Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe, Volume IV

740.00119 Control (Italy)/5–545: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

Caserta, May 5, 1945—midnight.
[Received May 5—8:32 p.m.]

1960. For Acting Secretary. See our 1951, May 5, midnight. In view of Tito’s reply to SAC’s message Alexander called a meeting this afternoon to discuss the next step to be taken in connection with the question of Trieste and Venezia Giulia. During the course of the meeting Macmillan pointed out that while CCS is continually referring to Fan 536 as directive on which SAC must base his actions in fact it is out of date. He added that American policy as presented by us at AFHQ is holding to Fan 536 and the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Territories but President Truman on the other hand has made it clear that he wishes to avoid the carrying out of any action in Venezia Giulia which might possibly lead to fighting between Yugoslav and American troops. SAC proposed sending his Chief of Staff²⁰ directly to Belgrade to confer with Tito rather than to meet with Tito’s Chief of Staff at Bari and then produced a draft military agreement²¹ which he considered might be concluded between himself and Tito in order to arrive at some working arrangement. The proposed agreement between Tito and SAC would provide:

1. As Field Marshal Alexander requires that the Port of Trieste and the railway and roads from there to Villach via Gorizia, the territory west of the line marked on the map will be under his control. All forces, whether 15 Army Group or Yugoslav, or Partisan, will come under his orders at an agreed time.

We suggested that we did not think at this stage that SAC should proceed to make with Tito any arrangements of any kind which were not in accordance with the terms of Fan 536 and considered that any such agreement should first be approved by CCS and by the two Governments in Washington and London. We added that in view of the present delicate situation in Trieste and Venezia Giulia, any military agreement would have serious political repercussions not only on the ultimate future of Trieste but also on the situation in Italy. Any agreement which SAC might make would be bound to involve delimitation of zones and would be construed as committing us in one way or another with regard to policy towards the fate of that area.

The above draft agreement is being telegraphed urgently today to CCS by Alexander together with a statement that unless he receives a reply from CCS by May 7 he intends to send his Chief of Staff to Belgrade in order to negotiate such an agreement with Tito.^21a

I understand that Macmillan is communicating urgently with Churchill requesting him to clear this draft with President Truman as soon as possible. In the meantime SAC is dispatching a telegram to Tito telling him that we suggest that a quicker and more satisfactory manner to handle this matter would be for Lieutenant General Morgan, SAC’s Chief of Staff, to proceed to Belgrade for conversations.

2. Field Marshal Alexander’s Military Government will administer this area. Full use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration already set up and working satisfactorily.

3. To facilitate the working of 1 and 2 above Yugoslav regular forces should gradually be withdrawn from the area under Field Marshal Alexander’s control and Partisans will hand in their arms and disband.

4. This agreement is purely military in character and in no way affects long term policy regarding these territories.

It is clear that the maximum that Field Marshal Alexander now hopes to get out of Tito is Trieste and the rail and road lines of communications from that port into Austria. In other words he is planning to obtain even less than he would have gotten had he been able to persuade us in March of the merits of the so-called Robertson Line which included territory within a radius of 15 miles from Trieste, northwest to Tolminio and then north to 1939 frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia.

As I have informed Department Tito offered SAC not only port of Trieste and the L of C to Austria but also use of port of Pola. We urged SAC to include this offer in his draft agreement and he was inclined to do so but his Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Morgan (who will conduct proposed negotiations with Tito) strongly objected on grounds Tito would become “suspicious”. Admiral Cunningham CinCMed²² would also like to have use of port of Pola but up to present time has been overruled by Alexander.

I cannot help but feel that this is the last opportunity we shall have to save the position which we have maintained throughout the past months with regard to Venezia Giulia. I hardly need remind Department of our responsibility to Italian Government as conveyed by Allied Commission (see our 609 of February 20, 11 p.m.). As I have already reported on previous occasions Department must envisage the collapse of any Italian government which acquiesced in any surrender of territory in connection with the question of Venezia Giulia and it would seem therefore most desirable to prevent serious political and administrative troubles which must arise if Venezia Giulia is to be handed over to Yugoslavs before the peace settlement. I confidently hope that the Department will agree that it is no less desirable now than it has been heretofore for us to agree to establishment of a provisional line of demarcation such as British have been suggesting for some time, and I submit that in my opinion any action which might be interpreted as a withdrawal from our position for maintenance of the 1939 frontiers, pending final settlement, would in the eyes of American and world public opinion be interpreted as abandonment of the principles which we have always maintained.

Judging from Tito’s last message to Alexander it is my view that he has climbed down a few pegs since receipt of SAC’s message referred to in my 1926 of May 4 midnight which is due to fact that Alexander called his bluff and while I sympathize with our desire to avoid having to fight Tito and possibly the Russians I am convinced that they will be just as reluctant to fire on us as we would be to fire on them.

I hope you will confer urgently with CCS before they prepare reply to SAC’s proposal on draft agreement under reference.^22a

Kirk

20. Gen. W. D. Morgan.
21. The terms of the agreement were presented to Marshal Tito by General Morgan on May 9. For text, see C.R.S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy: 1943–1945 (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957), p. 337. When ultimately presented, though not when discussed on May 5, the agreement included provision that the port of Pola and the anchorages on the west coast of Istria between Pola and Trieste would be open to unrestricted use by Allied naval forces.
22. Naf 948; not printed. For major portion of text, see Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, in the official Army history, United States Army in World War II: Special Studies (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 597–598.
22. Adm. Sir John Cunningham, R.N., British Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and Allied Naval Commander, Mediterranean.
23. The Department of Defense has supplied information to the effect that on May 7, in a message dispatched after clearance with the Department of State, the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorized Field Marshal Alexander to negotiate his proposed agreement with Tito, with instructions to “make it abundantly clear that this agreement is purely military and ensure that Tito understands that it does not affect the ultimate disposal of any pre-war Italian territory which will be a matter to be decided at the peace settlement.”