Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/12–2645

United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 26, 1945, 3:20–5:30 p. m.

Moscow, December 26, 1945, 3:20–5:30 p.m.

Present:87
Mr. Molotov	Mr. Byrnes	Mr. Bevin
Mr. Vyshinski	Ambassador Harriman	Mr. Cadogan
Mr. Tsarapkin	Mr. Bohlen	Ambassador Clark Kerr
Mr. Pavlov		Mr. Watson
		Mr. McAfee

Subjects:	Bulgaria
	Iran
	Austria
	German Vessels
	Repatriation of Soviet Citizens

1. Bulgaria

Mr. Molotov inquired whether his new draft on Bulgaria had been received (enclosure No. 1). In this draft he had met the wishes of his colleagues with regard to paragraph 2 but had reverted to the wording of the original Soviet draft on paragraph l.⁸⁸ He stated that he wished the first sentence of paragraph 1 to read that the Soviet Government would assume the “mission” rather than assume the “obligation” as in the draft presented.

Mr. Byrnes said that Mr. Molotov’s paragraph 2, while not the same as the one which the United States delegation had proposed,⁸⁹ met the argument which he had raised yesterday, but in paragraph 1, the substance of the paper, Mr. Molotov had reverted. Mr. Byrnes thought that it had tentatively been agreed yesterday to accept the first paragraph as finally proposed by the American delegation, based on the language of the Rumanian draft.⁹⁰

Mr. Molotov said that the situation in Bulgaria was not similar to the situation in Rumania. In Bulgaria there had been elections. The opposition had boycotted these elections. Therefore the Soviet draft referred to members of the opposition who were loyal to the Government.

Mr. Byrnes said that no one was questioning the desirability of including the stipulation that the selected representatives would work loyally with the Government. This had been worked out yesterday and Mr. Byrnes had been under the impression that this wording was acceptable to all.

Mr. Molotov said that the Rumanian text as agreed upon yesterday was acceptable. However, the situation in Bulgaria was different from that in Rumania. Mr. Molotov was accepting the United States paragraph 2 in his new Bulgarian draft. However, the wording of paragraph 1 should differ from that of the corresponding portion of the Rumanian draft. There were more reservations in the case of Bulgaria.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the substance of the agreement was in paragraph 1. He reiterated that there was no doubt as to the desirability of adding two men who would be truly representative of groups not now participating in the Government. Furthermore they should work loyally with the Government. This had been agreed upon after much discussion yesterday. The same thing applied both in Rumania and in Bulgaria, namely, that the men selected must work loyally with the Government. Mr. Byrnes said that he would have to explain to the American people why the United States delegation had adopted the position which it did adopt. This would not be an easy task. But if Mr. Molotov would agree to the language agreed to yesterday afternoon, then it would be possible to make this explanation with some hope that it would be accepted.

Mr. Molotov reiterated that there was a difference between Bulgaria and Rumania. He said that the present Soviet draft recognized that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States would have to satisfy themselves that the prescribed changes had actually been made. The same point had not been made with regard to Rumania. There was also a substantial difference in the first paragraphs of the Rumanian and Bulgarian documents. A special exchange of letters had been agreed upon in the case of Rumania. No individuals were being specified and no letters exchanged in the case of Bulgaria. Furthermore Rumania had had no elections and had no Parliament. Moreover, the Bulgarian opposition had boycotted the elections. In specifying the qualifications of the persons to be added to the Bulgarian Government these differences should be borne in mind.

Mr. Bevin inquired as to the meaning of the phrase “other democratic groups” in the new Soviet draft.

Mr. Molotov replied that this phrase referred to the Agrarian Union and Social Democratic parties, i.e. the Bulgarian opposition.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that paragraph 2 of the Bulgarian document differed from paragraph 2 of the Rumanian document since there would be no Commission in Bulgaria. However, there was no justification of distinguishing between Rumania and Bulgaria as regards the qualifications of the men to be added to the Governments. In both cases the men would be members of opposition parties not now participating in the Government. It would create misapprehension, however, merely to say “opposition parties” in the Bulgarian document. The American people would suppose that an “opposition party” would not amount to very much. In order to avoid this impression the language should refer to the Agrarian and Social Democratic parties specifically.

