You may find him a little more sanguine with respect to the possibility
of our working things out with the Russians than I am. This will not be
because of any real difference of views between us, but because perhaps
he is less politically-minded than I am.
As I see matters here, we are now going through the 1944 Bulgarian
version of what began to happen in Russia in November 1917; or, to put
it another way, September 9, 1944 in Bulgaria picked up the threads of
the Stambuliisky régime, broken by the coup
d’état of June 1923. Here we are in full revolution. In 1923
the revolutionary régime which then seemed to be so solidly ensconced
was overthrown, I might even say eradicated throughout the country, in
the short period of four hours by a coup d’état
engineered by army officers, former politicians and intellectuals. This
time the Communists are, or think they are, in charge, and they propose
to sink deep foundations. All that is opposed to them is “fascist”, and
must be excavated for those deep foundations. The Russians agree in
principle, and even look upon the Agrarians with askance.
The one hopeful factor in the situation is that while everything
bourgeois is “fascist”, nevertheless, our Bulgarian Communists are
seeking only, in fact, to assure for themselves the advantages and
security that the bourgeois system in Bulgaria has in the past conferred
upon those who now constitute the hated and dreadful “fascists”. The
pendulum will swing, but in the meantime we should not delude ourselves
into believing that three-cornered collaboration here is going to pay
dividends, that is, dividends as we understand the term. Our Russian
friends are by nature too suspicious to believe that either we, or, and
particularly, the British, could keep our eyes on the ball of higher
objectives than selfish national or Anglo-Saxon interests.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the United States Representative in
Bulgaria (Barnes)
United States Participation in Allied (Soviet) Control
Commission, Bulgaria
Section I
The Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria exists, according to
Article 18 of the Armistice, “to regulate and supervise the
execution of the armistice terms under the chairmanship of the
representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command and with the
participation of representatives of the United States and the United
Kingdom”.
The “participation” to date of the United States and United Kingdom
representatives has been limited by Russian action to what Molotov
once described in a communication to the British Ambassador in
Moscow as substantially that of liaison. They have participated in
no decisions of the Commission, and they are only infrequently
informed of decisions; in fact, they have not even been afforded the
opportunity of effective liaison with the Commission, namely, full
knowledge of the Commission’s activities.
They know of course that hostilities ceased on September 9 between
Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R., and that relations were severed by
Bulgaria with Germany and Hungary (Article 1, Paragraph A of the
Armistice).
They know that no German armed forces exist in Bulgaria and that the
nationals of Germany and her satellites have been interned. (Article
1, Paragraph B).
They know in general that Bulgarian forces are serving under the
Soviet High Command in the war against Germany. (Article 1,
Paragraph C).
They have no knowledge of the plans for the demobilization of
Bulgarian forces on the conclusion of hostilities against Germany.
(Article 1, Paragraph D).
They know that Bulgarian forces and officials have been withdrawn
from Yugoslav and Greek territories, except as otherwise required by
the Soviet High Command in the case of Yugoslavia where Bulgarian
forces are operating against the German army; also that all
legislative and administrative provisions relating to the annexation
[Page 193]
or incorporation into
Bulgaria of Greek or Yugoslav territory have been repealed. (Article
2).
They know nothing in detail about the movement of Soviet forces over
Bulgarian territory, nor of the facilities, services and supplies
made available by Bulgaria for these forces. (Articles 3, 15 and
17).
They know that Allied prisoners of war and internees have been
released and that the same is the case with respect to persons
formerly held in confinement for activities or sympathies in favor
of the United Nations; also that anti-Jewish legislation has been
repealed. (Articles 4 and 5).
They are of course aware of the extent to which the Peoples Courts
have gone in dealing with members of the former régime. (Article
6).
They have been informed that all Fascist political, military,
paramilitary, etc. organizations have been dissolved and that
control measures exist against the resumption of activities by such
organizations. (Article 7).
They know that Soviet control over literature, the press, the
theatre, the cinema and communications facilities is being exercised
and that these controls have facilitated the dissemination of
U.S.S.R. information, but have not operated to any noticeable
advantage to United States and United Kingdom informational
services. United States and United Kingdom correspondents are not
welcome. (Article 8).
