740.00119 Council/12–2645
United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Spiridonovka, Moscow, December 25, 1945, 5:15–11:30 p. m.
| Present:70 | ||
| Mr. Byrnes | Mr. Molotov | Mr. Bevin |
| Mr. Harriman | Mr. Vyshinski | Sir A. Clark Kerr |
| Mr. Cohen | Mr. Gusev | Sir A. Cadogan |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Pavlov | Sir R. Bullard |
| Mr. Tucker | Mr. Watson71 | |
| Mr. Dixon | ||
| Mr. McAfee |
| Subjects: | Rumania |
| Bulgaria | |
| Iran |
1. Rumania
Mr. Molotov pointed out that the paper submitted today by Mr. Byrnes on Rumania72 did not refer to Maniu, Bratianu, and Lupu although Generalissimo Stalin had stated in the discussion of this matter that he was in agreement with Mr. Byrnes’ amendments provided that these three individuals would not be among the candidates for the Rumanian Government.
Mr. Byrnes said that there was no disagreement on that point. If there was any doubt concerning the agreement a letter could be written to Mr. Molotov. However, it would not be seemly for three great Governments to mention three individuals in a formal paper.
Mr. Molotov said that the important thing was that there would not be any lack of clarity in the future. He would agree to any form of statement of the agreement reached on this point. However, the statement should be written in such fashion as not to give rise to any misunderstanding in the future. The statement could be made either in a letter or in the protocol.
Mr. Byrnes proposed that the statement be made in a letter.
Mr. Bevin said that this would be better. The letter would be signed but not published. Mr. Bevin inquired whether it was intended to have any unpublished protocol for the present conference.
[Page 782]Mr. Molotov replied that the protocols of the previous conferences had not been published. Communiqués had been published on the basis of the protocols.
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that a letter would be unpublished whereas eventually the protocol would be published. There was no doubt about each of the parties living up to the agreement. The agreement would be placed in writing and each party would have copies.
Mr. Bevin suggested that the instructions to the representatives of the three powers on this question should read as follows: “In accordance with the understanding reached by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Byrnes, and Mr. Bevin, you are hereby instructed that in the formation of the Government referred to in paragraph 1 there shall not be included Mr. Maniu, Mr. Bratianu, or Mr. Lupu.”73
Mr. Molotov agreed to this.
Mr. Molotov then proceeded to the next Soviet objection to the U.S. draft on Rumania. He objected to the phrases “in important positions” and “at least” in the first paragraph of the U.S. draft. However, he was willing to accept the phrase “two members” as distinct from the Soviet wording “1–2”.74
Mr. Byrnes said that the phrase “in important posts” ought to be included; otherwise there would be no agreement that these two newly appointed members would be appointed to important posts in the Government. There were many non-important posts in the Government. It would have a very bad effect on public opinion if the impression were created that they would be appointed to minor posts in the Government. The U.S. wording did not specify what posts the new members should occupy.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet proposal referred to the composition of the Government itself, which now included 18 members. The posts would be “appropriate” and the new appointees would be genuine members of the Government.
Mr. Molotov objected to the U.S. wording “who are loyal to the objectives of the armistice” at the end of paragraph one. He said that this was not sufficient.
[Page 783]Mr. Bevin said that in forming a coalition, it was very difficult to apply the criterion “loyal to the Government” as in the Soviet draft. Mr. Bevin had not been loyal in the Churchill coalition.
Mr. Molotov said that he was sure that Mr. Bevin had never been disloyal to his Government.
Mr. Bevin replied that the term had a different meaning in the English language and would be misunderstood if used in the decision. He proposed to embody the wording “with approved democratic records.”
Mr. Molotov said that if different members of the Government could not get along together there could not be a government.
Mr. Bevin replied that in a democratic government decisions once made were carried out. He inquired what the test of loyalty would be.
Mr. Molotov replied that the Commission should choose individuals who were not in conflict with members of the present Government and who would work loyally with the Government. If their previous records were besmirched, they should not be selected.
Mr. Bevin pointed out that the present Government would no longer exist if the King of Rumania appointed a new Government.
Mr. Molotov replied that the bulk of the future government would be identical with the present Government—why would it not be the “present Government?” The head of the Government would remain.
Mr. Bevin proposed to use the wording: “who are prepared to work loyally with the Government thus broadened.” He said that it would be up to the Commission to choose individuals conforming to this criterion. The appointees should be men loyal to the present Government. This was the basic pre-condition of their being able to collaborate in it.
