| Present: |
Messrs. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of
War, |
|
James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the
Navy, |
|
Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of
State. |
|
Also present during part of the
meeting: |
|
Mr. Artemus L. Gates, Assistant Secretary
of the Navy–Air, |
|
Major Mathias F. Correa, USMCR. |
|
Mr. Harvey H. Bundy was present as Acting
Recorder. |
Mr. Grew reported the present action of Marshal Tito’s forces in taking
practical control of the Gorizia province up to the Isonzo River, his
forces acting with the very definite intention of taking territory which
would never be voluntarily relinquished. Mr. Grew reported Ambassador
Kirk’s strong feeling that acquiescence by the Allies would have very
serious effects and amounted to appeasement in the face of aggressive
action. The directive of the President that American forces should not
be put in a position of possible clashing with Tito’s forces nor take
part in the political arena in the Balkans was referred to by Mr. Grew.
Mr. Grew further stated that the State Department has conveyed to the
Yugoslav authorities our preference for Allied Military Government in
occupied areas and has made the reservation that any action taken now is
not to be considered as prejudicing the ultimate settlement of
territorial claims.
. . . . . . .
Attached hereto is the State Department Information for Secretaries
Stimson and Forrestal.
[Annex—Extract]
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of
State
[Washington,] May 8,
1945.
1. Venezia Giulia. Kirk reports that any
Italian Government which acquiesced in any surrender of territory in
connection with the question of Venezia Giulia would collapse. The
Italian press has reported that AMG is already set up in the area,
and that Italians generally believe these reports. AC’s Chief
Commissioner emphasizes that serious consequences will result if
this Italian belief in AMG’s presence is allowed to go
uncontradicted. He also points out the deplorable effect on Allied
prestige throughout Italy if the Allied commitment made to Italy
last September that AMG would be set up in Venezia Giulia is not
carried out at least in Trieste. Italian feeling on this is
extremely strong.
Far from AMG having actually been set up in Venezia Giulia, the
Yugoslavs by a combination of bravado, bluff and show of arms are
getting things their own way. BBC’s24 broadcasting that
Partisan troops had conquered Trieste before the British forces got
there has not helped the situation. SAC has demanded that BBC
broadcast
[Page 1147]
no communiqués
on the situation in Venezia Giulia except those AFHQ issues or
approves.
SAC has proposed a working arrangement with Tito giving SAC military
control of the port of Trieste and the railway and roads from there
to Austria via Gorizia. “Full use will be made of any Yugoslav civil
administration already set up and working satisfactorily,” which
means Yugoslav, not Allied, control of the area. This is even less
than Tito offered SAC on May 5 since Tito also offered use of the
port of Pola. Admiral Cunningham, CinCMed, is anxious to use Pola
but up to now SACMED has overruled him. British JCS25 is urgently
pressing American JCS to agree to this arrangement, with a
face-saving clause that this does not affect the peace-treaty
disposal of “any pre-war Italian territory.”
Kirk points out that this means the whole position which the U.S. has
maintained with regard to Venezia Giulia for the past several months
is about to collapse. We are even retreating further than the
British position. He observes that this withdrawal would in the eyes
of the U.S. and world public opinion be interpreted as abandonment
of principles we have always held.
Tito has frankly told SAC that in addition to his military
responsibilities as Yugoslav’s CinC he is also as Yugoslavia’s Prime
Minister bound “to take care of the interests of his country” and
that Yugoslav occupation of Venezia Giulia has not only a military
but a political character. Tito has repeated that his troops are
under order to hold all the territory they have occupied up to the
Isonzo River, which is 95% of Venezia Giulia.
Actually, Yugoslav forces are pressing on even further west and north
into Italy, and all Allied personnel who are in a position to
observe the movement and disposition of these Yugoslav troops are
being ordered to get out of the country at once.25a The Yugoslavs
are even trying to establish civil control in the eastern part of
Udine, the Italian province beyond Venezia Giulia.
[Page 1148]
In Trieste the Yugoslavs are using all the familiar tactics of
terror. Every Italian of any importance is being arrested. Yugoslavs
have taken over complete control and are conscripting Italians for
forced labor, seizing the banks and other valuable property, and
requisitioning grain and other supplies on a large scale. The
Archbishop of Gorizia and other priests have been arrested, and many
others are threatened. Some “incidents” are naturally occurring over
this. The Yugoslavs are exaggerating these “incidents” along the old
Nazi lines and by the same methods. Further reports of such
“incidents” may be expected as Yugoslav troops are “insulted” by the
local citizenry and peasants.
It is apparent that under present conditions Allied operation of
Trieste and road and rail communications to Austria would depend on
Yugoslav good will. The main Yugoslav objection is to the presence
of a strong force of Allied fighting troops, as opposed to the Army
service elements they were expecting to operate the ports and
railways. The Yugoslavs do not want any troops there who might
conceivably hamper their designs. So they are claiming that the
Allies have intervened in “local Yugoslav affairs” (in this Italian
area) and that the Allies intended to impose “a Fascist or
Imperialist government on an unwilling people.”
. . . . . . .
