740.00119 Control (Italy)/11–3045: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:50 p.m.]
3804. Reference Dept’s 2198 of Nov 27.22 Admiral Stone had discussion yesterday with SACMED on subject of my 3749 of Nov 26.22 Chief Commissioner in presenting his case spoke from memorandum of which following is extract of pertinent portion.
After communiqué issued on Sept. 26 by Council of Foreign Ministers in London regarding Italian-Yugoslav frontier, political advisers recommended sending military liaison officers to anchorages on west coast of Istria and from Appendix “C” of Morgan Agreement it appeared that maintenance of military liaison officers in these ports was justified. Furthermore, AFHQ’s original stand on this matter appeared to indicate it desired information concerning change in the inhabitants of this area and that only through stationing of these officers on shore could this information be obtained.
Since AFHQ rejected AC’s proposals Allied Commission felt it should reiterate its case (see my 3282 of Oct 27) to effect that Yugoslav policy of sabotaging Belgrade Agreement would lead to their producing false evidence to deceive the commission of inquiry and that therefore Allies should by legitimate means attempt to prevent presentation of such false evidence.
With respect to SACMED’s views (see my 3564 of November 16), since Allies have right to inspect ports and anchorages in question, surely this right could be used to obtain evidence on population movement. There is ample evidence that Yugoslav policy is to proceed to annexation of Zone B and not to hold it “in trust”. Finally, it is reiterated that it appears important to ascertain truth and in this connection it is also pointed out that US Embassy has stated that the rights re question to inspect the anchorages were included in Belgrade Agreement more for political reasons in order to increase Allied control over densely populated Italians areas and not so much for purely naval reasons, at least from American viewpoint.
Suggestion of SACMED that this matter be taken up through diplomatic channels is termed impracticable since Yugoslav Govt would never furnish evidence that it was causing population changes in this area and, furthermore, no diplomatic action could stop such movement.
In conclusion, Admiral Stone’s memorandum notes that I originally pointed out in this connection that it was preferable to implement the existing agreements under which we had these rights rather [Page 1218] than to start some new diplomatic crisis. In his last point the Chief Commissioner mentions that Allied Commission was instructed to prepare ethnic and economic report on whole of Venezia Giulia and that original proposal to send officers to anchorages on west coast of Istria was made in order to facilitate preparation of truthful report for use of Foreign Ministers.
Chief Commissioner informs me that following presentation of his case SACMED informed him that inasmuch as his presentation appeared to offer nothing new he did not propose to alter his previous decision. In this stand, according to Admiral Stone, Morgan was supported by his American Deputy, Gen. Ridgway. It appears that SACMED’s position was in substantial agreement with Foreign Office’s position as outlined in London’s 11359 of Oct. 30 repeated to Caserta, and that he had made decision in favor of his, the British Govt’s policy.
In view of fact that this question appears to represent a difference of opinion between the Allied Govts (since Dept’s position as outlined in its 1907 [907] of Oct 18 to Caserta would not appear to be in agreement with Foreign Office and SACMED’s position) and this would not appear to be a matter for decision in the field, it is suggested that the Dept and the appropriate British authorities may care to refer this matter to CCS for decision following which appropriate instructions could be sent to SACMED.
Sent Dept; repeated London 350; Caserta 1142.