Office of the Historian

740.00119 European War 1939/12–1145: Airgram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

Rome, December 11, 1945.
[Received December 21—9:47 a.m.]

A–1076. Following is text of Allied Commission’s covering letter of December 8 to AFHQ enclosing interim document to replace existing armistice terms, reported in my telegram no. 3981 of December 10.

  • “1. In your F55392 of 5 Dec 45 you instructed me26 to send my views as to abrogating or modifying the terms of the Armistice without prejudice to Allied military requirements or to any question which will fall to be decided in the eventual peace settlement.
  • “2. If we follow the public utterances of the leaders of the United Nations the terms of Fan 48727 and (notwithstanding certain restrictive financial directives received subsequently) the policy underlying these statements and directions: if we study the long terms of the Armistice and your commentary recently made thereon, we can arrive at only one conclusion, namely, that the Armistice is out of date: most of the clauses have been superseded by events, the remainder have with few exceptions been modified in implementation and the instrument, designed for the surrender of an enemy in war, enjoyed [Page 1094] immediate modification as a result of co-belligerency during war and now is practically inapplicable. If it were thought that Italy was ready for a Treaty then it must be admitted that she is ready for a new formal relationship, which, while perhaps less than that of an Ally a member of the United Nations is certainly more than that of a defeated nation.
  • “3. Moreover, from the purely practical point of view an examination of the existing Armistice Terms demonstrates that any attempt to modify or abrogate the articles of the document piecemeal would leave an instrument so tattered and unbalanced as to be quite unsuitable.
  • “4. We recommend, therefore, that the Armistice Terms be abrogated altogether and be replaced by an Agreement of which a proposed draft is attached. The preamble is much the same as that prepared for MJPS28 in September.
  • “5. The general clauses reflect reciprocal aid. The political clauses make reference to free and democratic government, a plebiscite or referendum on the institutional question which must be the first concern of both the Allies and Italy. The armed services are covered by a blanket clause which is not very satisfactory, but which appears necessary because control of the Italian Navy and Air Force has not yet been handed back to the Italian Government, and because to show the consequent discrimination between the Army and the other services would be invidious. In this respect I have assumed that the abrogation of the Armistice Terms does not necessarily suppress the Cunningham–de Courten Agreement. Perhaps it may be possible to relax control of the Italian Navy and Air Force sufficiently to be able to include a clause to this effect in the Agreement. The rights and privileges of the Allied Forces would be covered by the civil administration arrangements originally proposed to come into effect with the Peace Treaty but which under our proposal would be applied with such an interim Agreement. As already expressed at SACMED’s Conference of 4 Oct 45, Minute 8, I would most strongly recommend that one Allied instrument on the lines of the US draft be prepared and that certain clauses be modified. A cultural clause covers reciprocal action regarding works of art. I have included provision for an Allied Police Mission the acceptance of which by the Italian Government would be more probable in the manner proposed. Finally, an Allied Liaison Mission is recommended. There is little doubt that a Mission of this nature will be necessary to interpret your views to the Italian Government and vice versa.
  • “6. Such an Agreement replaces the existing Armistice Terms by a document which reflects more accurately the present relation between Italy and the United Nations and the latter’s confidence in the Italian people, which adequately safeguards Allied interests and is in line with Allied policy towards Italy as we understand it.”
Kirk
  1. Presumably Adm. Ellery W. Stone, Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.↩
  2. Fan 487, January 31, 1945, not printed, but see aide-mémoire, February 24, 1945, which is based on Fan 487, p. 1244.↩
  3. Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.↩