874.01/2–1447
Memorandum by the United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State 63
The United States Government has taken the position that the present Bulgarian government is not broadly representative of democratic opinion in the country. The Government has already made the important concession to the United States point of view of postponing the general elections set for August 26. That setback for the Communist-dominated Bulgarian government was, however, more apparent than real, and such will continue to be the case until there has been a reorganization of the cabinet in the following sense:
- (1)
- Inclusion therein of the real leaders of the Agrarian and Social Democratic Parties in place of the Agrarian and Social Democratic stooges, Obbov and Neikov.
- (2)
- Acceptance within the government of a representative of the Democratic Party—a party which to date has been proscribed but whose leaders throughout the period of German domination remained faithful to the Anglo-American cause.
- (3)
- Replacement of the present Communist Minister of the Interior by the representative of a less aggressive and a more democratic political element, or by a neutral figure in the country’s life.
Reorganization of the government along the above lines is imperative to accomplish the following prerequisites to free elections:
- (1)
- The holding of party congresses by the Agrarians and the Social Democrats by the party organizations as they existed prior to May 8, 1945, and June 10, 1945, respectively, on which dates the aim of the Communist Party to split the Agrarians and the Social Democrats into numerous opposing groups, thereby establishing Communist domination over those elements of these parties within the government, was accomplished.
- (2)
- Revision of the existing electoral law so as to assure free opportunity for any non-Fascist party or candidate to participate in the electoral campaign from its outset to the end. This will require the elaboration of some fair test to determine “Fascist” views.
- (3)
- Freedom of speech, press, radio and assembly for all.
- (4)
- Measures to assure honest recording of election returns.
- (5)
- Reorganization of the militia in the sense of a police organ for the maintenance of domestic peace and order instead of a Communist instrument of intimidation and oppression, as it now is.
- (6)
- Liberation from prison or house arrest and restitution of political rights of such important and democratically inclined political leaders as Bourov (Democrat), Moushanov (Democrat) and Guitchev (Agrarian).
The Russians are anxious to maintain the present order of things in Bulgaria. It is therefore reasonable to assume that they will try by every means to force early elaboration of a treaty of peace for Bulgaria. Even if at the present time they accomplish no more than discussion of the treaty provisions between the Big Three, the effect in Bulgaria will be to bolster the present government and further to cower the opposition. The Russians have told the present government that it need not reorganize itself as Russia will be able effectively to handle the United States and the United Kingdom in this matter. Action at this time looking to the early elaboration of a treaty of peace with Bulgaria can only confirm the existing Bulgarian government in the hope that Russia is truly the master in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.
There is a further consideration of importance that weighs against the early negotiation of a treaty of peace with Bulgaria, namely, the problem of the Straits. One of the major objectives of concluding peace with Bulgaria should be the withdrawal of the Russian troops of occupation, variously estimated at the present time from 115,000 to 200,000. This figure is not an accurate estimate of Russia’s immediate potential in Bulgaria against Turkey. Three of four existing pontoon bridges across the Danube constructed by Russia, with a reservoir of perhaps more than a million troops in Rumania and [Page 329] Hungary, constitute a better gauge of Russia’s plans and possibilities. It seems hopeless to believe that until the question of the Straits has been settled, peace treaties with the ex-satellite States would cause Russia to withdraw her military forces from the Balkans.
In the above connection the Russian proposal to elaborate a treaty of peace with Bulgaria merely by expanding nine or ten articles of the existing armistice seems significant. For us to accept such an instrument would be very much like signing a blank check in favor of Russia. The treaty would contain nothing assuring our interests, either material or political, and would leave the future entirely clear for utilization of Bulgaria as an instrument of Russian policy alone.
P.S. As of possible interest in connection with this memorandum I am attaching a paraphrase of a telegram sent by me to the Department after the postponement of the Bulgarian elections and just before my departure from Bulgaria.64