Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 EAC/11–3044

The Czechoslovak Minister of State (Ripka) to the Chargé Near the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London¹

No. 10.304/d/44.

London, 23 November, 1944.

Excellency: For the information of the Government of the United States of America I have the honour to submit the enclosed Memorandum outlining the programme of the Czechoslovak Government regarding the solution of the question of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. This solution involves the removal of roughly two-thirds of the German population of the Republic by voluntary emigration and organised transfer, and the establishment of conditions which would promote a gradual merging of the remaining part of the minority with the rest of the Czechoslovak population so as to form a political and cultural unity. The plan is based upon the following three assumptions:

• a/ that the Governments of the United Nations most directly interested in preserving the peace of Europe share the Czechoslovak Government’s desire to make an end, once and for all, of a very troublesome and dangerous problem,—dangerous from the point of view of Czechoslovak as well as general European security;
• b/ that no solution of this problem should involve any arrangements detrimental to the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic within its pre-Munich frontiers;² and
• c/ that the terms imposed upon Germany after her defeat will oblige her to accept as her citizens all Germans transferred or otherwise removed from Czechoslovakia and find accommodation for them on German soil; and that the Allied occupation authorities in Germany will see to it that Germany duly fulfills her obligations in this respect.

I should be greatly obliged if Your Excellency would kindly lay the enclosed Memorandum before the Government of the United States of America and would let me know their views on this matter which is of vital importance to Czechoslovakia.

I avail myself [etc.]

Hubert Ripka

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of the Czechoslovak Government on the Problem of the German Minority in Czechoslovakia³

I.

1. It is now generally recognised that national minorities,—i.e. minorities who consider themselves and are considered part of a nation other than the one on whose territory they live,—constitute a serious source of friction and conflict between nations, a menace to internal and international peace, and a potential danger to the security of the State containing them; they have, moreover, in the past been used as instruments of political pressure and expansionist schemes, and pretexts for aggression.

This is especially true of German minorities, in particular those in States bordering on Germany, who always considered them as one of the most effective means for upsetting the European order established after the last war.

2. It is obvious that the problem cannot be solved by territorial adjustments: in fact it is owing to the impossibility of finding a frontier-line which would not leave a minority on one or both of its sides that minority problems have arisen; for European minorities live nowhere in compact groups unmixed with other nationalities. The mere fact that a minority population is numerically superior in a particular district does not of itself entitle it to claim national sovereignty there, especially when, as in Bohemia, such districts have always formed with the rest of the country a geographical, historical, political, economic, social and cultural unit within one natural defensive frontier. The nation which has held this frontier ever since the beginnings of its history, and to whom it is indispensable for the maintenance of its independence, cannot surrender it merely because the agitation of an aggressive neighbour has inflamed the population of the frontier districts with a desire for union with a foreign State. A territorial settlement thus enforced and the principle involved in it would only contain the germ of new conflicts and wars.

In the case of Czechoslovakia any such attempt to solve the German minority problem by territorial adjustments would moreover lead to the absurd, morally inacceptable, and politically dangerous result of justifying German aggression by allowing Germany, though militarily defeated, to emerge from the war strengthened in territorial, economic, and psychological respects, while depriving Czechoslovakia, though a victim of German aggression, of its historic, natural, and strategic frontiers, and placing it economically and strategically as completely at the mercy of Germany as it became after Munich.

Among other things it would leave in Germany’s hands valuable raw-material resources, such as the Most and Falknov coal and lignite fields which form the basis of a large part of the Third Reich’s production of synthetic petrol and rubber.

It cannot be sufficiently stressed that German control of Czechoslovak territory is an essential condition for the “Drang nach Osten” and a necessary preliminary for the “Drang nach Westen”.

3. After past experiences, especially since the advent of Nazism and the appalling mass-murders and brutalities committed by the Germans upon the Czechoslovaks, it cannot be hoped that the Czechoslovak people could live peacefully together with a major part of the German minority in Czechoslovakia.

4. The liberated Republic cannot, moreover, tolerate the existence, on its territory, of elements who have proved by their attitude that they regard themselves, not as citizens of the Czechoslovak State, but as members of a neighbouring and hostile nation and State, which they consider to be their proper cultural and political home (See App. 1.⁴). Their presence constitutes a permanent danger to the existence of the Republic, more especially as the territory in which most of them are settled is situated in the frontier areas and is therefore of the greatest importance for the defence of the State.

4.1 Any attempt to retain the German minority in a country in which it so gravely compromised itself as in Czechoslovakia would involve that country in a vicious circle from which it would find it difficult to escape without causing a new international crisis.

