874.00/10–2945: Telegram
The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 30—5:38 p.m.]
645. In Mytel 559 [599], Oct. 15, I expressed view that insofar as Bulgaria is concerned, Ethridge Mission should not be merely fact finding but should be used to direct local political developments along path that would facilitate understanding between US and Russia in connection with Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. Mr. Ethridge’s activities here and local and Russian response thereto have strengthened me in this view. As Russia is real stumbling block to broadening basis FF Govt and forthcoming elections, the point at which Mr. Ethridge’s conclusions must be brought to bear if stalemate of non-recognition is to be avoided is Moscow. I cannot imagine of any way in which these conclusions could be [used] more effectively to modify local situation for better and bring closer together US and Russian points of view with respect to Bulgaria than to have Mr. Ethridge go directly to Moscow upon completion of Bulgarian visit, purpose entering into direct conversations under the guidance Ambassador Harriman, with competent Russian authorities. He would go there with prestige of enthusiastic reception given to him all political groups and currents opinion in Bulgaria and with first hand knowledge necessary to cite chapter and verse in reply to Russian disposition to dismiss all criticism on grounds US not accurately informed. I believe such effort our part would also [dispel] Russian suspicion by emphasizing that we are anxious to find way of “getting [Page 355] on” and that we have no desire to score a political or moral victory expense Russia.
Following résumé written by Mr. Ethridge of important talk he had this morning with General Biryusov seems to support foregoing recommendations, especially as Biryusov is “cautious operator” limited by Moscow’s traditional reluctance to grant large authority to agents abroad. I am telegraphing recommendations in conjunction with this résumé with approval Ethridge.
This is by no means final or interim report from Ethridge. Its purpose is solely to report a conversation with General Biryusov today.
Ethridge said he desired to give General his impressions after talking with great many people and to receive impressions from General. Ethridge said there was general agreement among all with whom he talked that at time of its organization year ago Fatherland Front represented between 80 and 90 percent of the people of Bulgaria and met stipulations later agreed upon at Yalta but there was also almost unanimous agreement that its popularity had sharply declined because of excesses including those of courts [and] militia and activity of Communists in seizing power everywhere. Ethridge added he felt that Russia’s position had become prejudiced to some extent in that she as occupation force and as force backing Communists was. naturally held responsible also.
Ethridge continued he does not now consider Fatherland Front representative govt as defined under terms Yalta Agreement in that it was his feeling that a great majority of Agrarians and Socialists not represented. Ethridge pointed out that opposition Agrarians and Socialists still in sympathy with the Fatherland Front program and that it therefore seemed to him that way to make govt representative in sense Yalta would be to broaden base by bringing back into it Petkov Agrarians and Lulchev Socialists. Ethridge said he had had indications that such solution would not be impossible before elections if both govt and opposition could be encouraged to make rapprochement but that concessions would be necessary both sides. One concession he felt necessary on part of govt was change in Communist Minister of Interior since he has directed militia and district and municipal officials in seizure of power for Communist Party. He has become symbol to both sides. To opposition he is symbol of repression and of forceful imposition of will to rule; to Communists he is symbol of their safety in that they think his fall would bring reprisals. Ethridge pointed out fallacy of Communist argument in view of occupation forces here. He then asked General if he would be inclined to give encouragement to Bulgarian leaders to get together. Biryusov said in effect that opposition was inconsequential, that its only [Page 356] strength came from hope of intervention Western Powers. As Chairman Allied Control Commission he could not intervene in political affairs, he said, but he would report conversation to Moscow. Implementation of Yalta was a matter between the three govts, he added, and not one for ACC. He implied however that if he received instructions to act on Ethridge suggestion he would do so.
On Barnes’ suggestion Ethridge asked Biryusov whether any purpose would be served by Ethridge going to Moscow. Biryusov replied he would likewise report this suggestion to his government. (End Ethridge Résumé).
Ethridge reluctant to proceed Moscow. Nevertheless while all local possibility negotiations not yet exhausted it becoming increasingly clear that in Bulgaria Moscow decides, not local political leaders nor Russian representatives. He therefore willing to act on views expressed first paragraph this telegram if Dept also of opinion his visit can accomplish positive results only if facts he has learned are brought to bear Moscow. As elections scheduled November 18, it will be necessary to act utmost dispatch should Dept conclude visit Moscow might serve useful purpose.
Repeated to Moscow as No. 278.