Mr. Vyshinski named Mihailache as an example of a Rumanian who would not be an acceptable candidate for the Government. Mihailache had been fighting the present Government for nine months.
Mr. Bevin pointed out that he had been fighting Churchill for 30 years.
Mr. Molotov said that this was a question of a defeated country which had armistice obligations to meet and had only recently emerged from the period of the Antonescu75 regime and the Iron Guard.76 By the term “loyal representative” as used in the Soviet draft Mr. Molotov meant (a) a representative of a non-party group and (b) a man whose relations with the Government had not been “spoiled.” He should be a man capable of working with the Government and one who had been loyal in his behavior although he might have disagreed with the present Government. However, this could not be [Page 784] formulated in detail. It was a matter for the representatives to decide.
Mr. Byrnes stated that what Mr. Bevin had said was true. In the U.S. a man would be loyal to the Government but not necessarily to the administration of the Government.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that Generalissimo Stalin had mentioned the example of Dewey.
Mr. Byrnes replied that Dewey was a good example of a man loyal to the Government but not to the present administration. Dewey’s position would be that he would be prepared to work with a government thus broadened.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that any person might declare his willingness to work loyally with the government. Maniu might declare such willingness but regardless of that would be unsuitable. The type of person needed was one whose relations with the present Government had not deteriorated.
Mr. Byrnes proposed the words “prepared to work loyally.” It would then be up to the Commission to see whether or not a given individual was prepared to work loyally with the Government. The Commission would not leave it up to the individual to say this.
Mr. Molotov proposed the wording: “two members who do not have a reputation of being hostile to the Rumanian Government and are actually prepared to work loyally with it.”
Mr. Bevin objected that anyone who had expressed the “slightest view” in opposition to the Government would thus be ruled out.
Mr. Molotov then proposed to accept the original Soviet language as being simpler. The rest could be cleared up by the representatives on the Commission. Personalities could not be discussed in Moscow.
Mr. Byrnes said that he could not agree to the language of the original Soviet draft. He referred to the phrase “truly representative” in the second sentence of the U.S. draft and asked whether this phrase was acceptable.
Mr. Molotov objected that it was redundant.
Mr. Byrnes replied that persons not truly representative of the two parties might be selected. In his conversation with Generalissimo Stalin Mr. Byrnes had added the words “they should be truly representative” to the Generalissimo’s statement in order to avoid the charge of selecting persons who in actual fact were not truly representative of their parties.
Mr. Vyshinsky said this would be up to the Commission to decide.
Mr. Byrnes replied that if this was so the Commission should be advised explicitly in the draft. Mr. Byrnes might select a Republican whom other Republicans would not consider representative of their party.
[Page 785]Mr. Vtshinsky said that the word “truly” did not add anything.
Mr. Byrnes replied that the American people believed that in some instances persons had been selected as representative of a given party who did not really represent the sentiment of that party. If the three Governments wished to select men who were really representative, it would be a fine thing to say so. This would give confidence that such would be done.
Mr. Molotov said that this might give rise to argument.
Mr. Byrnes replied that argument would only arise if the three Governments failed to say that the appointees should be “recognized leaders” so that the Commission would know that the men it chose should be “really and truly leaders of their parties.”
Mr. Molotov raised again the question of making specific reference to Maniu, Bratianu, and Lupu. He said that he perhaps should not have made a concession to Mr. Byrnes on this point.
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that agreement had already been reached that letters would be written with instructions not to select these three individuals. The important thing was to present a document which would give rise to hope that representation would be given to these two parties.
Mr. Molotov then made the following proposal: to replace the phrase “1–2” by “two;” to delete the reference to Maniu, Bratianu, and Lupu; and to employ the wording “two representatives loyal to the present Government—truly representative of those groups of the National Peasant and Liberal parties not at the present time participating in the present Government.” If this proposal was unacceptable, then Mr. Molotov suggested that specific mention be made of Maniu, Bratianu, and Lupu.
Mr. Bevin said that the following language would be more acceptable to public opinion of his country: “The King should be advised that two representatives should be added to the Government, representatives of the National Peasant and Liberal parties. The Commission shall satisfy themselves that
- (a)
- They are members of the groups of the parties not represented in the Government;
- (b)
- They are suitable, will work loyally with the present Government, and are friendly to the three Allied Governments.
Mr. Byrnes was inclined to concur in Mr. Bevin’s proposal. It had the advantage of giving more discretion to the Commission. He would be willing to accept Mr. Bevin’s proposal in the hope of finding a way out.