Past experiences of the nations afflicted by a German minority, and particularly during German occupation, have naturally increased their mistrust and hostility towards the members of this minority, especially the younger ones, reared and trained under Nazism; this mistrust would necessarily and naturally lead to various precautionary measures (e.g. the refusal to appoint members of such a minority to responsible functions) which would certainly be resented by the members of the minority as unfair discrimination and would produce bitterness, grievances and obstructive action on their part; this in its turn would provoke repressive measures by the Government, with consequent internal disturbances which might easily become a pretext or even cause for new wars.

5. Under these circumstances, and accepting the fact that it is not intended to use German methods in order either forcibly to assimilate or exterminate the 3 million Germans living on Czechoslovak territory, the transfer of a major part of the German population which manifested its actively hostile attitude towards the Czechoslovak State and which insists on regarding Germany as its cultural and political home, is nothing short of a prime necessity: it is a condition which must be fulfilled before it will be possible to speak of the internal or external security of Czechoslovakia, or, for that matter, of European security in general.

6. All the usual arguments against a transfer of population prove, on careful examination, to be invalid when compared with the major interests involved and the dangers arising from a continuance of the old conditions. (For their detailed discussion see App. 2.⁵)

7. While conditions of security must take precedence over any other, there are three considerations, which, in so far as they can be reconciled with the former, must influence the extent, method, and rate of the eventual expulsion or transfer in any practical scheme concerning Czechoslovakia:

a) The transfer should not apply to those members of the German minority who have actively participated in the struggle for the liberation of the Czechoslovak Republic;

b) it should be so planned as to keep to a minimum the economic injury to the Republic, which might result from a sudden and indiscriminate removal of skilled man-power;

c) it should not aggravate too much the problem of repatriation of displaced persons which will be one of the major problems of the immediate post-war period. The transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia to Germany and the repatriation of displaced Czechoslovaks from Germany to Czechoslovakia should be properly coordinated and harmonised, which is quite feasible as the two movements are of opposite directions.

8. Having regard to all political and economic considerations, in particular those set forth above, the Czechoslovak Government feels that Czechoslovakia can, without endangering the security of the State, retain somewhat less than a third of its present German minority, up to, but not exceeding the number of 800,000. Members of the German minority up to this number will be allowed to remain if they have not proved disloyal towards the Czechoslovak Republic, and on condition that they will undertake, without any reservation, to bring up their children in the democratic spirit of Czechoslovak citizenship and will do nothing which would tend to prevent a gradual merging of their descendants with the Czechoslovak people in a political and cultural unity. It should not be forgotten that a large proportion of the German minority consists of Germanised descendants of the autochthonous Czech population.

9. As to the precise number of people affected by the proposed transfer, it is as yet impossible to give any but a very rough estimate. Taking the 1930 census figures, according to which the German minority numbered 3.2 million, and assuming that about 250,000 Germans will have been lost as war casualties (including workers who have died or permanently settled in Germany during the war), and that approximately a further 500,000 of the more pronounced Henleinists⁶ and other Nazis will flee from Czechoslovakia of their own accord, we are left with a little more than 1,600,000 Germans to dispose of by a process of organised transfer.

9.1 This estimate, as already stated, is only approximate; many factors (including the birth- and death-rates of the German population during the six years of occupation) are as yet unknown or unavailable, and this makes it impossible to give exact figures before the whole of Czechoslovakia is liberated from German and Magyar occupation.

10. Conditions and methods of procedure with regard to this transfer will be formulated as soon as more accurate numerical and material data, determining the extent and technical details of the task, become known. Generally it may, however, be said that the Czechoslovak Government envisages the process of transfer as a gradual one, and one which will give the affected members of the German minority sufficient opportunity for voluntary emigration to Germany or to other countries which may be willing to accept them as immigrants.

11. Concurrently with the process of the transfer of the Germans, the Czechoslovak Government will carry out a systematic resettlement of the evacuated regions with Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenes from other parts of the Republic or from abroad (Germany, Austria, Volhynia, America) and also, should they wish to migrate into Czechoslovakia, with the Lusatian Sorbs (see 11.1). Incidentally, it may be remarked that the scheme will enable the Republic to solve the problem of surplus agricultural population in the eastern parts of the Republic.