With regard to the question of loyalty to the Government, Mr. Byrnes stated that Generalissimo Stalin had cited the very good analogy of the position of Mr. Dewey in the United States. Dewey had merely declared that he would work loyally with the Government. This statement had been referred to by Generalissimo Stalin and then agreed upon as text. Dewey had not stated his loyalty to the Democratic Party. Mr. Byrnes called upon Mr. Molotov to agree that the Bulgarian paragraph 1 should specify, just as did the Rumanian document, the qualifications of the men to be chosen.

Mr. Molotov reiterated that according to paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom would not recognize the Bulgarian Government unless satisfied that the prescribed changes had taken place.

Mr. Byrnes replied that in Rumania the new candidates would be selected by the Commission, which would determine their qualifications. In Bulgaria this would be left up to the Bulgarian Government. Accordingly, it was all the more important to spell out the qualifications in the document.

Mr. Bevin suggested the wording: “an additional two members truly representative of the other democratic groups from among representatives of the opposition who will work loyally in the Bulgarian Government”. In addition he proposed that the word “suitable” should precede the word “additional” in the second paragraph.

Mr. Molotov said that a more “flexible” formula was desirable. This was supplied by the Soviet wording “loyal representatives of the opposition”.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the Bulgarian document did not refer to the assurances of the democratic freedoms which were mentioned in the Rumanian document. Mr. Byrnes would have liked to include such assurances. The first paragraph of the Bulgarian document should be similar to the first paragraph of the Rumanian document in order that the American people might be convinced that this was a fair and just agreement.

Mr. Molotov said that he had conceded paragraph 2 to Mr. Byrnes and asked that the Soviet language be accepted in paragraph 1.

Mr. Byrnes proposed to take the United States language in paragraph 1 and return to the original Soviet language in paragraph 2.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had no objection to reverting to the previous Soviet paragraph 2. But it would be necessary to refer to “loyal members of the opposition” in paragraph 1.

Mr. Byrnes again referred to the example of Dewey and said that Mr. Molotov should agree to this as expounded by Generalissimo Stalin. Dewey had declared after the elections that he would work loyally with the Government. That is all that should be required here. It would be difficult to find a true leader of one party who had worked loyally for a party which he had opposed, i.e., a man loyal to his opponents.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government could not tender to Bulgaria the advice which Mr. Byrnes proposed.

Mr. Bevin inquired what Mr. Molotov meant by a “loyal member of the opposition”.

Mr. Molotov replied that by this he meant a person whose relations with the Government had not deteriorated so far that he could no longer work with the Government. Such a person could, however, belong to the opposition. It would not mean that such a person had participated in the boycott since the whole opposition had participated in the boycott. However, there are differences among various persons who had participated in the boycott. It was a question of personalities.

2. Iran⁹¹

Mr. Molotov stated that nothing had come of the Iranian discussions and that they should be dropped.

Mr. Bevin inquired whether that was the Soviet Government’s decision.

Mr. Molotov replied that this was the fact of the matter. He added that Iran was not on the agenda.

Mr. Byrnes said that Iran had been on the agenda as enumerated the first day.

Mr. Molotov recalled that Iran had been stricken from the agenda by agreement.

Mr. Byrnes said this was correct but it had also been agreed to discuss Iran.

Mr. Molotov said that Iran had been discussed. Mr. Molotov inquired whether the delegates wished to discuss the Soviet papers on Austria and Germany.

Mr. Bevin pointed out that Austria and Germany were in the same position as Iran. These questions were not on the agenda.

Mr. Molotov said that there had been a lot of discussion on Iran but no settlement.

