Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88: CFM London Documents

Statement by the Italian Foreign Minister (de Gasperi) to the Council of Foreign Ministers

C.F.M.(45) 27

London, 18 September, 1945.

Italian Peace Treaty: Yugoslav Frontier and Trieste

statement of views of italian government

The following is the text of a statement made by Signor de Gasperi on behalf of the Italian Government at the Ninth Meeting of the Council held on 18th September, 1945:—

“I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible. I thank you for having given the representative of democratic Italy this opportunity to speak. I will do so with all frankness, avoiding the time-worn tactics of submitting maximum proposals so as to be enabled to fall back on alternative ones. I will immediately refer to the sacrifices that we can and must make in the name of European solidarity and for the reconstruction of a better world, thereby implicitly excluding other solutions that no Italian democratic Government could afford to agree to.

Our object is, above all, the re-establishment of our old friendship with Yugoslavia, torn asunder by the Fascist aggression that we anti-Fascist democrats deplored and condemned. During the 1914–1918 world war, at the cost of 600,000 dead, Italy not only freed Trento and Trieste but decisively contributed to the liberation of other oppressed peoples. The Italian people consider it an honour to be amongst the makers of the independence of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. I am before you to-day in the same spirit which prompted us during those days.

The frontier between the two countries was established through a free and mutual agreement between Italians and Yugoslavs embodied in the Treaty of Rapallo, ratified by the two democratic Parliaments of Home and Belgrade. If Italian democracy had been able to apply the principles by which she was inspired, a series of linguistic guarantees and regional autonomies would have given to the ethnic minorities a secure national life. Unfortunately, however, the wave of nationalistic reaction swept over democracy and—from the episode of Fiume—Fascism was born, attaining power through violence and terror, and establishing itself throughout Italy. Yugoslavia rightfully complained of the oppression of her minorities and Venezia Giulia and sought vengeance for the fire of the Narodni Dom in Trieste. They are right. We can understand the affronts they are denouncing because we too have shared them. My newspaper in Trento was also burnt and sacked and I too was thrown in jail. Like many Italian and Slav anti-Fascists, within and without Italy, thousands of democrats, with no distinction of nationalities, had to live in exile. We certainly do not wish to hide any responsibility in this war, but it is a fact that the Italian people did their utmost to end the situation brought about by the dictator. On their side, the Yugoslavs can have some understanding of what our position was. They too, under Nedich and Pavelich,⁷⁷ have experienced what a ruthless dictatorship can mean. The overthrow of Fascism on 25th July and the Armistice of 8th September⁷⁸ enabled our soldiers in certain regions of the Balkans to furnish arms to the Slav and Balkan partisan bands and to join these in strong units. What closer bond could have been forged in order to cancel with bloodshed in common the ancient offences and to renew the friendship between the two democracies? Why is it that at the moment of victory the “right of the first occupant” was imposed and thousands of Italians were deported from our soil and interned in Yugoslav camps? The Alexander–Tito agreement⁷⁹ provided for their repatriation, but in most cases Italian mothers are still living in anxiety, and horrible visions haunt them, thereby dividing men of good will. Let us unite to clear the atmosphere in which we live. Let us dispel these visions, let us regain our peace of mind, let us avoid mutual recriminations, submitting to an international body the control of the accuracy of the facts and the judgment of offences and atrocities past and present.

