Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

840.50/4–1745: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, April 17, 1945—7 p.m.
[Received 9:40 p.m.]

3903. Following is a summary of the present position of EECE⁷⁸ and ECO and of our views regarding future procedure.

1. The only obstacle to prompt establishment of both EECE and ECO is the attitude of the Soviet. It has been agreed to wait until April 20 to give the Soviet an opportunity to reply to the representations made at the meeting on April 10.

2. As a result of the repeated representations made in London by the United States, United Kingdom and French delegations to the head of the Soviet delegation and passed on by him to Moscow, there are signs that the Soviet is becoming uneasy at finding itself in a minority position. The Soviet has drawn back from its extreme negative position on EECE and would “if necessary” join in a reconsideration of EECE after the San Francisco Conference. The question therefore arises whether we should agree to a postponement of further EECE discussions until that time or should proceed to establish EECE without the Soviet.

3. Our view still is that an essential prerequisite to the initiation of any plan for proceeding without the Soviet is that at least France, Belgium and Holland should first be found willing to join in the plan. We have privately sounded out the French⁷⁹ and Eonald the Belgians, Dutch and Norwegians. We understand that the Belgians and Norwegians and probably the Dutch will be ready to go ahead if necessary without the Soviet. The French here are willing to do the same but have not yet obtained an instruction from Paris on the matter. The acting head of the French delegation⁸⁰ has gone to Paris for some days and we await his return for definite information on the French position.

4. If the French and the United Kingdom will agree to join in some form of EECE whether the Soviet do so or not, we strongly favor taking prompt steps as soon as practicable after April 20 to invite other European Allies to a meeting to set up EECE. Our view is that if we accepted the Soviet proposal for delaying EECE discussions we should lose valuable time without any assurance of compensating future gain. Even if the Soviet change their general attitude after the San Francisco Conference they may attach unacceptable conditions to their adhesion to EECE in line with the tactics which they have used in the EITO and ECO negotiations.

5. We therefore favor the following procedure: (1) Given assurance that at least the United Kingdom, French, Dutch, Belgians and Norwegians will join an EECE, to send invitations in the name of United States, United Kingdom and France to the other European Allies (the invitation to Poland to be postponed until an agreed government is established) to meet at a date about 10 days ahead to set up EECE; (2) to express to the Soviet an appreciation of their willingness to return to a discussion of EEC after the San Francisco Conference, to inform them that in view of the urgency of the matter, the long delay since the first proposals were made, and the strong views on the need of EEC expressed on the UNTRRA Committee of the Council for Europe by a number of Allied countries, we feel it necessary without further delay to invite other Allies to discuss the immediate establishment of an emergency committee the functions of which will be reconsidered when the Economic and Social Council is set up, and we hope that if such an emergency body is established the Soviet will participate at least by an observer.

6. It is our view that the invitation should go to all the European Allies and not to a western group only, first because all the Allies have been informed on the CCE of UNRRA that we favor an EEC and difficulties would arise if some of them were subsequently ignored, and second because, even if a few of the Allies, for example Czechoslovakia, felt that they could not accept for political reasons it is still desirable to do all we can to counteract the tendency for separate spheres of economic influence to arise in Europe. If Czechoslovakia or any other country does not wish to participate fully it can be invited to send an observer.

As regards ECO, we have given careful consideration to the question whether a limited ad hoc coal committee without the Soviet would be useful. We have discussed the matter with Ott⁸¹ and unofficially with SHAEF coal officials. We are now all agreed that such a body would serve useful purposes. It would provide means for inter-Allied consultation with respect to the needs for coal and coal mining machinery, thus facilitating the work of the Combined Coal Committees. Its work would also be useful to the United States, United Kingdom and French members of the Control Commission.

If there is no change in the Soviet position we therefore strongly favor proceeding to the establishment of an informal ad hoc inter-Allied coal committee, following similar procedures to those recommended above in reference to EEC.

Please bring this message to the attention of Hawkins.

Sent to Department, repeated Moscow as 138, Paris as 204.

Winant

78. The name of the projected organization had been changed from European Economic Committee to Emergency Economic Committee for Europe.
79. Meeting of April 11, 1945, between Hervé Alphand and Henry R. Labouisse, Jr., adviser on economic affairs at Paris, with the honorary rank of Minister.
80. Olivier Boris Wormser, Secretary of the French Embassy in the United Kingdom.
81. Probably Walter J. Ott of the War Production Board.