740.00119 Potsdam/6–1845

Memorandum by the Director, Office of Strategic Services (Donovan), to President Truman

We have made a study of the problems created for the Allied powers occupying Germany by the return of the Sudetenland to [Page 1255] Czechoslovakia. In order to save you time in going over the entire report, the following is presented as a summary:

Re-establishment of the former Czechoslovak frontier will create a number of problems affecting several parties—Czechs, Germans, Sudetenlanders, and the occupying powers. These problems will be outwardly largely of a technical nature, having to do with the transfer of property and of elements of the population. They have, however, their political side, which under the force of circumstances may easily assume serious proportions. The underlying causes of the political factors are found in the history of the Sudetenland under the Czechs (1918–1938) and since the German occupation (1938). The purpose of this paper will be (a) to recall briefly the main features of this history, and ((b) to indicate the types of problems arising out of the Sudetenland situation with which the powers occupying Germany may be confronted.

The problems of particular concern to the occupying powers constitute but one part of the whole picture, every feature of which is colored by the fact that the Sudetenland is a political pressure area. The nature of the country, the distribution of the population, the mixture of ethnic groups with different political, social, and cultural loyalties, have given a distinctive imprint to the history of the country. To the complications of the past, German occupation has added six years of economic exploitation, the conscription of Sudetenlanders into the German Army, the removal of Sudeten workers to the Reich, and the immigation of Germans from bombed areas in the West. There are a number of proponents or plans for dealing with the situation: a Czech Government-in-Exile, refugee political groups, political elements at home and the principal Allied belligerent powers. It is against the political background created by such conditions that the frontier will be re-established, the local government changed, the former allegiance restored.

These changes will create problems on various levels. Determination of the frontier is primarily a problem of decision for the Allied governments or for the authorities who determine the conditions for cessation of hostilities and peace and who will secure the observance of those conditions. Then there are the problems primarily for the German and Czechoslovakian States relating to any conventions or other agreements they may enter into to implement a treaty, to regulate transfers of property, and the like. In this respect it may be borne in mind that the interests of the German State will for a period be represented by the occupying powers, and those of the Czechoslovakian State, if not represented by others, will be at least strongly influenced by USSR support. Finally, there will be problems on the [Page 1256] local level arising out of the new arrangements, relating to the enforcement of the decisions of higher authorities and to easing the disruption of local life occasioned by such great changes.

The occupying powers may be partly involved in all of such problems, insofar as they may be asked to give assistance, in the demarcation of the frontier, for example, or may enter into provisional arrangements as one of the authorities temporarily exercising the functions of the German State. The problems which will be peculiarly their concern, however, are those on a local level, on the solution of which peace and order and the economic existence of the local communities may in some measure depend. In this connection the problems arising on the German side of the frontier will probably be much less troublesome than those on the Czech side. Nevertheless, problems will arise on the German side; repercussions will be felt; and the solution of numerous difficulties will depend upon collaboration between the authorities on both sides. These problems may be grouped under the following headings:

A.
Transfer of sovereignty;
B.
Change of nationality and minority problems;
C.
Protection of individual rights;
D.
Economic and technical problems

From the consideration of these problems, two things stand out: (1) the advisability of some sort of preliminary agreement between Czechoslovakia and the Allied powers dealing with the Sudetenland question; (2) the advisability of having whatever arrangements with Czechoslovakia undertaken by the tripartite authorities rather than the zonal authorities.

One of the most difficult problems will be that arising out of the Czech Government’s expressed intention of expelling large numbers of the Sudeten Germans. In this matter the interests of Czechoslovakia and the occupying powers may collide. The Czechs have an interest in expediting this expulsion as much as possible; it would reflect popular feeling against the Germans and would present the occupying powers with a fait accompli. It might be to the interest of the occupying powers, on the other hand, to avoid or postpone such large-scale transfers of population in order not to be burdened with this additional responsibility. Considerable difficulties might be avoided by a preliminary agreement upon the question between Czechoslovakia and the occupying powers for Germany and Austria whose zones border on Czechoslovakia—the USSR, Great Britain, and the United States.

In a great many situations, complications will be obviated if agreements are reached on the level of the tripartite rather than the zonal [Page 1257] authorities. The problem is that of avoiding the development of one situation in the USSR zone, another in the British, a third in the American; such as might occur, for example, if one zone refused to admit expelled Sudetenlanders, with the consequence that the entire flow was channelled into the others.

William J. Donovan