requisition the very large amount of sugar they had demanded. The President informed me that when he had learned of the large quantity of sugar Soviet military authorities [Page 491] proposed to requisition he had (without consulting Cabinet) instructed the Czechoslovak military authorities to occupy the refineries and resist by force if necessary any attempt by the Soviets to requisition the sugar. He said Soviet soldiers had attempted to seize the sugar but when Czechoslovak guards fired over their heads they retired. He specifically requested that this incident be not disclosed.
- (4)
- Protest at the continued entry into Czechoslovakia from Germany and Austria of considerable numbers of Soviet troops and to warn Koniev that if this practice continued and these troops continued to requisition at will there would be “conflict.”
- (5)
- Complain of the large garrisons, hospitals and other establishments the Soviet military authorities continue to maintain outside of Praha, Brno, and Bratislava and to request that they be withdrawn at once.
The President said that although Svoboda and Clementis had been cooly received by Koniev, after a full discussion of the grievances presented by them Koniev had promised to reduce Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia to eight divisions, to stop depredations by Soviet troops from Germany and Austria and to withdraw garrisons and other establishments outside of Praha, Brno and Bratislava. He had also agreed to the creation of mixed Czechoslovak Soviet units to deal on the spot summarily with irregular requisitions, attacks on civilians (including many murders) and other transgressions.
The President said he attributed Koniev’s promise to remove the causes of complaint to the fact that shortly before Svoboda and Clementis left for Vienna he had instructed the Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow74 to insist on seeing Stalin and to recite the same grievances to him. He said that after listening to the grievances Stalin had remarked “I understand the situation, there will not be tranquility before we leave completely.”
The President then said that Svoboda and Bocek, Chief of Staff, had left today for Moscow under instructions from him (1) to repeat what Svoboda had told Koniev and to refer to Stalin’s remark to the Czechoslovak Minister (2) to ask for the armaments promised the Czechs by the Soviets and which have not been forthcoming and (3) to ask for the immediate fulfillment of Stalin’s promise to reduce Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia to eight divisions.
The President then observed that as many of the Czech Communists holding office in his Government do not favor a reduction of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia as they believe their presence will aid them in coming elections, he feared that any attempt by him to obtain approval of Cabinet to a request of US and Soviet Governments to effect simultaneous withdrawal of their forces might precipitate dissension within his Government. He suggested as an alternative that our Government [Page 492] prepare a precise plan for withdrawal of our forces from Czechoslovakia including dates, bring same to attention of Soviet Government and ask for its plan of withdrawal. He said that if our Government decided to pursue this or some similar course it would be desirable to communicate officially to Czechoslovak Government our plan of withdrawal so that his Government could also bring American plan to attention of Soviet Government. President remarked that if Soviets then failed to propose a plan to withdraw their forces he favored widest publicity in United States of our endeavor without success to arrange that all Allied forces be withdrawn simultaneously. Beneš regards it as great importance that any approach our Government may make to Soviet Government, or any plan of withdrawal that may be proposed by United States to Soviet Government be brought to personal attention of Stalin as he is convinced that failure of Soviets to withdraw from Czechoslovakia is policy and preference of Soviet generals and not that of Stalin. He pointed out that Soviet generals and their troops prefer remaining in Czechoslovakia to returning to Soviet Union or being stationed in hostile Germany or Austria. He said there was ample evidence that they “feel at home among their brother Slavs in Czechoslovakia and thoroughly enjoy our much higher standard of living.”
I believe a direct approach by our Government to the Soviet Government along the lines suggested by Beneš offers the best prospect of achieving simultaneous withdrawal. Meanwhile and until the possibility of bringing about simultaneous withdrawal has been thoroughly explored I urgently recommend that we retain two divisions in Czechoslovakia and that the orders already issued for the reduction of our forces by September 21 to less than one division be countermanded. In conversation today with General Harmon in command of American forces in Czechoslovakia, his reasons were very convincing as to why he cannot effectively maintain control of 266 miles of demarcation line which he holds with less than two divisions.
Repeated Moscow as 30 USPolAd Berlin as 16 and London for personal attention of Secretary of State as 49.
- In June 1945, Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev became Commander in Chief of the Soviet Central Group of Forces, Commander of Soviet Forces in Austria, and Soviet representative on the Allied Council for Austria when that body was activated in September 1945.↩
- Apparently reference is to the Czechoslovak Chargé in the Soviet Union, Jaroslav Hnidzdo.↩