874.00/5–2945: Telegram

The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

280. I had further hour and a half talk last night with the PriMin and Genl Velchev. Genl Crane was present. I read to the Ministers my tel 278 and 279 May 28 and again appealed to them to be mindful of the importance of the US Govt and of American public opinion in world affairs. In my conversation earlier in the day I had expressed the personal view that involved in the Dimitrov case were all of the ideals for which the people of the US had participated in two wars on European soil.

The Ministers agreed that for the time being the Dimitrov problem was back in the hands of the Bulgarian Govt and myself. I mentioned in passing as a possible solution that the Govt might exile Dimitrov, thus facilitating from their point of view what I consider to be the only foolproof formula, namely, the temporary departure of Dimitrov from Bulgaria until the internal political situation is more normal.

The conversation left matters about as follows:

The problem remains one for solution between the Mission and the Govt. This may change if Biryusov receives contrary instructions but in that event the Dept’s insistence upon a tripartite decision will [Page 237] become a factor. In the meantime Dimitrov will remain with me, the militia and their civilian Communist overseers, who have put in an appearance again, will probably be replaced by personnel of the regular Bulgarian Army, responsible to the Minister of War, while the competent authorities seek to work out some formula of final solution. A guarantee was given that under no circumstances would the Bulgarian authorities attempt to seize Dimitrov by force, nor would my movements be restricted. By this morning the Russian roadblock had already been withdrawn.

I am by no means convinced that we are near a final solution of the Dimitrov case. The Communists will not give up their prey so easily. Also while officially appearing to have disinterested himself in the case for the moment, Biryusov may spur the Communists to force the Prime Minister’s hand. He has used this back door many times already. Furthermore Biryusov may at any time receive orders from Moscow to act peremptorily without regard for US and UK delegates on the Commission.

Rptd to Moscow as 139.

Barnes