874.00/9–345: Telegram
The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 4—1:36 p.m.]
500. In its telegram of August 30 (No. 287) the Department used the terms “moral effect” and “victory” in connection with postponement of Bulgarian elections. General Crane and I appreciate Department’s anxiety now to proceed cautiously and we shall, of course, be guided by our instructions. At the same time, I feel that I must emphasize the following points:
- 1.
- The “victory” gained thus far was attained by dint of constant effort in the face of aggressive Russian policy and all-out Communist support—for the past year there has been daily Russian interference in the internal political life of Bulgaria.
- 2.
- The US is credited by both the enthusiasts and the opponents of the “victory” with almost sole responsibility for the turn of political events in Bulgaria of the past 2 weeks.
- 3.
- It is obviously impossible for me to recapitulate in this telegram the facts and opinions that I have presented so extensively to the Department over past 4 months in support of the course that finally attained postponement of the elections. (Please do see my 311, June 11.)
- 4.
- General Crane and I believe that these facts and opinions are as valid today as when currently presented.
- 5.
- They sum up, in our opinion, to the conclusion that any disposition at the present time to rest on our oars can only give final victory in Bulgaria and throughout eastern Europe to the Communists and the USSR.
- 6.
- Russian policy and Communist activity continue positive, even aggressive—only a momentary setback has been accomplished.
- 7.
- In the opinion of those of us on the spot, free elections in Bulgaria can be assured only by continued surveillance on our part, accompanied by a disposition to make our views known and our influence felt at every moment until a government has been brought into being that [Page 318] all three of the Allies can recognize and with which they can conclude peace.
- 8.
- The two essentials to neutralization of Russian and Communist aggressiveness in Bulgaria are (1) replacement of Russian-dominated Allied Control Commission by regular diplomatic relations and (2) evacuation of Bulgaria by Russian troops through conclusion of peace.
- 9.
- If the active policy on the part of the US and the UK essential to the accomplishment of these ends is, for some over-all reason, out of the question, then in truth the Yalta and Potsdam agreements can have no helpful meaning in fact for Bulgaria and the term “liberated countries” can in the end evoke only derision in eastern and southeastern Europe.
- 10.
- It can hardly be expected that the effect of ultimate failure to assure democratic procedures for this area will be attenuated by recollections of momentary, interim successes.
I am leaving Bulgaria on the morning of September 5 for a brief stay in Paris. I should welcome the possibility of expanding the above views to those of our delegation who will shortly be in London as part of the council of the five Foreign Ministers. In my opinion we have not merely a chance here, but we have a brilliant opportunity. It is my very sincere hope that we are prepared to exploit that opportunity in the interest of those principles for which we have fought two wars on the continent of Europe and one in the Pacific.
Repeated to Moscow as No. 253 and to London as No. 5.