840.48 Refugees/12–1945
The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Acting Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Acheson: The War Department has just received an urgent cable from General McNarney28 describing the critical problem faced by the Military Government in the United States Zone in Germany of deciding whether or not asylum and care should be given to persons who are currently fleeing eastern European countries with claims of active persecution, or fear thereof, on account of race, religion or political beliefs.
General McNarney reports that an estimated 300 persons per day, mostly Polish Jews, are crossing the border into Bavaria despite Military Government Law 161 prohibiting such entry, and that 250 Polish Jews are arriving in Berlin daily. These movements are in addition to the return to Germany of German populations of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia with respect to which agreement was reached in the Berlin Protocol29 and more recently in the Control Council. The potential extent of the movement of persecutees cannot be determined accurately. From a realistic viewpoint, the United States Zone appears to most persecuted persons as the only accessible safehaven remaining in Europe. While it is estimated that there are some 250,000 Polish Jews remaining in Poland and the Soviet Union, it is not known how many of these, or how many non-Jewish Poles, might be expected to seek asylum in the United States Zone, Germany. The number of persons who might seek entry from other eastern European countries is also unknown. Moreover, some displaced persons previously repatriated are returning with relatives and friends, and other displaced persons have been moving to the United States Zone from the British and Russian Zones.
The problem presented by this gravitation from many directions to the United States Zone in quest of better conditions is a new one with respect to which no United States policy has been established. In occupying Germany, the United States undertook to administer the United States Zone and to care for displaced persons found therein [Page 1216] at the time of the German surrender. In the Berlin Protocol the United States, with the United Kingdom and the USSR, agreed to accept into Germany, Germans formerly resident in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. No agreement has to date been made or responsibility assumed by this Government to grant asylum in the United States Zone to persons who claim to be the victims of discrimination by countries other than Germany.
It is my strong feeling, and I am sure that you will agree with me, that General McNarney and the War Department must look to the Department of State for a firm policy decision with respect to this problem. In order to insure that in making such a decision the Department has before it as many relevant factors as possible, I would like to mention several other important considerations not referred to above.
I think that it is important to bear in mind the close relationship of this problem to that of planning for resettlement of stateless and nonrepatriable persons now under our control. You will recall that in my letter of 29 November, I expressed my concern about the lack of planning and activity for resettlement of stateless and non-repatriable displaced persons now in the United States Zones of Germany and Austria. If no progress is made in resettlement activities, and none whatsoever appears to have been made to date, every additional person claiming to be persecuted who is admitted to the United States Zone must be cared for indefinitely. We would, in effect, be expanding the “hard core” of non-repatriables rather than reducing it. I cite this factor not as a bar to a policy of asylum but rather as an indication of the importance of considering resettlement as a phase of this problem.
Another important factor is the type of care needed by these persons, as well as by a substantial proportion of stateless and non-repatriable persons already under our jurisdiction. It is not enough merely to afford emergency shelter and rations. What is really needed is specialized treatment for rehabilitating such persons in a manner which will prepare them for a new life in the future. The War Department had planned for a long time to turn over complete responsibility for care and handling of stateless and non-repatriable persons to a civilian agency which would be able to furnish the specialized care required. It was felt that a civilian organization could be in a better position than the Army to provide trained social workers and administrative personnel to handle this problem, and could more effectively mobilize the services of experienced voluntary agencies. It was for these reasons that the Army had made tentative arrangements to transfer full responsibility for care of displaced persons in Germany to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administraton on October 1, 1945.
[Page 1217]As a result of the insistence of this Government, UNRRA was prohibited by its Council last August from providing basic supplies for displaced persons in Germany. Since the Army had to continue furnishing all basic supplies, it was placed in the position of being required to retain overall supervision and control of displaced persons with UNRRA actually in charge of most of the camps. While theoretically this might seem to be a satisfactory solution, in practice it has not been so. The inroads of demobilization upon our troops and Military Government have left our Army in Germany without the experienced and technically expert personnel necessary to carry out even this supervisory function.
I think it is important, therefore, that at the earliest possible date direct and complete responsibility should be given to a civilian agency for the handling of all persons in the United States Zone entitled to treatment as United Nations displaced persons. As long as the UNRRA Council resolution mentioned above remains in effect, there appears to be no possibility that this job can be given over to UNRRA. A further obstacle to assumption of complete responsibility by UNRRA is the opposition of certain of its member Governments to assisting persons who do not desire to return to their countries of origin. The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees is subject to similar disabilities because of the opinions of some of its member Governments.
In my own thinking, based upon discussions with the Chief of Staff and others within the War Department, I have been led to the tentative conclusion that an independent civilian agency should be established by the President to assume overall responsibility for persons in the United States Zone, Germany, entitled to treatment as United Nations displaced persons. This would be desirable in my opinion whether or not an asylum policy is approved, but particularly so if added responsibilities are created by approval of such a policy. I think that such an agency might be set up on the model of the War Refugee Board which performed so effectively during the war and which was dissolved last September. Such a civilian agency would be responsible for utilizing to the maximum available extent personnel and resources of UNRRA, Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, voluntary agencies and the Army. In addition, it might serve as the agent of this Government for planning and arranging for resettlement of stateless and non-repatriable persons, if the Intergovernmental Committee will not function more promptly and effectively in these matters.
General Eisenhower and I are anxious to discuss all aspects of this subject with you and your staff as soon as possible, but I thought that [Page 1218] it might prove useful to you to have some of our views preliminary to such a discussion. General McNarney has stressed the seriousness of the problem, and accordingly I believe it is important that he be informed of this Government’s policy at the earliest possible moment.
Sincerely yours,
- Not printed.↩
- See paragraph XIII, “Orderly Transfers of German Populations”, in Final Protocol of the Berlin Conference, signed August 1, 1945, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, vol. ii, pp. 1479, 1511.↩