740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/5–2745: Telegram
The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:45 a.m.]
277. No effort to take Dimitrov by force has yet been made but the afternoon and evening have been eventful.
Several hours after my talk yesterday68 morning with the MinFonAff I drove to my villa without the slightest molestation from the militia posted all about the property. It was clear that orders had been given in the sense requested by me in my talk with the Minster. But the dawn was quite different. I was ordered out of my car at my own gate by a barefooted gangster in disreputable civilian clothing supported by a dozen militia men. I did not take kindly to the idea. The resultant altercation ended with the capture in my car by me and one of our unarmed soldiers of the officer in charge of the militia. We drove off to the FonOff with him and there convoked the MinFonAff from his home. In the course of the afternoon I received the apologies of the Minister of Interior and was informed that the barefooted party (Communist) agent had been relieved of his duties and lodged in prison.
But far more important, I learned from our captured militia man the reason for the changed state of affairs between arriving home for luncheon and return to town after. In the interim word was received that the Russians would invade the property by force during the course of the afternoon—hence anything was permissible against the Americans. I protested about this to the MinFonAff who had the effrontery to tell me that as I had formally refused in the morning to surrender Dimitrov, the Cabinet had subsequently taken a decision to lay the whole case before the ACC, meaning the Russians, of course. I recalled to the Minister that he, himself, had placed the conversation on a speculative and exploratory basis; that there had, as he well knew, been nothing definitive about the conversation. I said that I could only conclude that he had acted dishonestly. I learned tonight the reason why.
Fearing some precipitate action at the villa Gen Crane and I hurried there with some additional Amer soldiers. As we neared the property it was clear that the Russians were taking over from the militia men and their civilian Communist overseers. Just as we left the mission building I was handed the decoded text of the Dept’s tel No. 143 of May 25. I don’t believe that any more welcome telegram [Page 231] has even [ever] been received in the history of the Service. Genl Crane and I were delighted.
Arriving at the villa I sought to locate the MinFonAff by telephone. Genl Crane had previously asked our military quarters to send additional soldiers to the villa and I had invited Genl Oxley to come there for a conference and had asked Mr Black of my staff to come out to be available to interpret with Bulgarians and Russians, if necessary. By the time I had learned that the MinFonAff had left town I had been informed by Genl Oxley that Russians had established a barrier on the road near my home and had refused to allow him to pass. They did the same with our soldiers.
Under the circumstances I insisted by telephone with the Secty Genl of the FonOff that the Prime Min and the Minister of Interior either individually or together come to my villa to hear the contents of the Deptel 143. He called me back shortly to say that the two Ministers were waiting for me at the home of the PriMin. I pointed out the impossibility of passing the Russian barrier, an obstacle for which the Bulgarian Govt was doubtless entirely responsible because of its precipitate and stupid action of turning the Dimitrov case over to the Russians in violation of all that had been said between us since the morning of the arrival of Dimitrov at my house. I said that under the circumstances I would await the PriMin and the Minister of Interior at the villa with Genl Crane and shortly thereafter the commander of the militia and the Secty Genl of the Minister of Interior arrived to discuss the situation in the name of the Minister. I sent them back with the message that what I had to say could be communicated only to a responsible member of the Govt.
Black finally got through from town and after him Sviridov, Commandant of Sofia under the Russian forces of occupation, arrived from his nearby job of establishing the post to block the road to my house. He tendered a circulation permit with the explanation that I could not pass the post without it but that Gen Crane as a member of ACC was free to come and go. I declined the honor and sought to explain why, but the good colonel left with the remark that he could not discuss political matters.
At 7 o’clock in the evening the Secty Genl of the FonOff arrived to plead that I go with him to talk matters over with the Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and MinFonAff. (I suspect he had never been absent but had at last summoned his courage to meet my charge before the Prime Minister that earlier in the day he had given an untrue account of our conversation of the morning.) The Secretary General assured me that he had authority to get me through the Russian post.
[Page 232]Accompanied by Black, we proceeded to the PriMin’s house where a long (2½ hours) and futile conversation took place. Futile because the real masters of the Govt are the Communists with Yugov, Minister of Interior, as their spokesman. The conversation revealed that a definitive character had been given to my talk of the morning with the MinFonAff because Yugov wanted to call the Russians into the situation. It also revealed that the PriMin of Bulgaria is the Central Committee of the Communist Party, through the mouthpiece of Yugov. I complained bitterly against the action taken contrary to the spirit of all our conversation by the decision of the Cabinet to call the Russian (so-called ACC) into the Dimitrov case. I proposed that even so we could perhaps get back onto the solid ground of a practical solution if the three Ministers would authorize me to telegraph the Dept that “given the circumstances obtaining in Bulg, namely the presence of the ACC, the Bulgn Govt was ready to accept as a solution of the problem presented by the fact that G. M. Dimitrov had taken refuge in the residence of the US Rep in Bulgaria, the departure of Dimitrov from Bulgaria should the ACC reach such a decision.” This formula which would prevent the Russians from contending that the Bulgarian Govt would not accede which they want to do about anything they themselves oppose, had formed in my mind from remarks made by the PriMin and the Foreign Minister [who] were prepared to accept the formula, but not so Mister Yugov. He would have nothing to do with anything but of his own devising, and all of his formulae were based on one thought only, neither the Communist nor the Russians are willing to allow Dimitrov out of their reach. Hence Biryusov must not be deprived of their defense that the Bulgarian Govt is unalterably opposed to the departure of Dimitrov.
Tiring of the footless argument, by half-past ten I finally observed that we were getting nowhere and I was going home. The PriMin expressed regrets and with a shrug of the shoulders looked toward Yugov. We all smiled, shook hands and Black and I left.
When I reached the villa I learned of the contents of Deptel 144, May 25, 8 p.m. Because of the insistence upon tripartite action if the ACC deals with the Dimitrov case, Gen Crane and I shall both sleep peacefully tonight. Gen Crane will go to Sofia this morning to ask for a meeting of the Control Commission. He will carry this message with him then for despatch to the Dept.
Rptd to Moscow as 136 and AmPolAd as 151.
- May 25.↩