740.00119 Control (Italy)/5–845

Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee of Three, May 8, 1945, 11 a.m.

[Extract]23a
Present: Messrs. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War,
James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy,
Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State.
Also present during part of the meeting:
Mr. Artemus L. Gates, Assistant Secretary of the Navy–Air,
Major Mathias F. Correa, USMCR.
Mr. Harvey H. Bundy was present as Acting Recorder.
[Page 1146]

The following matters were discussed:

Venezia Giulia

Mr. Grew reported the present action of Marshal Tito’s forces in taking practical control of the Gorizia province up to the Isonzo River, his forces acting with the very definite intention of taking territory which would never be voluntarily relinquished. Mr. Grew reported Ambassador Kirk’s strong feeling that acquiescence by the Allies would have very serious effects and amounted to appeasement in the face of aggressive action. The directive of the President that American forces should not be put in a position of possible clashing with Tito’s forces nor take part in the political arena in the Balkans was referred to by Mr. Grew. Mr. Grew further stated that the State Department has conveyed to the Yugoslav authorities our preference for Allied Military Government in occupied areas and has made the reservation that any action taken now is not to be considered as prejudicing the ultimate settlement of territorial claims.

. . . . . . .

Attached hereto is the State Department Information for Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal.

[Annex—Extract]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

1. Venezia Giulia. Kirk reports that any Italian Government which acquiesced in any surrender of territory in connection with the question of Venezia Giulia would collapse. The Italian press has reported that AMG is already set up in the area, and that Italians generally believe these reports. AC’s Chief Commissioner emphasizes that serious consequences will result if this Italian belief in AMG’s presence is allowed to go uncontradicted. He also points out the deplorable effect on Allied prestige throughout Italy if the Allied commitment made to Italy last September that AMG would be set up in Venezia Giulia is not carried out at least in Trieste. Italian feeling on this is extremely strong.

Far from AMG having actually been set up in Venezia Giulia, the Yugoslavs by a combination of bravado, bluff and show of arms are getting things their own way. BBC’s24 broadcasting that Partisan troops had conquered Trieste before the British forces got there has not helped the situation. SAC has demanded that BBC broadcast [Page 1147] no communiqués on the situation in Venezia Giulia except those AFHQ issues or approves.

SAC has proposed a working arrangement with Tito giving SAC military control of the port of Trieste and the railway and roads from there to Austria via Gorizia. “Full use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration already set up and working satisfactorily,” which means Yugoslav, not Allied, control of the area. This is even less than Tito offered SAC on May 5 since Tito also offered use of the port of Pola. Admiral Cunningham, CinCMed, is anxious to use Pola but up to now SACMED has overruled him. British JCS25 is urgently pressing American JCS to agree to this arrangement, with a face-saving clause that this does not affect the peace-treaty disposal of “any pre-war Italian territory.”

Kirk points out that this means the whole position which the U.S. has maintained with regard to Venezia Giulia for the past several months is about to collapse. We are even retreating further than the British position. He observes that this withdrawal would in the eyes of the U.S. and world public opinion be interpreted as abandonment of principles we have always held.

Tito has frankly told SAC that in addition to his military responsibilities as Yugoslav’s CinC he is also as Yugoslavia’s Prime Minister bound “to take care of the interests of his country” and that Yugoslav occupation of Venezia Giulia has not only a military but a political character. Tito has repeated that his troops are under order to hold all the territory they have occupied up to the Isonzo River, which is 95% of Venezia Giulia.

Actually, Yugoslav forces are pressing on even further west and north into Italy, and all Allied personnel who are in a position to observe the movement and disposition of these Yugoslav troops are being ordered to get out of the country at once.25a The Yugoslavs are even trying to establish civil control in the eastern part of Udine, the Italian province beyond Venezia Giulia.

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In Trieste the Yugoslavs are using all the familiar tactics of terror. Every Italian of any importance is being arrested. Yugoslavs have taken over complete control and are conscripting Italians for forced labor, seizing the banks and other valuable property, and requisitioning grain and other supplies on a large scale. The Archbishop of Gorizia and other priests have been arrested, and many others are threatened. Some “incidents” are naturally occurring over this. The Yugoslavs are exaggerating these “incidents” along the old Nazi lines and by the same methods. Further reports of such “incidents” may be expected as Yugoslav troops are “insulted” by the local citizenry and peasants.

It is apparent that under present conditions Allied operation of Trieste and road and rail communications to Austria would depend on Yugoslav good will. The main Yugoslav objection is to the presence of a strong force of Allied fighting troops, as opposed to the Army service elements they were expecting to operate the ports and railways. The Yugoslavs do not want any troops there who might conceivably hamper their designs. So they are claiming that the Allies have intervened in “local Yugoslav affairs” (in this Italian area) and that the Allies intended to impose “a Fascist or Imperialist government on an unwilling people.”

. . . . . . .

  1. For another excerpt from the minutes of this meeting, see footnote 56a, p. 687.
  2. British Broadcasting Corporation.
  3. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  4. In telegram 1958, May 5, midnight, from Caserta, Ambassador Kirk had reported that the Chief of Staff of the Fourth Yugoslav Army had issued through the British Liaison Officer an order that all Allied personnel who were in a position to observe the movement and disposition of Yugoslav troops must withdraw to Fourth Army headquarters or be evacuated from the country; the presence of Allied personnel (including liaison officers) would be interpreted as an “enemy gesture”. In telegram 1963, May 5, midnight, Kirk added that General Jovanović in the name of Marshal Tito had “protested that Allied troops withdraw immediately to previously agreed line namely the Isonzo River”. (740.00119 Control (Italy)/5–545) The Yugoslav demands were evidently ineffectual, for the Department of Defense has supplied the information that nothing has been found in its records to substantiate the statement that all Allied personnel were being ordered to get out of the country, either by their own superiors or by the Yugoslavs.