Mr. Byrnes said that there would never be a time when all questions could be settled. Since many questions had been disposed of and the conference could not remain in session indefinitely, he proposed that the delegates proceed to consideration of the communiqué and protocol. The delegates would be together again in January.

Mr. Molotov remarked that Mr. Vyshinski would be the Soviet representative at the United Nations Conference.

Mr. Byrnes said that he wished to conclude the good work which the conference had accomplished. He did not wish to jeopardize this by attempting to take up all questions at issue. He therefore proposed that the delegates conclude work on the questions which had been settled and then exchange opinions on points outstanding.

Mr. Molotov said that if Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin did not wish to deal with remaining questions, he could but concur. However, there were three further questions which he would like to discuss: (1) the Soviet draft on Austria,⁹² (2) the Soviet draft on the German fleet,⁹³ and (3) the Soviet draft on the repatriation of Soviet citizens.⁹⁴ With regard to the latter, Mr. Molotov stated that this was a very sore question for the Soviet Union and that it would be well to make some progress on it.

3. Austria

Mr. Bevin stated that he had no objection to publishing the Soviet memorandum on Austria in the conference protocol, together with the reply which he had prepared. Mr. Bevin said he was tired of having unfounded charges thrown at the British Government. These did not help good relations. He was circulating a complete reply which refuted the allegations made in the Soviet paper. (Enclosures 2a and 2b.)

4. German Vessels

With regard to the question raised by the Soviet paper on German vessels, Mr. Bevin stated that he would have to study a report of the Tripartite Commission. He could not do that at the present conference. He understood that there were some vessels ready for delivery apart from the disputed craft. He proposed to leave a letter with Mr. Molotov on this subject.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether the Tripartite Commission could not be authorized to deal with the question.

Mr. Bevin said that the dispute was one which only the Governments could solve. However, he had no details concerning the dispute. He understood that the dispute was limited to a very small portion of the vessels.

Mr. Byrnes said that he did not know the facts in this question but that he had looked up the section of the Berlin agreement bearing on it. He did not understand this proposal to repeal the Berlin decision, which the delegates had no authority to do. Mr. Byrnes read paragraph 4 of the Berlin agreement.⁹⁵ He stated that in conformity with this decision he could only instruct the United States representative on the Allied Control Commission to carry out the decision and report on the progress made. He could ask his representative to take steps to avoid delay.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether Mr. Byrnes had meant to imply that types of vessels not specifically mentioned in the Berlin agreement, such as fishing vessels, should be given to Germany.

Mr. Bevin stated that the dispute in the Commission had arisen over the fact that certain technical craft necessary for ports had been claimed by the Russians as a part of the merchant marine, concerning which no agreement had been reached. Mr. Bevin remarked that no statistics had been received from the Soviet Government on the vessels which they had taken from Germany.

Mr. Molotov suggested that this question be discussed in the Tripartite Commission. He inquired again whether fishing vessels were to be retained by Germany since they had not been specifically mentioned in the Berlin agreement.

Mr. Byrnes replied that the Berlin agreement had commissioned the Allied Control Council to determine which craft were necessary for the German economy and which should be included in the pool for division among the victor powers. He said that he would endeavor to look further into this question.

Mr. Molotov said that Mr. Byrnes had correctly read the relevant paragraph of the Berlin agreement. However, did this mean that all vessels not referred to in the agreement were to be retained by Germany? The Soviet Government did not take this view. It followed a liberal rather than a literal interpretation of the Berlin agreement.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government desired to have this question discussed in the Tripartite Commission.

Mr. Bevin said that he could not commit himself before he had received a report.

5. Repatriation

Mr. Bevin said that with regard to repatriation, he could not add anything to what he had already said previously. He would like to see this question settled sooner or later. Mr. Bevin had sent the Polish troops back to Poland. The persons sent back had been in the Polish army when he sent them. Mr. Bevin therefore thought he had done his duty with regard to them.