Mr. Byrnes proposed that the phrase “should declare” should be substituted for the phrase “will declare” in the first sentence of paragraph [Page 786] 2 of the Soviet draft on Rumania. His objection was to the phrase “take note that.” The Governments could not take note when there was nothing to note.
Mr. Molotov replied that this phraseology had been taken from the Polish document.
Mr. Byrnes said that he would not object to this phrase if it had already been used in the Polish document.
Mr. Molotov stated that he was prepared to accept the language of Mr. Bevin’s proposal with the following suggestion. The first sentence was acceptable without change, as was also (a). However, (b) should read: “They are suitable for this purpose on account of their past political activities” etc.
Mr. Bevin asked whether the intention was to rule out any person who might have said something against the present Government. He was not referring to Maniu, Bratianu, and Lupu.
Mr. Molotov said that this did not follow from his formula.
Mr. Vyshinski said that the Commission would take account of a candidate’s whole record rather than any one fact in his record. It was clear that the persons selected should not be rank and file members of their parties.
Mr. Bevin said that he had come to the conclusion that it would be best not to spell out the qualifications of the persons to be chosen since each would have his own ideas on that subject. However, he construed the word “suitable” to mean that a person chosen should be a person of character and ability, physically qualified, and trained for the particular position offered.
Mr. Byrnes had wished to use the phrase “truly representative,” but he would compromise on the term “suitable.”
Mr. Molotov stated that he was willing to accept the language proposed by Mr. Bevin provided Section (b) would read: “suitable for this purpose on account of their past political activities.” He was willing to agree that (a) should read, “They are truly representative members” etc. The rest should be left up to the Commission.
Mr. Bevin inquired as to the meaning of “past political activities.”
Mr. Molotov replied that this criterion would rule out persons who had been compromised by association with such elements as the Iron Guard and the Antonescu group.
Mr. Harriman asked whether a person who had in the past opposed particular measures of the present Government would be opposed.
Mr. Vyshinski replied that such persons would, of course, not be opposed. He had in view compromised persons such as Penescu,77 [Page 787] who had dispersed a workers’ meeting. Persons of that sort were not desirable.
Mr. Bevin said that it would be left to the Commission to determine the scope of the phrase “past political activities,” which, however, he understood, would be limited to collaborators, Iron Guardists, etc.
Mr. Vyshinski assented to this.
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the second sentence of the second paragraph of the U.S. draft included the phrase “free from force or intimidation.” He said that there could be no objection to the inclusion of this phrase.
Mr. Molotov replied that the inclusion of this phrase was inconsistent with the final sentence of paragraph 2, which referred to assurances concerning freedom of the press, etc. The document should not be repetitious. Such freedoms excluded the use of force and intimidation.
Mr. Byrnes stated that the assurances referred to in the final sentence of paragraph 2 did not refer to the elections.
Mr. Molotov said that with regard to the elections, the draft stated that they should be “free and unfettered.”
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that there might be freedom of the press but at the same time intimidation at the polls.
Mr. Byrnes was sure that Mr. Molotov had no real objection to the words “free from force or intimidation.”
Mr. Molotov replied that it would not be correct to include this phrase. It was already being specified that the elections should be free and unfettered. There was no need to offend the Rumanian Government. It would not be seemly to include this phrase. The phrase “free and unfettered” disposed of the matter.
Mr. Vyshinski pointed out that the wording of paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft was that of the original U.S. draft. Now the U.S. Delegation was making new amendments to its own previous language.
Mr. Byrnes replied that the revised U.S. draft was in question.
Mr. Molotov suggested that the phrase “anti-fascist” should be substituted for “anti-Nazi” in the sentence 2 of paragraph 2 of the U.S. draft. This was agreed to.
With regard to the final paragraph, Mr. Molotov stated that it was not clear why the U.S. Delegation had introduced the preamble: “As soon as the Governments of,” etc. The conditions upon which the Rumanian Government would be recognized by the Governments of the U.S. and the U.K. had already been set forth in the previous part of the draft.
Mr. Byrnes replied that the United States formula was based on the principle that only a government can decide whether to recognize another government. The Rumanian Government could not be recognized [Page 788] unless the United States Government was satisfied that the steps had been properly taken and the required assurances received.
Mr. Molotov said that the same idea was implied in the wording of the Soviet draft.