11.1 Lusatia, which is today a part of Saxony and Prussia, belonged from the Middle Ages (14th Century) until 1635 to the lands of the Bohemian Crown and is still inhabited by the remnants of autochthonous Slavonic elements, known as Lusatian Sorbs (Wends) and numbering about 150,000, whose language is closely related to Czech. In spite of a continuous and violent Germanisation, they have preserved their national character, language and consciousness. In 1919 the Lusatian representatives, backed by the Czechoslovak Delegation at the Peace Conference, demanded minority protection for their people.⁷

12. An appropriate organisation will be set up by the Czechoslovak Government and entrusted with all practical details of the transfer and re-settlement which will make it possible for the process to be carried out in the most efficient and orderly manner; for this purpose it must be in contact with, and enjoy the co-operation of, the relevant Allied bodies in occupied Germany.

13. To make the transfer possible without undue delay and new international complications, it is, however, necessary that Germany should accept the following commitments:

a) to recognise as her citizens and to admit to her territory all Germans, who were formerly Czechoslovak subjects and who may be expelled or transferred to Germany, or who voluntarily emigrate there;

b) to attend, at her expense, to these persons from the moment of their reaching her frontiers until their final settlement upon her territory, and for this purpose to make all necessary arrangements of a legislative and administrative character, including the provision of the necessary land;

c) to honour, in an appropriate fashion, the vouchers issued by the Czechoslovak State to transferred persons as receipts for the property left behind in Czechoslovakia (such payments to be debited against Czechoslovak claims on Germany), and to exchange any German money brought by them from Czechoslovakia, should this money be no longer current in Germany;

d) to release from German citizenship, and to allow to emigrate to Czechoslovakia any Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenes and Lusatian Sorbs who, with the consent of the Czechoslovak Government, may wish to acquire Czechoslovak citizenship and settle in Czechoslovakia.

13.1 The first three of the above proposals have already been submitted to the European Advisory Commission in the Memorandum of the Czechoslovak Government dated 24 August, 1944.⁸

13.2 Germany should, of course, also retain or accept such Czechoslovak Germans who at the conclusion of hostilities will be found outside Czechoslovakia and whom Czechoslovakia may refuse to repatriate. Since there is a considerable number of such people in Germany itself, this will diminish the technical problem both of repatriation and transfer.

14. The group retained by the Czechoslovak Republic would contain all those who actively fought for the liberation of the Czechoslovak Republic, and those elements among the Germans for whom linguistic and cultural allegiance does not imply a political allegiance to Germany. It will further comprise most of the nationally indifferent elements who considered themselves German because of some fortuitous circumstances.

15. Great caution must be exercised to prevent disguised Nazis among the minority from escaping transfer with the idea of repudiating, at some future opportune moment, any engagements of loyalty entered into, and acting as instigators of new irredentist movements. For this reason it must be left to the responsible authorities of the Czechoslovak State to make the final selection of the desirable elements and to decide, after carefully examining and sifting all evidence, who are to remain and who must be transferred.

II.

16. To ensure against the creation of a new irredenta, and to facilitate the administrative task of selecting the people who wish to remain under the new conditions and whom it is desirable to retain, it is proposed to proceed as follows:

16.1 All Germans possessing Czechoslovak citizenship—with the exception of those who took an active part in the struggle for the liberation of Czechoslovakia—will be deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship by a decree or law of the Republic.

16.11 The fact that Germany declared all Germans in the Czech territories to be her subjects, although invalid from the point of view of the Czechoslovak laws, considerably simplifies the situation: with the exception of the comparatively insignificant number of Germans in Slovakia (who remained “Slovak” citizens), the transfer will apply to persons whom Germany regards as her citizens. But even the Germans in Slovakia had a special position in their relationship towards the German Reich, recognising special allegiance to the Reich or the Reich-German Nazi organisations: thus, for example, they were enlisted into the German (and not Slovak) army and special SS detachments.

16.12 It may seem that the act of depriving all Germans of their Czechoslovak citizenship, while there is no intention to transfer them all, goes beyond the demands of necessity and that a more logical procedure would be to deprive of Czechoslovak citizenship only those individual Germans who are to be transferred to Germany. On careful reflection it will, however, be recognised that the latter procedure would impose an almost hopeless task from the administrative point of view, and could therefore never achieve its object of reaching all who must be dealt with; in innumerable cases it would, moreover, leave Czechoslovak citizenship to persons who have no desire to retain it. The procedure proposed avoids these pitfalls: instead of a large-scale search for the guilty and undesirable who form the majority, the administrative task is reduced to selecting the smaller number to be retained from those who desire to remain and are recognised as reliable and desirable elements;—but it also makes the Germans who wish to regain Czechoslovak citizenship to “contract in” under clear, new conditions, which they will freely accept “en pleine connaissance de cause”.