They know virtually nothing of what is being done about the return of
Greek and Yugoslav property, or of what is envisaged in the way of
reparations in favor of these countries. They understand that the
rights and interests of United Nations nationals have been restored
but they are unable to obtain entry for their nationals who desire
to regain legal possession of their interests in Bulgaria. They know
of no final arid legal act of the restoration of United States and
United Kingdom property. (Articles 9 and 10).
They possess no details of the restitution of United Nations property
removed from United Nations’ territory by Germany or Bulgaria.
(Article 11).
They possess no real knowledge concerning booty handed over to the
Soviet High Command. (Article 12).
They possess no knowledge of the property belonging to Germany or
Hungary or to their nationals that is being held for ultimate
disposition by the Commission. (Article 13).
They possess no real knowledge of United Nations vessels handed over
under Article 14, nor do they know about Bulgarian merchant vessels
subject to the operational control of the Soviet High Command.
(Article 16).
[Page 194]
They know of no steps looking to the determination of reparations on
behalf of Greece and Yugoslavia, nor do they know of any steps being
taken to supply foodstuffs for the relief of the Greek population.
They know in general that relief supplies have gone to Yugoslavia,
but they possess no details. (Article 9 and the Protocol).
Whatever we may consider the rights of our representation on the
Allied Control Commission to be, our participation on that
Commission has been modified in effect by the Eden and Molotov
exchange of correspondence, as set forth in the annex to this
memorandum.
Section II
The United States Mission in Bulgaria exists to foster and develop
the interests of the United States in Bulgaria and the interest of
the Bulgarian people in the United States and its way of life. It is
charged with reporting fully on all developments of political
significance, externally and internally, and of keeping the United
States Government informed during the present critical period in
Bulgarian affairs of major trends in this country. While the Mission
does not have formal diplomatic relations with the Government of
Bulgaria, it is instructed to maintain such informal contact with
the Bulgarian Government, as well as to assure itself full freedom
of movement and communications, as may be necessary to fulfill its
responsibilities for the protection and extension of American
interests in Bulgaria.
The objectives which it pursues in the interests of the United States
Government are:
- 1.
- The right of peoples to choose and maintain for themselves
without outside interference the type of political, social
and economic systems they desire, so long as they conduct
their affairs in such a way as not to menace the peace and
security of others.
- 2.
- Equality of opportunity, as against the setting up of a
policy of exclusion, in commerce, transit and trade; and
freedom to negotiate, either through government agencies or
private enterprise, irrespective of the type of economic
system in operation.
- 3.
- The right of access on an equal and unrestricted basis of
bona fide representatives of the recognized press, radio,
newsreels and information agencies engaged in gathering news
and other forms of public information for dissemination to
the public in the United States; and the right to transmit
information gathered without hindrance or
discrimination.
- 4.
- Freedom for American philanthropic and educational
organizations to carry on their activities on the basis of
most favored-nation treatment.
- 5.
- General protection of American citizens and the protection
and furtherance of legitimate American economic rights,
existing or potential.
[Page 195]
Section III
Modification of A.C.C. procedures in favor of the United States and
United Kingdom representatives is foreseen in Article 18 of the
Armistice terms. Also, in Ambassador Winant’s letter of October 22
to the Acting Soviet Representative on the European Advisory
Committee31 a caveat
was filed in favor of more effective representation for the United
States after the termination of hostilities with Germany.
The modifications proposed in correspondence exchanged between the
Department and the Mission are:
- 1.
- American and British representatives to take their places
as full members of the Commission with the right to be
present at all meetings and to participate fully in the
handling of all questions before the Commission. They should
have the right to direct access to the Bulgarian
authorities.
- 2.
- Decisions issued in the name and authority of the Allied
Control Commission should be unanimous. Should the Soviet
High Command insist upon issuing directives to the local
government or upon taking measures which the United States
and the United Kingdom representatives do not approve, these
acts should be taken unilaterally in the name of the Soviet
High Command.
- 3.