Mr. Byrnes said that his aim was to avoid future misunderstandings. If the United States Government did not believe that the tasks had been carried out, it would not take action. There should be no doubt as to where the decision lay.
Mr. Molotov said that it would be very strange if the Commission settled its tasks and then some time were required before the recognition took place. This would imply mistrust of the Commission. Mr. Molotov said that the original United States draft had not included this.
Mr. Byrnes replied that the second draft did, however, include it, pointing out that he had agreed to amendments proposed by Mr. Molotov which had not appeared in the original United States draft.
Mr. Byrnes reiterated that the Commission did not have the right to determine whether one government would recognize another.
Mr. Molotov concurred in this.
Mr. Byrnes said that this should, therefore, be formulated. He added that the success of this whole matter depended upon the existence of absolute confidence among the three governments. If the United States Government did not desire to recognize the Rumanian Government it would not be conducting these conversations regarding it.
Mr. Bevin proposed the following language: “as soon as the Commission reports that these tasks are accomplished and the required guarantees have been received by the respective governments, the Government of Rumania, with which the Soviet Government maintains diplomatic relations, will be recognized by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.”
Mr. Molotov inquired how long the Commission would take in its work.
Mr. Bevin said that the Commission should work swiftly. Just how long, would depend upon the Rumanian Government; however, the task should not be a long one.
Mr. Molotov said that the language proposed by Mr. Bevin might imply that the Commission should function for a long period of time. He said that the governments should not delay the work of the Commission.
Mr. Bevin said that he had not intended to do that.
Mr. Molotov proposed to accept the language suggested by Mr. Bevin.
[Page 789]Mr. Byrnes said that it was up to the government itself to decide the question of recognizing another government. He desired to retain the words “are satisfied.”
Mr. Molotov said that the Commission’s report should be an agreed report.
Mr. Byrnes said that he had referred to the document on Poland and discovered that the word “properly” had been used therein.78 He pointed out that the first sentence of the final Soviet paragraph read: “As soon as these tasks are resolved.” He proposed that this be altered to read “properly resolved,” borrowing the language of the document on Poland.
Mr. Molotov said that this would be acceptable.
Mr. Byrnes said that he wished to have it clearly understood that the United States Government would determine whether the tasks had been properly resolved and whether the required assurances had been received.
It was agreed that the word “accomplished” should be employed instead of the word “resolved” in the English text.
Upon Mr. Molotov’s request, Mr. Byrnes read the text as agreed upon: “as soon as these tasks are properly accomplished and the required assurances have been given, the Government of Rumania,” etc. with the remainder of the sentence embodying the language of the Soviet draft.
After a recess for further study of the Rumanian proposals, Mr. Molotov stated that he could not accept the word “properly” in the last paragraph. This formula had been applied to Poland at a time when two governments were in question. However, there were no two governments involved in Rumania and Mr. Molotov could not agree to the use of the same formula.
Mr. Byrnes said that he was disappointed that Mr. Molotov could not agree on this. He had not thought that there would be any further objection. When the language of the United States draft had not been accepted, Mr. Byrnes had suggested the language of the Polish paper as a compromise.
Mr. Vyshinski had said that the word “properly” was superfluous.
Mr. Byrnes requested that this superfluous word be included.
Mr. Molotov could not agree to this. He said that the representatives on the Commission would not sign an agreement unless they considered that the tasks had been properly accomplished.
Mr. Byrnes said that he did not wish to eliminate the word “properly,” even if it was superfluous.
[Page 790]Mr. Molotov said, with regard to paragraph 1, that he proposed to delete “on account of past political activities.” The phrase “present government” should be retained. The specification that the individuals chosen should be friendly to the three governments would be deleted.
Mr. Harriman said that he had understood from Mr. Vyshinski that this paragraph had been agreed to. The specification that the individuals chosen should be friendly to the three governments had been dismissed as superfluous.
Mr. Vyshinski concurred.
Mr. Harriman said that he wished to confirm that the phrase “present government” was construed by Mr. Vyshinski to mean “the existing government plus two members.”
Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Molotov concurred.
Mr. Molotov said that it was necessary to retain the word “present” since it was not being proposed to set up a new government but merely to amplify the present government.
It was decided to pass on to the question of Bulgaria, leaving the undecided points in the Rumanian proposals.
Mr. Harriman inquired whether the phrase “free from force or intimidation” was to be retained in paragraph two of the Rumanian paper.
Mr. Molotov said that he assumed that it had been agreed to eliminate this phrase.
