Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/9–1645

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

[London,] September 16, 1945.

Participants:	The Secretary
	Mr. Bohlen
	Mr. Molotov
	Ambassador Gusev
	Mr. Pavlov

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that he had asked to see Mr. Molotov in order to talk with him privately before the question of the Balkan treaties came before the Council of Foreign Ministers. He said it was essential for the future of the world that our nations continue to cooperate, and that if we had any differences of view, we should talk them over together and endeavor to adjust our disagreements in such a way as to preserve our unity of purpose. He said he wished to emphasize that the United States is not interested in any way in seeing anything but governments friendly to the Soviet Union in adjacent countries.

Mr. Molotov replied that he must tell the Secretary that they did have doubts, and it would not be honest to hide it.

The Secretary replied that it was essential that these doubts be removed, and that he was prepared to do it.

Mr. Molotov replied that the doubts of the Soviet Government arose from the attitude of the United States and Great Britain in the case of Rumania. For example, when the Radescu Government,²⁵ which was hostile to the Soviet Union, was in power in Rumania, it received British and American support, but when the Groza Government, which was friendly to the Soviet Union, was established both the United States and Great Britain withdrew their support.²⁶

The Secretary remarked that after the Yalta Conference and the adoption of the agreement on liberated Europe²⁷ he had returned to the United States in the role of a missionary of peace and had explained these agreements to members of Congress and the Senate. He said they had been warmly received in the United States as an indication of our ability to find a common policy. Subsequently, however, when nothing was done about Poland the American people got the idea that these agreements had been violated by the Soviet Government. He added that our Government knew that it was the result of an honest misunderstanding; but, nevertheless, the people were unable to understand why no progress was being made. Following Mr. Hopkins’ visit to Moscow,²⁸ however, and the reorganization of the Polish Government which permitted us all to recognize it.²⁹ there, had been a great improvement in public opinion in the United States in regard to the Soviet Union. The Polish agreement was warmly welcomed, and everyone was satisfied with the compromise reached. He went on to say that he realized our habits were different, and it was up to all of us to be tolerant of the habits of others. He asked Mr. Molotov to look at the question from this point of view and from what he knew of the feeling of the people of the United States. He said he thought that if he looked at the matter in this light he would understand why our people had doubts about the Groza Government. For example, we knew that shortly after the Yalta Conference our good friend Mr. Vyshinsky had given the King of Rumania two hours to install Groza as Prime Minister.³⁰ Since that time the Groza Government had done a number of things, such as excluding the press, and their treatment of American representatives, which had confirmed these doubts as to the character of the present Rumanian Government.

Mr. Molotov said he understood that correspondents were now permitted in Rumania, and he had seen a State Department announcement to that effect.

The Secretary said that formal permission had been received, but that it had been many, many months in coming; that fourteen correspondents had applied for visas, and that many of them had become discouraged and had gone elsewhere. He added that there were now two American correspondents in Bulgaria who had at last received permission to go to Rumania, but only three days ago he had been informed that the Bulgarian Government would not let them leave Bulgaria for Rumania. He said it was very difficult for him to explain these events to the American people.

Mr. Molotov said that the question was one of friendly governments, and that he was sure, for example, that if Mexico had been at war with the United States and had invaded it, and for two years occupied a part of the United States, that the American Government would not tolerate in Mexico a government hostile to it.

The Secretary said he agreed, and referred to his statement of our desire to see friendly governments in these areas adjacent to the Soviet Union. He said what he wished [to] plead for was some arrangement which would permit the Rumanian Government to be both friendly to the Soviet Union and at the same time representative of all democratic elements in the country. He said that he felt that these two considerations were not irreconcilable, and inquired whether it would not be possible to proceed as we had in the case of Poland.

Mr. Molotov replied that he did not think the Polish precedent could be applied in Rumania, as it was too dangerous. He felt it might lead to civil war there, and that in any case the situations were different, since Poland had been an ally, and there had been two governments in existence. He said, for example, if Radescu had stayed on in Rumania, he felt there was a real danger of civil war. He added that the Soviet Government had taken note of the fact that the British had given refuge to Radescu. He repeated that no self-respecting government could tolerate the existence of a hostile government in a country which it had defeated. He said that in the case of the Bulgarian elections the Soviet Government had met the wishes of the United States and Great Britain. He said in Rumania he felt it would be better to wait until the elections were held, and a new government installed. He said categorically that in the view of the Soviet Government no reorganization of the present Rumanian Government was possible until after these elections.

The Secretary repeated that the United States did not desire to see hostile governments in these countries and said again that he found it impossible to believe that a temporary Rumanian government could not be formed which would be both friendly to the Soviet Union and also representative of the people. He said that such a temporary representative government could then hold the elections, and the world would accept the results as those of a fair election. He said he felt that the Soviet reputation would be greatly enhanced throughout the world if this were done. He added that the United States was not interested in any particular party or individual, and repeated his suggestion that some solution along the lines of that adopted in Poland would be the best.

Molotov inquired whether all parties were represented in the British and American Governments.