- The degree to which the United States and United Kingdom
representatives shall participate in the administrative and
executive work of the Commission is a matter for
determination on the spot. However, they must certainly have
the right to membership in any sub-committee or executive
organ dealing with United States and United Kingdom rights
and property.
- 4.
- Unrestricted movement in and out of Bulgaria of United
States and United Kingdom aircraft required by
representatives for communication and transportation.
- 5.
- Unrestricted movement of necessary personnel into and out
of Bulgaria and freedom of movement within Bulgaria.
Section IV
We have seen from the foregoing that the representation of the United
States on the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria is for the
purpose of regulating and supervising the execution of the Armistice
terms, and that the United States Mission in Bulgaria exists for the
purpose of political representation, reporting and the protection
and furtherance of the interests of the United States people in
Bulgaria.
[Page 196]
We have also seen from the foregoing that the representation of the
United States on the Allied Control Commission has not, because of
Russian hindrance, been able to participate effectively in
regulating and supervising the execution of the Armistice terms. The
sme qua non to effective participation in
the supervision and the execution of the Armistice terms in the
period after the termination of hostilities with Germany is
acceptance by Russia of the conditions set forth in Section III of
the memorandum.
There remains to be emphasized the fact that the two avenues of the
United States action in Bulgaria (Allied Control Commission
representation and the Mission) are useful to United States
interests, both on the higher level of cooperation between the three
principal allied powers and in the more restricted realm of the
protection and furtherance of United States interests in Bulgaria,
only if these two courses of action are complementary. Otherwise,
our representation along one avenue serves only to check the
effectiveness of our representation along the other.
Ineffective participation in the Allied Control Commission can serve
only to frustrate political representation in Bulgaria.
Representation on the Allied Control Commission serves to bolster
the position of a commission dominated by the Russians, who thus far
have refused to deal with the Mission on the grounds that the proper
channel of communications is the Representative of the United States
on the Allied Control Commission. At the same time the Russians have
refused thus far effectively to cooperate with the United States
Representative on the Control Commission.
On the other hand, so far as the Mission is concerned, the Bulgarian
Foreign Office is held in check by the Russian dominated Control
Commission on the grounds that the relations of the Foreign Office
with the Mission must likewise pass through the channel of the
Control Commission.
Section V—Conclusions
Neither with respect to the broader problem of cooperation between
the three principal Allied Powers, nor in the field of the more
restricted one of protection and furtherance of the rights and
interests of the United States people in Bulgaria, can it be argued
that our objectives will be served by the continuance of ineffectual
United States representation on the Allied Control Commission. In
other words, during the second period of the Armistice, the United
States Government must either obtain Russian acceptance of the
conditions set forth in Section III of this memorandum or revise the
form of its dual activity in Bulgaria at this time.
[Page 197]
In my opinion, no evidence exists to support the hope that we may
obtain these necessary concessions from the Russians for the second
period of the armistice. If we do not succeed I suggest that United
States interests can best be served by a policy that seeks to
short-circuit the Allied Control Commission wherever possible, and
when not possible to force the Commission to deal directly with
representation that seeks to protect and extend United States
interests. This could be accomplished only by the elimination of our
representation on the Allied Control Commission. As between
protecting and extending United States interests and regulating and
supervising the execution of the armistice terms there would seem to
be no difficulty of choice, if a choice must be made. The decision
would of course rest in the final analysis with the Russians: they
must in future accept our representation on the Commission in a
manner that will assure our effective participation; at any rate,
they should no longer profit from a situation that renders
ineffective both the activity of our representation on the
Commission and our political representation in Bulgaria.
There remains one point to be mentioned: to leave open our
representation on the Allied Control Commission would of course
arouse the apprehensions on the part of the Bulgarian public in
general. The mere presence of our military here has an encouraging
effect on the skeptical and doubtful with respect to ultimate
Russian aims. The evaluation of this factor as an offset to the
protection and furtherance of our own national interests would seem
to be a matter for decision on a high level. My own view is that the
choice, if one must be made, should be in favor of protecting as
best possible, our own national interests. Especially would this
seem to be the case when Russian action makes impossible any serious
attempt at cooperation in Bulgaria between the three principal
Allied Powers.