Mr. Molotov said that there was no argument between the Soviet Union and Poland since they had an agreement on this question.

Mr. Bevin stated that when a general peace conference was called and all frontier questions were settled, such matters as that raised by the Soviet delegation would be settled also, presumably on the basis of option within a certain period of time.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government had a full agreement with the Polish Government with regard to the frontier. He said that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed to this frontier at Yalta.

Mr. Bevin replied that there was a misunderstanding here. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States had promised to support the Curzon Line but they had never ratified this and had never been asked to ratify it. They had merely pledged to support it at the peace conference.

Mr. Molotov read the relevant section of the Yalta Agreements.⁹⁶

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this section of the Yalta draft had been deliberately altered prior to publication at the initiative of President Roosevelt, who had insisted that it read: “the heads of Government” and not “the Governments” as no President had the juridical right to speak for the Government of the United States. However, there was no reason to believe that the United States Government would not stand by the agreement made by its President.

Mr. Bevin said that his Government accepted the Yalta agreement on this point but that it was necessary to legalize the agreement.

6. Iran

Mr. Bevin said that he was concerned about the Iranian question. Did the Soviet Government propose not to enter into any understanding regarding the settlement of this problem? Mr. Bevin had discussed this problem with Generalissimo Stalin. Furthermore, he had accepted practically every amendment which the Soviet delegation had proposed to his draft on Iran.

Mr. Molotov said that it was sufficient that views had been exchanged. No decisions had been reached. The question was not on the agenda. Accordingly, there was no need to mention it in the communiqué.

Mr. Bevin stated: “What is my next step?”

Mr. Molotov replied: “You know that well.”

Mr. Bevin replied that he thought he understood the situation and that he regretted it. He had desired to clear up this very awkward situation between the two countries, a situation which had evoked a good deal of feeling.

It was decided to recess the meeting.

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Moscow, December 26, 1945.

Bulgaria

It has been settled by the three Governments that the Soviet Government undertakes to give friendly advice to the Bulgarian Government in respect of the desirability of including in the Bulgarian Government of the Fatherland Front, which is now being formed, an additional two members of other democratic groups from among representatives of the opposition who are loyal to the Bulgarian Government.

As soon as the Governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain are convinced that the friendly advice has been accepted by the Bulgarian Government and the said additional representatives have been included in its body, the British Government and the Government of the United States will recognize the Bulgarian Government, with which the Soviet Government already has diplomatic relations.

[Enclosure 2a]

Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

German and Other Military Units in the British Zone of Occupation in Germany

1. On December 19th, the Soviet Delegation circulated to the Conference a Paper containing allegations that in the British zone of occupation in Germany, German and other military formations are being kept in existence in a manner which constitutes an infringement of the Allied agreement on the control of Germany.⁹⁷ The demand was made in this Paper that these formations should be disarmed and abolished.

2. The Soviet Paper on Germany made reference to a Memorandum submitted by Marshal Zhukov to the Control Council in Berlin.⁹⁸ It made no reference to the reply made on November 30th by Field Marshal Montgomery, in which he gave full account of the Germans held in the British zone, and denied categorically that they were armed.⁹⁹ The repetition by the Soviet Delegation of this allegation after its denial by the British Commander-in-Chief is a reflection on his veracity to which the British Delegation takes strong exception.

3. In discussion of this matter mention was made of the proposal, originally put forward in Berlin by Marshal Zhukov, that a commission of investigation should be sent into the British zone.¹ This proposal, which was accepted by Field Marshal Montgomery on November 30th on the condition that the Commission should investigate all four zones, was agreed to here by the British Delegation on the same condition.

4. On December 21st, the Soviet Delegation stated that they had heard from Berlin that this matter had been satisfactorily settled at the meeting of the Control Council the day before, and that in consequence they withdrew their proposal for a Commission. On the assumption that this statement constitutes a withdrawal of the whole accusation, the British Delegation are prepared to accept it, and to let the matter drop.