The Secretary replied “No”, but in Rumania they were speaking of a temporary government, and not one based on elections. He said that he was afraid because of the manner in which the Groza Government had been established, and its subsequent actions that any election held under its auspices would be suspect in the eyes of the American people.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether we were not asking for a change in the present government of Greece before the election, since it was well known that this government had not lived up to its agreement and did not enjoy support from the Greek people, whereas in Rumania the majority of the people were satisfied with the Groza government, and only a small minority did not like it. He inquired what was the reason for this difference in attitude.

The Secretary replied that it was a question of the facts. He said in Greece correspondents had been allowed to go in and move about freely and report without censorship what they saw; that as a result the American public were fully informed about Greece and felt on a basis of these reports that the situation was not that expressed by Mr. Molotov. In Rumania, however, correspondents had not been allowed any such facilities and the actions of the Groza government in this respect had led the American people to believe that the government was not representative of the people.

Mr. Molotov said that apparently in Greece the correspondents were happy, but the people were not; whereas in Rumania the people were happy, but the correspondents were not. He said the Soviet Government attached more importance to the feeling of the people. He proposed that they should endeavor to work out with the Rumanian Government conditions which would permit the American correspondents to do their work properly; then in Rumania everyone would be happy, the people and the correspondents.

The Secretary said that he had just recently received information from one of our leading news agencies, from the Herald-Tribune newspapers, which had correspondents in Rumania, to the effect that they had received word from these correspondents that the censorship was so heavy in Rumania that their outgoing dispatches should not be regarded as descriptive of conditions in Rumania; that when they left Rumania they would be able to write the true story.

Mr. Molotov replied that he thought that we could come to a general agreement with the Rumanian Government on the improvement of these facilities.

The Secretary replied that it did not require any general agreement, but merely decision on the part of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Molotov said they were ready to have it.

The Secretary said he had come to see Mr. Molotov to talk over these matters privately, since we felt it was better to try to thrash them out in that manner than to make statements and hold discussion at the big meeting in the presence of so many people. He said that when the question of the Rumanian and Bulgarian treaties came up at the Council he would be forced to say that the United States could not conclude treaties with the existing governments of those countries since we did not regard them as sufficiently representative. He said if he did sign such a treaty with these governments, when it came before the Senate for ratification he would be asked why he had done so, and whether he was able to assure the Senate that these governments were really representative of their countries. He would be forced to say that he knew very little of the conditions in those countries, and there was a very good chance that the Senate would refuse to ratify.

Mr. Molotov answered that in order not to complicate matters the Soviet Government had agreed to meet the wishes of the British and Americans in hastening the conclusion of the peace treaty with Italy, and that it did not see any reason except an artificially induced one for delaying the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland, and Hungary. He said it was not a question of signing these treaties now, but merely doing the preliminary work; the signature could wait until after the elections in these countries. He repeated that they could see no reason for delay, particularly as the matter of these treaties was less complicated than the one with Italy. The Soviet Government had suggested turning the armistice arrangements into peace treaties and proposed no new clauses or conditions in this connection. This should simplify the matter since all three Governments had signed the armistice terms. He said that if the United States refused to consider these treaties, which, according to his proposal, would contain nothing new, a very bad impression would be created in wide circles of Soviet public opinion. It would be felt in the Soviet Union that the United States Government wished to see governments unfriendly to the Soviet Union in these countries. He mentioned that the King of Rumania had told them that he was satisfied with the Groza government, but that he had said only the British and the Americans were not.

The Secretary pointed out that the King had been the one to request the change of government, and he certainly had nothing to fear from the United States in a situation where the Red Army was all around him.

Mr. Molotov replied that the King had taken this step in the face of a British and American demand and as a result of pressure which their representatives had exerted on him.

The Secretary replied that he had seen some statement to that effect from some official or other, but that our representative categorically denied it, and as everyone knew, he did not lie.

Mr. Molotov said that the United States and the United States representative were at least acting in that general spirit.

The Secretary reviewed his previous statements in regard to the governments of these countries, and said that it would be impossible for him to defend the Soviet position before American public opinion if the Groza government remained unchanged and held the elections. He said that frankly the American people would not believe the results of the election held under such auspices.

Mr. Molotov said what kind of a press was it that did not criticize the Greek Government and did that of Rumania? He said he felt that the press should be told to criticize the Greek Government which was not founded upon democratic bases.

The Secretary repeated that there was no censorship in Greece, and that he had not heard one complaint of any interference with the work of our correspondents there, and in view of this freedom, the American people had not received the same impression of the Greek Government as they had of the Rumanian.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had already said that the Soviet Government was ready to help obtain for the correspondents the proper facilities for their work in Rumania.

The Secretary repeated that when these treaties came up for consideration he would have to make a statement at the time that the United States would not sign treaties of peace with these governments. They felt it should be possible to establish a more representative government in Rumania which at the same time would be friendly to the Soviet Government but which could hold elections that the entire world could accept as genuine.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government would not regard this as a very friendly action on the part of the United States. He repeated that his Government did not consider that the Polish precedent could be applied in the case of Rumania.

