Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

840.70/1–2045

Memorandum by Messrs. John N. Plakias and Walter A. Radius of the Office of Transportation and Communications to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton)

[Washington,] December 28, 1944.

In response to the joint invitations of the U.S. and U.K. Governments,² representatives of twelve countries convened in London on October 10, 1944 to discuss the establishment of a European Inland Transport Organization (EITO). The participating countries are Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia. The Danish Minister in London,³ SHAEF,⁴ SACMED⁵ and UNRRA⁶ are represented by observers.

Background

The document which is serving as a basis for discussion at the conference is an Anglo-American draft agreement, drafted in London in the summer of 1944 at bipartite discussions between representatives of the U.S. and U.K. Governments.⁷ The Soviet Government was represented by an observer. The draft agreement is based on, and incorporates to a large extent, the proposals emanating from the work done during the preceding two years by the Technical Advisory Committee on Inland Transport (TACIT) of the Allied Requirements Bureau. The Governments participating in the present conference, with the exception of the USSR, are represented on TACIT.

The Military Interest

The military are keenly interested in the establishment of a European Inland Transport Organization to assume the following functions:

(1) To give technical advice relating to European transportation problems and equipment requirements;

(2) To coordinate transportation in areas which the military would wish to turn over to civil authorities;

(3) To assume responsibility for the allocation and distribution for use of surplus equipment made available by the military;

(4) To aid in the restitution of allied equipment; and

(5) To assist in the rehabilitation of allied transport systems.

The War Department was represented at the bipartite discussions of last summer by Major General Frank Ross, Chief of Transportation of the United States Army in the European Theater of Operations. General Ross and Ambassador Winant are the two chief American delegates to the present conference.

Interim Commission

At the bipartite discussions of last summer the representatives of the U.S. and U.K. recommended to their Governments that, since the establishment of the permanent EITO might be subject to delays (which is precisely what has happened), there be established a tripartite Interim Commission composed of representatives of the U.S.,. U.K. and U.S.S.R. to assist the military and do certain important preparatory work for the permanent organization. The Interim Commission was to cease functioning when EITO came into being.

While the U.S. and U.K. Governments were prepared to establish and participate in the interim organization early in the fall, no response was received from the Soviet Government. As a result, the establishment of the Interim Commission was deferred. With the convocation of the conference the British believed that the permanent organization might be established shortly and no longer favored the Interim Commission. It subsequently developed that the Continental Powers opposed an interim organization which excluded them.

The British position on an interim organization has changed periodically. First they urged it. Then they strongly opposed it. Now they are again advocating the establishment of some interim body.

The position of the U.S. Government has been consistent. The U.S. favored the establishment of the Interim Commission at an early date and prior to the convocation of the conference. However, since it was not established prior to the conference and the opposition of the Continentals became known, we have not considered an interim organization essential unless the military desire it or unless the establishment of the Organization appeared long delayed.

Preliminary Tripartite Discussions

Before the conference, as well as during the early stages of the conference, the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. delegations held a series of informal tripartite discussions in order to receive the Soviet views, attempt to reconcile differences and develop acceptable compromise provisions. It soon developed that the Soviets opposed an organization with centralized authority and strongly advocated that its functions be limited to recommendations and coordination.

The Conference

One of the main difficulties in drawing up an acceptable agreement was to find middle ground between the Soviet position for an organization without authority and the views of the U.S. and U.K. Governments, supported by the Continentals, who desired an organization with considerable administrative authority. The Department has taken the position that while it would prefer an organization with authority, the Continentals are the main parties at interest and that so long as the U.S. interests, particularly the military, are adequately provided for, the U.S. Government would be prepared to go along with an organization acceptable to the Continentals and Soviets.

The principal reasons for this position included the following: first, the U.S. has only a secondary and temporary interest in a regional organization of this character; and second, the success of an international agreement is dependent upon the spirit with which it is accepted by its members. Accordingly an organization with authority might be less effective if the participants accepted it reluctantly, whereas an agreement with milder provisions might be more effective if the participants supported it wholeheartedly.

Poland

Although there was some apprehension in the Department over the attitude of the Soviets toward participation in a conference with the Polish Government in exile, this problem was not raised until after the conference had been meeting for over two weeks. On October 28 the U.S. and U.K. Governments received similar notes from the Soviet Government requesting the unseating of the representatives of the Polish Émigré Government and the substitution of the representatives of the Lublin Committee.⁸ The Soviets threatened to withdraw from the conference unless this action was taken.

The U.S. and U.K. Governments rejected the Soviet request and pointed out that they thought it inappropriate to inject far reaching political factors into a technical discussion.⁹ The hope was expressed that the Soviets would continue to participate in the technical discussions. The Soviets have not answered the U.K. and U.S. replies, but neither has the Soviet delegation left London. No formal meetings of the conference have been called since this move by the Soviets. All subsequent discussions have been conducted through informal meetings, but without Soviet participation.

The Ronald Formula

Various methods have been considered in order to avoid the Polish political issue and still reach an acceptable agreement. One of the devices considered was a proposal made by Mr. Ronald of the British Foreign Office which has come to be known as the “Ronald Formula”. This formula provided that the agreement would only be signed by governments after their territory had been liberated. This would have permitted the Soviets but not the Poles to sign at this time. The Ronald Formula was not discussed with the Soviets. When it was presented informally to the other Continentals they strongly opposed it.

The British have suggested other proposals as gestures to induce the Soviets to participate in this technical organization and circumvent the Polish issue. The Department has taken the position that while Soviet participation is most desirable, an agreement should not be held in abeyance pending Soviet participation if the agreement meets the technical points raised by the Soviets and which might be acceptable to them at a later date. The Department has felt that formulas or gestures would not induce Soviet participation in a technical organization if for political reasons they wish to abstain.

Present Status of Conference

After October 28, in order to proceed with the important work of the conference, it was decided to continue discussions through informal meetings and to redraft the agreement, incorporating insofar as possible the views of the Soviets. The conference has not met in formal session since October 27; however, informal meetings have been held with the Continental delegations and the Soviets have been kept advised. It is proposed that on completion of an agreement acceptable to the Continentals which incorporated the Soviet views, it would be presented to the Soviets. If at that time the Soviets would be prepared to accept the agreement they could come in, otherwise the door would be left open for them to participate at such time as they saw fit.

At the informal meetings in which all the Continentals except the Soviets are participating, considerable progress has been made in reaching an acceptable draft agreement. Certain points on the procedure for establishing EITO and the method of signature remain unsettled and there may be some difficulty over the provisions affecting the inland waterways. The Department has suggested that the conclusion of the main agreement should not be delayed because of divergent points of view on the details of inland waterway transport question. This problem could be dealt with by the countries concerned, after the main agreement was signed.

John N. Plakias
Walter A. Radius

2. Invitations sent by the United Kingdom on September 11 and 12, 1944.
3. Eduard Reventlow.
4. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
5. Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.
6. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. For documentation on the participation of the United States in the work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, see pp. 958 ff.
7. Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, p. 792.
8. For note to the U.S. Government, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, p. 840. For continuation of the controversy regarding the establishment of a government in Poland, see ibid., 1945, vol. v, pp. 110 ff.
9. For U.S. note dated November 22, 1944, see ibid., 1944, vol. ii, p. 879.