874.00/11–645
Report by Mr. Mark Ethridge to the Secretary of State 95
[Here follow introductory and background sections on Bulgarian political situation.]
Conclusions
My own impression is that the Communists have overreached themselves. Force brings the necessity for further force and that is what has happened here. Some Government members are frankly fearful, and I have it on good authority that a good many moderate Communists would like to break away from the Party to save themselves from later reprisals, if they dared do so. I believe, too, that Russia has given directives to the Communists to modify their course here. Local Communists, out of their long bitterness, went back to the first page of the book on revolution and determined in Bulgaria to pull out by the roots all their ancient enemies, their new opponents and all institutions that flourished either under their local dictators or under the Germans influence. The situation is comparable in revolutionary terms to the early days in Russia and not, I believe, to present day Russia. Anybody who does not subscribe to the program is a “Fascist” and people with Western education and culture or with Western connections are suspect.
The situation in Bulgaria is most complex. The country would have had a revolution in any case after the Germans withdrew, because it has had complete dictatorship since 1934 and transition to any form of democratic government would not have been easy, particularly with all democratic parties completely demoralized. It could have been, however, much less bloody and it could have made the transition without swapping Fascist dictatorship for left-wing authoritarianism. Bulgaria is essentially a democratic country in aspiration. It has been badly governed; it has guessed wrong in every war in which it has been involved since 1912. Not all the guessing has been its own; it has been the pawn of big powers in a good deal of what it has done. It is a nation of hard-working people—the hardest-working I have ever seen—saddled with a military establishment which is much too big and much too expensive and completely ineffectual against any other power. It has all the conflicts of monarchist trappings; military conspiracy; politically-conscious, poverty ridden agrarians who enshrine Stamboliski in their hearts as we enshrine Washington or Lincoln; and long-exploited industrial workers who have every reason to hate any past government and mistrust any future government that is not in their own hands. It [Page 366] is indeed an agonized country at the moment without great hope for the immediate future, although I believe with normal crops (there has been a seven-month drought that has cut crops to about a third of normal), a few years of internal peace and freedom to trade to its own advantage, it could become another Denmark.
Whether it can become that is largely dependent on the course adopted by the major powers. Bulgaria, situated adjacent to Greece and Turkey and beyond a Rumania that is hostile to Russia, is the key to Soviet intentions in Southeastern Europe. It can be used strategically to force the Straits issue or to convert Greece into the Soviet orbit. It can be used as a nutcracker on Rumania. It can be used, as it is already being used, as a supply depot for the Soviets in raw materials that are being shipped elsewhere and sold at higher prices. It can be used, on the other hand, as a dumping ground for Soviet goods, including cotton and leather goods. It can be used, and I suspect it is being used along with Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary and other countries, as an outlet for civilian goods which the Soviet Union certainly must produce if it is not to have great unemployment and its own internal crisis. It can be used for the slow demobilization of Soviet armies, which, if too quickly demobilized, would create an unhealthy internal situation if employment is not readily available. The extent to which employment will be available inside Russia depends in large measure upon how much she has in the way of credits, machinery and materials for her own restoration. Therein, I think, lies the United States’ strongest bargaining card in carrying out our political commitments.
Bulgaria is really tied up with the whole question of Soviet intent: with the question whether she intends to operate in the field of international cooperation or whether she intends to have her own bloc and her own sphere. The London Conference “failure” was not to my mind a failure; somewhere along the line we had to know each other’s intentions and find a common ground where there would be no opportunity for misunderstandings, differing interpretations or evasions.
- Transmitted to the Department with covering letter of November 6; received November 15.↩