5. The proposal was made by Field Marshal Montgomery at the meeting of the Control Council in Berlin on November 30th that in future all questions of administration in which the Control Council can properly take an interest, and upon which information is required by the Council, should be dealt with by the appointment of a Commission which in all cases would be free to visit each of the four zones. I support this proposal, and commend it to my colleagues. In this manner the putting forward of allegations based upon incorrect information would be avoided.

Ernest Bevin

Moscow, December 24, 1945.

[Enclosure 2b]

Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

German and Other Military Units in Austria

1. In a Memorandum dated December 22nd, the Soviet Delegation circulated to the Conference a number of allegations relating to the British zone in Austria suggesting that the British authorities in Austria are deliberately creating an Austrian Army, and retaining in existence various Corps organized by the Germans from Nationals of other States, and that all these formations are armed.² These allegations, which are entirely without foundation, are categorically rejected. They display a distrust on the part of the Soviet Government which is deeply resented by the United Kingdom Delegation. The United Kingdom Delegation can only conclude that the Soviet authorities in Austria have listened to fictitious tales maliciously recounted to them by persons desirous of creating suspicion and ill-feeling between the Allies.

2. The United Kingdom Delegation are the more surprised at the action of the Soviet Delegation in circulating their memorandum in that reports from Vienna show that the whole question of Austrian Military activities has been exhaustively discussed in the Military Division of the Control Commission to the satisfaction of all parties, and that in order to remove any remaining uncertainty a quadripartite Commission of investigation has been set up by the Allied Council to visit all zones and study the whole question on the ground.

3. The United Kingdom Delegation consider it important that there should be an end to allegations of this kind made by one Ally against another. It is for this reason that they support the proposal that if there is any matter on which information is required by the Control Councils in either Austria or Germany, the Control Council in question should set up a Commission to establish the facts. Any Commission appointed in this manner should visit all zones, so that complete information can be obtained, and all grounds for suspicion removed.

Moscow, December 25, 1945.

[According to the United Kingdom delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of the afternoon of December 26, the meeting was resumed at 11 p.m. of the same day, at which time the Foreign Ministers had before them the drafts of the Communiqué prepared by the Drafting Committee. (The final agreed text of the Communiqué of the Conference is quoted in telegram 4284, December 27, from Moscow, printed on page 815. The Protocol (Report) and Communiqué are also printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, page 1027.) A discussion followed regarding the sections of the draft which concerned China. The United Kingdom delegation record of the discussion is as follows:

“M. Molotov desired to see a reference in the text to ‘other organs of authority.’

“Mr. Bevin found it impossible, in the absence of a representative of China, to agree to reference being made to anything but the Cabinet.

“Mr. Byrnes explained that he had asked General Marshall to bring pressure to bear on both factions to secure agreement, and had impressed on him that Marshal [Generalissimo] Chiang Kai-shek should not be allowed to believe that he would receive support in all circumstances, whether he was right or wrong. His suggestion was to add a phrase to the effect: ‘… the broad participation of democratic elements in the National Government.’

“(At this stage the Foreign Ministers’ staffs were asked to leave the room.)

“He could, in confidence, inform his colleagues that instructions had been given to all United States Government Departments to withhold all facilities (loans, &c.) so as to ensure that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would make a real effort to help himself. There had previously been straight talk between General Marshall and the Generalissimo as to what the latter could or could not do, but President Truman and Mr. Byrnes himself had now urged General Marshall to let bygones be bygones and give due respect to the Generalissimo’s susceptibilities. Therefore, nothing should now be done which would hamper or handicap the General in the efforts he was now making to secure unity of action in China.

“The Parties then proceeded to discuss the wording proposed by Mr. Cohen, the United States representative on the Protocol Committee, referring to the broadening of the National Government by the introduction of democratic elements.

“Mr. Bevin wanted to know what was meant by ‘democratic elements.’