16.2 Germans who desire to remain in Czechoslovakia will have to apply for the restoration of their Czechoslovak citizenship. This application will be examined, and those accepted for readmission will, after a probationary period of about two years which in particular cases can be shortened, have their Czechoslovak citizenship restored with all political rights enjoyed by other citizens of the Republic. Until then the régime specified below under 17. will be applied to them. But as soon as a positive decision is reached as to their read-mission, gradual mitigation of restrictions imposed by this regime can be envisaged.

16.21 The law depriving Germans of their Czechoslovak citizenship will specify the categories of persons who will not be granted readmission to citizenship of the Republic (persons guilty of a disloyal or hostile attitude towards the Czechoslovak Republic or her citizens) and no applications by persons from these categories will be considered.

17. Those Germans who, in principle, are not excluded from read-mission to Czechoslovak citizenship will, pending a final decision, or if the decision is a negative one, be allowed to stay until dealt with under the transfer arrangements. They will not be subjected to any other restrictions than those ensuing from the execution of the transfer (e.g. registration, control of residence and movement etc.). Having ceased to be citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic, they cannot, of course, enjoy the political and other rights of Czechoslovak citizens. The same applies to those who will not seek readmission, and who will emigrate before arrangements for their transfer are completed.

18. There is no intention of confiscating the private property of persons transferred, unless it should become forfeit on the basis of a legal penalty. They will, as a rule, be allowed to take their movables with them, with the exception of goods the export of which will be generally prohibited (e.g. livestock, machines, some currencies, gold, etc.).

19. In return for the property left behind, the price of which will be established in accordance with an established standard, they will receive either receipts authorising them to obtain payment on account of Czechoslovak claims against the German State, the Reichsbank or German nationals, or they will be paid in German money which may be found on Czechoslovak territory.

20. The presence of the Magyar minority in Czechoslovakia raises problems less dangerous than those caused by the German minority; but the Czechoslovak Government reserves to itself the right to proceed in a manner analogous to the proposals of this Memorandum in respect of those elements amongst the Magyar minority which have shown themselves to be hostile to the Republic. Incidentally, the presence of a considerable Slovak minority in pre-1938 Hungary makes it possible to solve this problem largely on the basis of an exchange of population.

III.

21. It is not proposed to give the Germans readmitted to Czechoslovak citizenship any special status which under the present circumstances would necessarily tend to make them “second class” citizens. The ultimate aim of this plan is the elimination of the German minority in Czechoslovakia qua national minority and the integration of the people of the Republic into one national unity; and this implies that while the individual German citizens of the Republic will possess all political rights enjoyed by all other citizens, they will in principle not be allowed any special rights as a political collective, or any special rights over and above the normal rights enjoyed by every citizen of the State. In particular it is not the ultimate intention of the Czechoslovak Government, subject to approval by the free expression of the will of the Czechoslovak people, to grant the Germans and Magyars in Czechoslovakia those linguistic privileges which they have hitherto possessed and which in Central Europe constitute the most important feature of collective minority rights.

22. While this means that ultimately no one will be entitled to demand the use of German (or Magyar) in Czechoslovak courts or for official purposes, and that no one in Czechoslovakia will be able to claim German (or Magyar) schools for his children, it is admitted that any attempt to carry this principle into immediate practice would generally tend to impair the normal civic rights of the citizens who do not speak the language of the State; nor would it be in the interest of the Republic to deny education to children who do not possess full knowledge of the language of the State. The Czechoslovak Government is conscious of this fact and is prepared to grant the readmitted Germans certain temporary privileges or alleviations which in the past they have possessed as a part of their collective minority rights. It may be assumed, for instance, that elderly people who can no longer be expected to learn Czech sufficiently for the full exercise of their rights, will be allowed to use German before the courts and for official purposes, and that German children from a purely German environment will, at least in the first generation, be granted elementary schooling in their mother tongue. The existing linguistic privileges would thus be gradually and progressively extinguished with the least injury to the State and the individual citizen.

23. While the reports reaching the Czechoslovak Government from the occupied territory leave absolutely no doubt about the whole-hearted and unanimous approval which any plan to remove the German minority will arouse in the liberated Czechoslovak people, it is impossible to judge to what extent the Government will be able to obtain support for any concessions, however temporary, which it will be prepared to grant to the remaining members of the German minority. For this reason the Czechoslovak Government must reserve its decision until it has been able to ascertain the will of the nation through democratically elected representatives of the Czechoslovak people, whose ultimate attitude will be determined by circumstances which are not fully known here and some of which possibly may yet arise.

