840.50 UNRRA/10–1145
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
The British have recently expressed to the Department10 concern at the size of Tito’s Yugoslav army and the effect of the maintenance of this large force on the UNRRA program in that country, resulting either directly by diversion of supplies to that army or indirectly by the fact that those troops, if demobilized, might contribute to increase agricultural production in Yugoslavia. The British have made two proposals in this connection 1) that the two principal supplying nations, the United States and Britain, ask Governor Lehman to reduce or suspend UNRRA supplies to Yugoslavia until the army is demobilized or 2) that an UNRRA “vetting” mission with large British and United States contingents be sent to investigate the situation particularly in the light of the present size of Tito’s army.
[Page 1033]On October 11, Mr. Balfour11 of the British Embassy discussed with Under Secretary Acheson his Government’s proposal for a “vetting” mission. It was indicated in this connection that the British had in mind the political aspects of such a mission and it is believed that in the first proposal made to you by Lord Halifax similar motives were at least partly behind the British suggestion.
We feel that it would be inadvisable to involve UNRRA in political matters even if Governor Lehman should be agreeable, which seems unlikely. In any case, we have in the meantime suggested to the British and to Moscow a joint approach to Dr. Subasič12 and Marshal Tito13 urging them to reestablish the basis for cooperation which we recommended at Yalta14 be put into effect and we believe this line preferable to that of exerting pressure for political ends on Tito indirectly through UNRRA or otherwise.
However, we agree that, political considerations aside, the continued existence of an army of 600,000 or more men in Yugoslavia constitutes, at least indirectly, a drain on UNRRA supplies and that if a portion of these men were demobilized they would be in a position to assist in increasing the local Yugoslav agricultural production materially. Tito maintains and recently told our Congressman Mundt and Mrs. Bolton that a program for demobilizing 200,000 troops has been completed.15 On the other hand, he subsequently said in an address to the officers corps in Belgrade that he intends to “strengthen” his army. But the army does not seem to be the sole problem faced by UNRRA in Yugoslavia. While there is a sizable production in the northern regions, a lack of transport prevents distribution from that area to the less productive populous southern and western sections. In addition, transport problems are hampering the distribution throughout Yugoslavia of UNRRA supplies now being landed at Adriatic ports. Consequently, a reduction in the army would not, in our opinion, provide in itself a solution to the relief problem in Yugoslavia and it seems to us that it is merely one of a number of factors to be considered by UNRRA in connection with the continuance or readjustment of the UNRRA program in that country.
[Page 1034]We have drafted the attached memorandum16 in reply to the aide-mémoire left with you by Lord Halifax on October 11 along the foregoing lines, for transmission, if you approve.
- By aide-mémoire of October 11, 1945, not printed.↩
- John Balfour, British Minister in Washington.↩
- Ivan Subasič, Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia.↩
- Josip Broz Tito, Premier of Yugoslavia.↩
- See Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 264.↩
- Karl E. Mundt, of South Dakota, and Frances P. Bolton, of Ohio, members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, led a Congressional group which visited Belgrade on a European tour. For a report of this conversation, see telegram 540, October 9, 6 p.m., from Belgrade, vol. v, p. 1262.↩
- Not printed; it was dated October 25, 1945, and transmitted to the British Embassy.↩