Lot 55D 668, Box 2380

Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

For your information I am sending you a copy of a memorandum from General Groves on certain questions in which I know your mission to Moscow is interested.

I approve of paragraphs 1a and b. No comment by me is necessary on paragraph 1c or paragraph 2 which merely reflect General Groves’ views.

Robert P. Patterson
[Enclosure]

Memorandum for the Secretary of War:

1.
In accordance with your instructions I give below my views on the steps which should be taken with respect to our domestic situation insofar as it affects the Moscow negotiations. If these meet with your approval, the United States representatives for the scheduled atomic energy discussions in Moscow should be informed.
a.
Scientific information which can safely be made public should, be released as soon as practicable. The possible amount of this information is so great that it cannot all be released at once but the process of release will extend over the next year or so. It includes information on medical research and other scientific matters not related to bomb production. A large amount of other information is vital to the national security and must not be released. Still other material is doubtful and will have to be carefully screened. I am momentarily expecting recommendations from my committee of scientists which has been reviewing this question.
b.
Arrangements should be made as soon as practicable for the distribution of certain isotopes of value for peacetime research in medicine and other sciences. Possible isotopes among others might be radio-sodium, radio-phosphorus, long life radio-carbon, radio-iron and radio-calcium. This step would not endanger the national security by appreciably hastening bomb production in any other country. While such isotopes can be made in minute quantities in cyclotrons they can be made in real quantity as by-products of our operations. No isotopes of real value in further research for [Page 98] bomb production should be released. There will be a considerable time lag involved in making the arrangements for proper distribution to qualified scientists in this country which must be done before any distribution can be made to foreign governments or nationals.
c.
The visits of foreign scientists to this country would have to be carefully supervised to prevent them from gaining appreciable information applicable to wartime uses of atomic energy. Furthermore, I know of no way of ensuring that American scientists traveling in Russia will not disclose vital information.
2.
I hope that the negotiators will not go beyond the first step outlined in the Joint Declaration of November 15, 1945. Specifically I hope they will not at this time discuss the raw material situation as covered in Paragraph 8 of the Declaration.
L. R. Groves

Major General, USA

[For documentation concerning atomic energy prior to and during the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers which took place in Moscow, December 16–26, 1945, see pages 560 ff.]