“Mr. Molotov preferred the Soviet wording:‘… broad participation of democratic elements in the National Government and its other central and local organs.’

“Mr. Byrnes suggested saying, ‘all branches of the central government.’

“Mr. Bevin objected to these suggested additions and insisted that as he had only half an hour previously seen the text under discussion he must have time to consider it and propose amendments. It was the first time he had heard of any proposal to amplify the reference to the ‘National Government.’

“After a further exchange of views, in the course of which it became clear that M. Molotov wished to have a form of words which would cover not only the Government but also the existing Constituent Assembly, it was finally agreed to insert the following words: ‘… the need for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government.’”

After an exchange between Bevin and Molotov regarding the conditions in the British zones of occupation in Austria and Germany, the Foreign Ministers accepted Secretary Byrnes’ suggestion that since agreement had been achieved on one subject there was no need to prolong discussions on topics on which there was disagreement. (740.00119 Council/1–2346)]

87. The United Kingdom delegation minutes of this meeting contain a slightly different list of persons present from the one which appears in the United States delegation minutes. For the Soviet Union, Ambassador Gusev is listed as present, but Tsarapkin is omitted. For the United Kingdom, Second Secretary Watson is omitted, but Dixon and Hayter are listed as present.
88. Reference here is to the Soviet memorandum on Bulgaria, included as enclosure 5 to the United States delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 24, 3:15 p.m., p. 772.
89. Reference here is to the United States delegation memorandum on Bulgaria, included as enclosure 2 to the United States delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 24, 3:15 p.m., p. 770.
90. For the final agreed wording of the agreement on Rumania, see section V of the Report of the Conference, contained in telegram 4284, December 27, from Moscow, p. 821.
91. Despatch 2337, January 5, 1946, from Moscow, transmitted to the Department as enclosure 12 a record of a conversation between Mr. Bevin and M. Molotov on December 26 regarding Iran. In commenting upon the record, the despatch reported that the meeting took place following an unsuccessful attempt by Mr. Bevin, at the suggestion of Secretary Byrnes, to arrange a third interview with Stalin. The despatch also reported that Mr. Bevin held still another private conversation with Molotov regarding Iran in the early afternoon of December 26, just before the informal session of the Conference at 3:20 p.m. According to the information available to the United States delegation at Moscow, it was at this later conversation that Molotov first expressed his disinclination to continue discussion of the British proposal for a tripartite commission on Iran. The despatch also reported that Secretary Byrnes also had one or two short private conversations with Molotov during the evening of December 26 and spoke of Iranian problems, but that no records of such conversations had been made. (740.00119 Council/1–346)
92. For the Soviet memorandum on German and other military units in Austria, see enclosure 3 to the United States delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 21, 2:30 p.m., p. 721.
93. For this memorandum, see enclosure 3 to the United States delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 25, 5:15 p.m., p. 799.
94. For this memorandum, see enclosure 4 to the minutes cited in previous footnote, p. 800.
95. The reference here is presumably to section IV of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) vol. ii, p. 1487.
96. Reference here is to the final paragraph of section VI of the Report of the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 973.
97. Memorandum by the Soviet delegation, December 19, included as a subenclosure to enclosure 5 to the minutes of the Fifth Formal Session, December 20, p. 703.
98. Regarding Zhukov’s note, circulated to the Allied Control Council for Germany at its 12th meeting, November 21, see telegram 1066, November 21, from Berlin, vol. iii, p. 852.
99. Regarding Montgomery’s report, made during the 13th meeting of the Allied Control Council for Germany, November 30, see telegram 1154, December 1, from Berlin, vol. iii, p. 854.
1. Presumably the discussion here referred to was that of the Informal Meeting of December 21, 2:30 p.m.; for the minutes, see p. 710.
2. Presumably reference is to the Soviet memorandum of December 21, included as enclosure 3 to the minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 21, 2:30 p.m., p. 721.