The Secretary pointed out that once the agreement with Poland had been reached it had worked out very satisfactorily. He added, however, that we would have no objection to considering these treaties, provided it was clearly understood that the United States was not going to sign the treaties of peace with these governments. He said he thought the question of consideration might be referred to the Deputies who, as in the case of the Italian treaty, might be authorized to go to the spot to examine any territorial questions. This would take some time, and there would be an opportunity for the Soviet Government to think the whole matter over.

Mr. Molotov said that he thought after the election there might be a possibility of reorganizing the Rumanian Government.

The Secretary replied that he did not see how this could be done as it would be an elected government and not a provisional authority. He repeated his statement that if the Groza government conducted the elections, they would probably not be believed, no matter what the result.

Mr. Molotov answered that if greater facilities for the correspondents could be obtained, they could observe and report on the elections. He added that the situation was calm in Rumania, and that he thought we should help the Rumanians to hold these elections so that they could devote their undivided attention to the difficult economic situation.

Mr. Molotov then said he had another question he would like to take up with the Secretary. He recalled that at San Francisco Mr. Stettinius had assured Ambassador Gromyko that the United States was prepared to support the Soviet Government in its request to receive a territory for administration under trusteeship.³¹ He added that in view of this the Soviet Government had been surprised that the United States Government had not supported their request at the Council for the trusteeship of Tripolitania. He inquired whether it was our desire to see the British monopoly in the Mediterranean maintained.

The Secretary said that he was not exactly clear as to the details of Mr. Stettinius’ communication, but as he recalled it, it was in general terms and did not refer to any specific territory.

Mr. Molotov said that that was true, but that this was the only opportunity for the Soviet Government. He said, if not Tripolitania, it might be some other Italian colony, but that it looked as though the United States did not wish the Soviet Union to have any territory under trusteeship.

The Secretary pointed out that it was not a question here of assigning these territories to individual states, but of placing them under elective international trusteeship. He said Mr. Molotov misunderstood; that we had given no commitment to support their claim to any specific colony, but that if he kept on saying we had, he would soon come to believe it himself. He said that, for example, if a man told another that he was prepared to help him find a house, and that friend then selected the best house in town, which turned out to be unavailable, he would not feel he would have the right to demand that the other provide him with some other house.

Mr. Molotov repeated that he felt there would be no other opportunity for the Soviet Union to acquire territory for administration under trusteeship. He said he would send the Secretary a copy of Mr. Stettinius’ letter.

Mr. Molotov then raised the question of their paper on German reparations.³²

The Secretary said he had examined this paper, and he felt that the first paragraph concerning the transfer of the Reparations Commission from Moscow to Berlin was a sensible suggestion, and he felt that it might be acted on immediately. He said that in regard to the other point, he noted that the suggestion was that the Commission complete its study by December 1, whereas at Potsdam they had been given six months from the end of the Conference.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the study in question was only a preliminary one and would have to be completed by that date if the six months’ period for the whole study was to be complied with.

After some discussion it was agreed that this item would be removed from the agenda of the Council of the Foreign Ministers, and that instructions should be sent by the United States and Soviet Governments, and also the British, if they agreed, to the representatives to accelerate their work in order to carry out the Potsdam decisions on time.

The Secretary remarked that he had studied the Soviet paper in regard to the repatriation of Soviet citizens,³³ and he felt that this question was not a proper one for the Council to discuss, but could be considered privately.

Mr. Molotov agreed, but said he felt measures should be devised to avoid the repetition of Soviet grievances on this subject.

The Secretary pointed out that this was a very complicated subject involving questions of disputed nationality and other factors.

Molotov agreed, but said that their principal complaint was the refusal of the American authorities to let Soviet representatives visit the camps.

The Secretary promised that in so far as the camps of the United States were concerned, we would have that remedied immediately.

25. Gen. Nicolae Radescu, Rumanian Prime Minister, December 1944 to March 1945.
26. Petru Groza, Rumanian Prime Minister from March 6, 1945; for documentation regarding the attitude of the United States toward the governments of Radescu and Groza, see vol. v, pp. 464 ff.
27. For text of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, see section V of the Report of the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 971.
28. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President, held a series of meetings with Marshal Stalin and his advisers from May 26 to June 6, 1945; for documentation on the mission, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. i, pp. 21–62.
29. The United States recognized the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity on July 5, 1945; for documentation regarding the recognition, see ibid., vol. ii, pp. 714–749; for documentation regarding the negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the Polish regimes in London and in Poland regarding the formation of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. v, pp. 110 ff.
30. For a report on the meeting between King Michael of Rumania and Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky on February 28, 1945, see telegram 146, February 28, from Bucharest, ibid., p. 487.
31. Presumably the reference is to the letter of June 23, 1945, from the then Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., to Mr. Gromyko, vol. i, p. 1428.
32. C.F.M. (45) 15, September 14, p. 175.
33. C.F.M. (45) 10, September 13, p. 151.