Democratic Italy strives to contribute to a fair solution. She could refer to the Treaty of Rapallo, freely negotiated between the two countries before the rise of Fascism, which establishes the present boundary and guarantees the autonomy of Fiume as a “corpus separatum”: but Italy is prepared to reconsider. An ideal ethnical line does not exist. Unfortunately, it is by now a European custom that in mixed areas both sides should not agree on statistics. In this regard, I recall a personal experience. In the many debates of the Austrian Reichstag on which I represented Trento Irredenta, the subject of statistics was most frequently raised but it was also the least agreed upon by the contesting parties, and therefore the least conclusive. This took place not only between Germans and Czechs, Poles and Ukrainians, Germans and Hungarians, but also between Italian and Slav members from the Adriatic coast. This does not imply that the Italian majority (according to reliable estimates approximately 550,000 Italians to 400,000 Slavs) residing in Venezia Giulia should have reason to fear statistics, and we are ready to submit all necessary technical data to support our thesis and to contest other claims. At this moment I only wish to state that the democratic Italian Government agrees that an attempt should be made in order that as many as possible Slav groups west of the present boundary be included in Slav territory—within, however, the limits indispensable to the vitality of Trieste and the other Italian cities, and provided this should not cause the economic collapse of the region. We cannot sever cities from the surrounding countryside nor from their acqueducts or the means of communications that connect Pola to Trieste. Within reasonable limits we are ready to recognise Yugoslav rights and interests, but it would not be just if the Arsa mines, that yield to Italy thirty per cent, of her national coal production, should be taken from her, nor that the bauxite beds, the only autarchic raw material existing in Italy, should no longer supply our aluminum factories, whilst Yugoslavia, notoriously an exporter of coal and bauxite, own 19 mines of anthracite, 202 of coal and lignites, and 82 of bauxite. We believe that a frontier based upon the Wilson Line might constitute a fair line of demarcation between the two countries. This line was conceived here in London and was subsequently developed in the course of friendly discussions amongst Italian democrats and Yugoslav émigrés during the 1914–1918 war. The same line, determined through a long series of studies based on a criterion of absolute impartiality, received the far-sighted support of President Wilson, who actually adopted it. The line of course implies a reciprocal legislation in order to guarantee the status of the minorities on either side of it, and equally implies that Fiume, a harbour at the disposal of the Yugoslav hinterland, should reacquire its ancient autonomy guaranteeing its natural character. It implies, moreover, that a renewed Italo-Yugoslav friendship, assured by international treaties, should protect the Italian character of Zara and other Italian minorities.

In stating our willingness to make these sacrifices, we are aware that we shall disappoint the expectations of many Italians and unwantingly inflict a painful blow on our compatriots living in the areas that would thus become separated from us. We are, however, prepared to take this heavy responsibility in order to contribute to the pacification of the Adriatic which, added to a possible demilitarisation and with an independent Albania, would thereby be assured. There remains the continental, or better still, the international function of the port of Trieste.

We are not against the internationalisation of the port of Trieste in the sense of admitting complete Customs’ exemption for the harbour, supplemented by a series of other concessions in favour of the countries of the hinterland, and allowing above all to importers the processing there of raw materials in finished or semi-finished products. The structure and the amplitude of this form of international emporium would have to be exactly elevated by technical experts. It is obvious in this connection that such international cooperation must eliminate all harmful competition between Trieste and Fiume and be implemented by collaboration in the matter of railways, entrusted to the countries of the hinterland and to the Danube-Sava and Adriatic railways.

Before concluding, however, I consider it my duty to request that emergency measures be adopted in order to remedy the economic consequences of the establishment of the Morgan line. This line, by breaking in two an economic and industrial structure, not only makes it impossible for Italy to bring aid to 200,000 Italians (Fiume and Zara included) on the other side of the above line in extremely difficult physical and food conditions, but forbids Italy from reactivating those industries vital to her economic structure. Unemployment and hardship have assumed alarming proportions; decisive and rapid intervention is imperative with regard to this question which, more than merely Italian, is a question of humanity and social justice”.

77. Milan Nedič, Prime Minister of the German puppet state of Serbia, 1941–45, and Ante Pavelič, Chief of State of the Axis puppet state of Croatia, 1941–45.
78. For text of the Allied Armistice with Italy, signed September 3, 1943, and effective September 8, 1943, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2740. For documentation regarding the negotiation of this armistice, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, pp. 314 ff.
79. For text of the Anglo-American-Yugoslav agreement respecting the provisional administration of Venezia Giulia (the so-called Alexander-Tito agreement), signed at Belgrade, June 9, 1945, see Executive Agreement Series No. 501, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1855. For documentation regarding the negotiation of this agreement, see vol. iv, pp. 1103 ff.