24. Nevertheless, it may be taken for granted, that Czechoslovakia will be prepared to accept any obligations which may be universally accepted and applied in all European States in respect of linguistic, religious, or racial minorities. In principle, however, the Czechoslovak Government would consider it extremely dangerous to grant again a special minority status to the Germans on Czechoslovak territory.

25. As regards religious minorities it can be taken as a matter of course that they will retain all the rights which they enjoyed in Czechoslovakia before September 1938.

IV.

Résumé:

1. After the past experiences between the two wars, and particularly after the unexampled acts of barbarity committed by the Germans against the Czechoslovak people during the present war, it is unthinkable that the state of affairs which existed in Czechoslovakia before Munich in respect of the German minority should be allowed to remain.

2. It is solely by a radical reduction in the number of Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic to a figure which would not involve any menace to the security of the Czechoslovak State and people, and which could ultimately be merged with the latter, that there can be any positive settlement of the German (and similarly of the Magyar) question in the Czechoslovak Republic.

3. In this way, Czechoslovakia will be able to attain the requisite homogeneity which is in the obvious interest of the security, internal peace and prosperity of every State. At the same time, however, one of the most serious causes of international conflicts and disputes will be removed, thus promoting international peace.

4. It is proposed to achieve these aims by a transfer of Germans (including, of course, all disloyal elements among them) which will not leave more than 800,000 of them in Czechoslovakia. (As regards Magyars, the problem can largely be settled on the basis of an exchange of population.)

5. The transfer must be carried out on organised lines, within the shortest possible period, i.e. about two years. The short period and an effective organisation will reduce the hardships of those transferred to a minimum, and at the same time will render possible rapid restoration and stabilisation of the political, economic and social conditions in liberated Czechoslovakia.

6. To achieve all these aims, it is essential, a) that Germany should be obliged by the capitulation terms to admit on her territory Germans transferred from Czechoslovakia, to recognise them as German citizens and to attend to their permanent settlement on her territory, b) that the relevant Allied bodies in occupied Germany should see to it that Germany conscientiously fulfils these obligations; these Allied bodies should likewise promote the realisation of the scheme by the appropriate means at their disposal.

By achieving the proposed schemes it will be possible to resolve the difficult and dangerous problem of the German, and analogously that of the Magyar minorities in Czechoslovakia.

[For the text of the statement by the Secretary of State, released to the press on December 18, 1944, regarding United States policy toward Poland and the readiness of the United States Government to cooperate with other governments to assist the Polish State to transfer national groups, see Department of State Bulletin, December 24, 1944, page 836. For the expression of the intention of the United States Government to raise no objection to the transfer of national minorities from Poland, see letter of November 17, 1944, from President Roosevelt to Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, then Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, Foreign Relations, 1944, volume III, page 1334.]

1. Transmitted to the Department by the Charge to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile in his despatch 218, November 30, 1944; received December 6, 1944.
2. For text of the Munich Agreement, signed on September 29, 1938, between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, see Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Third Series, vol. ii (London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1949), p. 627, or Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. ii (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 1014. For documentation regarding the German-Czechoslovak crisis, see Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. i, pp. 483 ff.
3. This memorandum was submitted to the European Advisory Commission under cover of a letter of November 25, 1944, from the Czechoslovak Minister of State, Ripka, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, John G. Winant, then Chairman of the European Advisory Commission. The letter from Minister Ripka to Ambassador Winant was virtually identical with the letter from Ripka to the Chargé to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile, dated November 23, 1944, supra. The memorandum and the covering letter, which were circulated in the European Advisory Commission as document P12B/4/44, were transmitted to the Department by Ambassador Winant with his despatch 19747, December 8, 1944; received December 13. (740.00119 EAC/12–844)
4. Appendix I, a memorandum entitled “The Pan-Germanism of the Germans in Czechoslovakia”, not printed.
5. Appendix II, a memorandum entitled “Discussion of Current Arguments Against Compulsory Transfers”, not printed.
6. Konrad Henlein, Gauleiter of the Sudetengau and Reichsstatthalter. Prior to the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany under the terms of the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, Henlein had been leader of the Nazi-type Sudeten German Party. Henlein committed suicide on May 10, 1945, following his capture by the U.S. 7th Army.
7. For statement by Eduard Beneš, then Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, at a meeting of the Council of Ten on February 5, 1919, regarding the Sorbs of Lusatia, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. iii, p. 886.
8. Not printed; it set forth the views of the Czechoslovak Government regarding the surrender of Germany (740.00119 EAC/8–2644). For a summary of the views of the Czechoslovak Government, see “Report by the Committee of Experts of the European Advisory Commission,” Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 68, 72.