Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume IV

874.00/11–2445: Telegram

The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

Sofia, November 24, 1945—3 p.m.
[Received November 26—12:16 a.m.]

716. Propaganda organs of both Bulgarian and Russian Government continue to harp on “Reliance of Bulgarian opposition on foreign intrigue” to effect change in local political situation. Press of both countries emphasizes failure of this “intervention”.

Members of Bulgarian Government follow same line in their public utterances. In fact, deep hostility to US efforts to implement Yalta Agreement only thinly veiled.

At same time Bulgarian Government and FF spokesman emphasize persuasive effect election returns “should” have on US policy in Balkans and profess desire now “to forgive and forget” and to engage in every reasonable effort to enlarge basis of FF Government so as to convince western democracies beyond shadow of doubt that thus far they have unjustly judged Bulgaria’s new political leaders.

It is clear that game now is to mount facade of moderation in hopes of drawing US into recognition without FF meantime sacrificing either Communist position in Government or Communist program. I believe such so-called moderate elements in Government as Kimon Georgiev and Petko Stainov will prove not only willing tools in this game, but will turn out to be star players on Communist side. In other words events since postponement August elections have done more to confirm me in my earlier estimates of these two men (see my 399, July 30¹⁶ and 383, July 25) than to strengthen any interim hope that they would ultimately be revealed as intellectually honest and patriotic Bulgarian members.

Because of foregoing, and as we have revealed through Ethridge’s visit to Moscow and otherwise, abundance of good faith toward Russia in dealing with Bulgarian political situation, I feel it necessary at least to suggest (now that elections have taken place despite our views) that instead of following course recommended in Moscow’s telegram 3859, November 14 (from Ethridge) and supported by me in mytel No. 691, November 15,¹⁷ it would perhaps be course of wisdom for time being to leave next step to Russia and Bulgarian Government.

I fear that if we press immediately for program outlined in Moscow’s 3859 Russians and Bulgarians may find way to accord appearance of what we seek without granting substance. Furthermore I believe silence and perhaps even a bit of mystery on our part at this time might lead local authorities to go further in effort to conciliate US than if continuance of pressure from US lead them to conclude that we are the most anxious of all to get off with elaboration of peace treaties with ex-satellites.

Cooperation with Russia in Balkans should be two way traffic, just as Russia insists on two way traffic with respect to Italy and Mediterranean problems. Also we have made our position clear in note to Bulgarian Government November 16 with respect to which Soviet Government now has expressed its complete disagreement in writing (Harriman’s telegram No. 3904) perhaps a bit of silence from US now would let words we have used to date “sink in”. In any event a silence might reveal sense of assurance that too much talk could only dissipate.

I should like also to suggest that under circumstances return to Sofia of Ethridge on way back to US might prevent [present] anticlimax, or at any rate something of a denouement that would soften effect locally of knowledge that his investigation fully supported policy US Government has followed to date with respect to Bulgarian political and electoral situation and that Russia has been so informed.

If, however, Department concludes it should proceed with course recommended in Moscow’s No. 3859, 1 suggest that proposals set forth therein be amended as follows:

I. Negotiations to be instituted at once between Government and opposition looking to agreement along following lines:

(a) All democratic parties to subscribe to FF program;

(b) All democratic parties to subscribe to general amnesty with respect to all political acts subsequent to September 1, 1944;

(c) Each democratic party to be free independently to decide to participate in elections for Grand National Assembly on basis of common list of candidates or separate lists;

(d) Modification of electoral law as may be recommended by an electoral committee composed of representatives of all democratic parties;

(e) Modification of law for the defense of people’s authority as may be considered necessary by committee composed of representatives all democratic parties;

(f) Neutralization of Ministries of Interior and Justice;

(g) Legislative program of Assembly elected November 18, 1944 [1945], to be restricted to follow: 1. Passage of budget law; 2. Legalization of decree laws from September 9, 1944 and enactment of electoral law and law for defense of people’s authority according to recommendations of committees mentioned in paragraphs “d” and “e” above; 3. Voting of general amnesty mentioned in paragraph “b” above; 4. Elaboration of purposes for which Grand National Assembly to be convened.

II. Resignation of present Cabinet upon meeting of Assembly elected November 18 and immediate reconstruction of Government on basis this agreement.

III. Elections for Grand National Assembly to be held not later than April 1, 1946.

Repeated to Moscow as No. 323 and to Bucharest as No. 23.

Barnes

16. Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, p. 728.
17. Latter not printed.