740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/1–1845: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative in Bulgaria ( Barnes )
21. Reurtel 36, January 18. There are no annexes to the armistice with Bulgaria, unless the four-point protocol (delivery of foodstuffs to [Page 149] Greece and Yugoslavia, definition of war material, delivery of vessels, and services and supplies for Allied representatives) may be so considered. Among the related unpublished documents would be (1) the exchange of letters concerning the American intention, if desirable at some later date, to discuss the detailed manner in which Article 18 should be implemented;40 and (2) the British or Soviet records of that part of the Eden-Molotov negotiations at Moscow dealing with Bulgaria. It is probably these latter documents to which you refer.
The Department had some knowledge of the Eden-Molotov conversations,41 which covered a variety of subjects and in the course of which, as the Department learned, Eden said that he was obliged to concede to the Soviet Government a predominating influence in Bulgaria in exchange for concessions in Yugoslavia which the Soviets made to the British. It was therefore important that this Government should make it clear that the Eden-Molotov deal should not be binding on us. While we accepted the compromise text of Article 18, we were not party to “interpretations” or “understandings” between the British and Soviet Governments as to the meaning of the word “participation”. We felt that during the military period our position on the Control Commission would of necessity be similar to that in Rumania, and similar to the Soviet position in Italy but that, not being bound by any interpretation agreed on by the British and Soviet Governments as a part of their general understandings on Balkan affairs, we could obtain the substance of our requirements under the term participation as it stands in the text. We were particularly unwilling to acknowledge, for the second period, a status where our representatives would have hardly more than observer and liaison functions. Accordingly Mr. Winant was instructed42 to inform his British and Soviet colleagues in the EAC that he had been directed to state that this Government continues to feel that Article 18 should properly have contained an additional provision to the effect that in the second period the Control Commission will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice according to the instructions of the three Governments. There followed the exchange of letters referred to above. In the Soviet reply reference was made to the discussions with Eden in Moscow, and the letter continued by stating that the provision for the chairmanship signifies that the direction of the Control Commission will belong to the Soviet Command during both periods, although in the second period the leading role of the Soviet High Command will be “limited to a certain degree in favor [Page 150] of the American and British representatives.” The reply also expressed the unwillingness of the Soviet Government to agree to a proposal for supplementing Article 18, since this might be interpreted as meaning that the three Governments would have an equal share in the practical activity and responsibility although only Soviet troops are in Bulgaria, and the country is not divided into zones of occupation. Such an interpretation, the letter continued, would lead to the elimination of the Soviet Command from the direction of the Control Commission, and in accepting the present form of Article 18 the Soviet Government based its attitude on the necessity for preserving the leading role of the Soviet High Command “although in a somewhat different form, likewise during the second period.”
Since the Soviet letter closed with an assumption that the American delegation would not insist on a further discussion of this article, Mr. Winant was directed43 to reaffirm the position taken in his first letter. He was instructed to say that the considerations advanced by the Soviet Government do not afford a convincing reason for the abandonment by this Government of its intention to discuss this question, and that they do not materially alter the desire of this Government to reexamine at an appropriate time together with the British and Soviet Governments the manner in which Article 18 should be implemented during the second period.
We have reason to believe that the language of the Soviet letter was substantially the same as that used in a letter from Molotov to Eden dated October 15, and while we were informed that Eden sent only a “simple acknowledgment”44 it may be that his reply, however short, accepted the Soviet position. The important point is that, whether or not the British may have accepted definite restrictions for themselves, the American representation on the ACC is governed by the language of the armistice as published, with such further potential advantages as we may claim under our reservation.
It is realized that in practice the Russians may not find it easy to make distinctions in the treatment of the British and American delegations. Your recent telegrams show your appreciation of this situation. With these considerations in mind General Crane need feel no hesitation in maintaining, as the Department considers he has very capably done thus far, his position for participation in regular and sufficiently frequent meetings of the ACC, for the right to obtain information from its respective sections, and for prior knowledge of important decisions made in the name of the ACC, even though the Soviet element, which retains, at least in the first period, administrative and [Page 151] executive power, may not feel obliged to accept his recommendations or advice. We expect that as a result of Harriman’s talks with Molotov in connection with the Hungarian negotiations arrangements will be made for better attention to the needs of our missions in Bulgaria.
The foregoing is being communicated to the Joint Chiefs for their information in replying to a telegram from General Crane on this matter. Sent to Sofia; repeated to London, Moscow and AmPolAd.45
- See footnote 6, p. 135.↩
- See footnote 8, p. 136.↩
- Telegram 8735, October 21, 1944, 3 p.m., to London, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iii, p. 469.↩
- Telegram 25, January 1, 1945, midnight, p. 137.↩
- See telegram 8904, October 18, 1944, 9 p.m., from London, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iii, p. 463.↩
- As 634 to London, 175 to Moscow, and 68 to AmPolAd, Caserta.↩