874.00/6–745: Telegram
The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State
[Received 3:55 p.m.]
302. I believe that I can now inform the Dept that every word contained in the first quoted pgh of my 284, May 31 is true. I believe that I can also state as factual the following information:
- 1.
- In the pre-armistice period following Sept 9 the Bulgarian Army spread out into Thrace on the advice of Gen Biryusov, who told the FF Govt that then was the time for Bulgaria to make sure that Thrace should evermore be a part of Bulgaria. Molotov had to reverse this decision at the time of the armistice negotiations in Moscow because of the pre-armistice conditions insisted upon by the US and the UK.
- 2.
- Bulgaria was prepared in Jan of this year, having been led to expect support from Moscow after the fact to confront the Allies with a fait accompli in the form of a south Slav federation on [of?] Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. All arrangements to the smallest detail had been prepared for the departure of the PriMin, the MinFonAff and other Ministers representing each party in the Front to sign in Belgrade. They were to be conveyed to the Yugoslav capital in the special car of the Shah of Persia which has remained in Sofia for some years now. Even the baggage of the Ministers had been packed. At the last moment word came from Moscow not to place such a strain on Russia’s relations with the US and the UK.
- 3.
- There followed the perfection of plans for an alliance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Again Russia had to say that the US and UK would never accept.
- 4.
- And likewise in the Dimitrov case the advocates within the govt of a policy of total disregard for what the US and UK think have been disappointed by the hesitancy of Moscow. They had counted on Dimitrov being taken by Russian force from my house.
In my opinion this info is interesting primarily as support for the view that despite the gangster nature of some of the dominant forces in Bulgaria’s present-day political life, even these forces can be impressed with the importance of the US and UK in world affairs.
A further occasion to assert our legitimate interest in the political life of Bulgaria will doubtless present itself shortly now that the electoral decree has been promulgated (please see mission’s next following tel No. 303, June 7). I have already had occasion to suggest in high quarters that any general election that might return a minority-dominated govt could hardly be expected to serve the best interests of the Bulgarian people and state as what Bulgaria needs above all else is a govt with which the democratic powers can, when the time arrives, conclude a treaty of peace. I have expressed the personal opinion that a Communist-dominated cabinet subordinated to a Fatherland Front Soviet could not be expected to meet this essential condition.
Rptd to Moscow as 154 and AmPolAd as 156.