Mr. Byrnes said that he had not agreed to eliminate it.
Mr. Bevin said that he had proposed an alternative wording.
Mr. Molotov said that he could not agree to this phrase as it was humiliating to the Rumanian Government.
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the first U.S. draft had made specific references to the militia and political police. This had been deleted in favor of the much milder terminology “free from force or intimidation” which Mr. Molotov was now objecting to.
2. Bulgaria
Mr. Byrnes said that he had made a few changes in the U.S. draft on Bulgaria to bring it into accord with what had been agreed at this meeting concerning Rumania. He assumed that it was desirable to use substantially the same language in both cases. (Enclosure no. 1).
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet draft on Bulgaria reflected the same idea as that which was now being presented by Mr. Byrnes and inquired why the Soviet draft was not, therefore, acceptable.79
[Page 791]Mr. Byrnes replied that this was because the draft he was now presenting fully reflected the conversation which he had with Generalissimo Stalin. It embodied the language of the Soviet paper down to the middle of paragraph one, beyond which point it followed the Rumanian proposals as agreed upon today. However, it did not include after the word “suitable,” the phrase “for this purpose on account of past political activities.”
3. Rumania
Returning to the Rumanian question, Mr. Molotov said that he would agree to delete the phrase “past political activities” provided that Mr. Byrnes would agree to delete the word “properly” in the last paragraph. The word “present” would be deleted from the phrase “present government.” At the same time, Mr. Molotov insisted that the phrase “free from force or intimidation” be deleted.
Mr. Byrnes inquired, in connection with the use of the term “properly”, whether Mr. Molotov wished the action of the Commission to be final.
Mr. Molotov replied that he did not. He said that the Commission could not itself recognize a government.
Mr. Byrnes said that was his position.
Mr. Molotov stated that the governments, nevertheless, assumed a moral obligation in sending the Commission.
Mr. Byrnes agreed that there was a moral obligation, but stated that this was not a binding obligation. He inquired whether the Commission’s report would be unanimous.
Mr. Molotov said that it would.
Mr. Byrnes said that he wished to make it certain that only the United States Government had the right to recognize another government. He wished to make the following statement for the record: The question whether these tasks are accomplished and the assurances received is a question for the decision of the United States Government, which always reserves the right to recognize another government.
Mr. Molotov said that this did not mean that in signing the agreement the Government was not assuming an obligation. It assumed an obligation by sending a Commission.
Mr. Byrnes stated there was a difference between a moral and legal obligation. He said that further, having made the above statement for the record, he would agree to Mr. Molotov’s proposal.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether the Rumanian text had been agreed upon in full.
Mr. Byrnes replied that it had but with the understanding which he had just formulated.
[Page 792]Mr. Molotov reread the portion of paragraph one as proposed by Mr. Bevin with the changes agreed to: “The King should be advised that one member of the National Peasant Party and one member of the Liberal Party should be included in the Government. The Commission shall satisfy itself that (a) they are truly representative members of the groups of parties not represented in the Government; (b) they are suitable and will work loyally with the Government.”
Mr. Molotov said that he understood the phrase “free from force or intimidation” was to be eliminated from paragraph 2.
4. Bulgaria
Mr. Molotov said that the Bulgarian draft proposed by Mr. Byrnes was acceptable. A modification would be made along the lines of that which had been made in the Rumanian draft so that the text would read: “one member of the Agrarian Party and one member of the Social Democratic Party”.
Mr. Byrnes said that there was a difference between the situations in Rumania and Bulgaria. In Rumania there would be a Commission, whereas Bulgaria would merely receive the “friendly advice” of the Soviet Union. It was, therefore, essential to include, as in the United States draft, “as soon as the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are satisfied that this friendly advice has resulted——”
Mr. Molotov said that the Bulgarian situation, of course, differed from the Rumanian. Elections had been held in Bulgaria. Moreover, there was a Parliament in Bulgaria, but not one in Rumania. The Soviet text made allowance for Mr. Byrnes’ considerations. According to this text, if the friendly advice should be accepted by the Bulgarian Government and the additional representatives included, then the Bulgarian Government would be recognized.
Mr. Bevin raised the point that the Soviet draft on Bulgaria should read “will recognize the Bulgarian Government” rather than “will establish diplomatic relations with the Bulgarian Government”. Diplomatic relations could not be established until the peace treaty had been concluded. Moreover, this would make the Bulgarian text correspond with the Rumanian text.
Mr. Molotov agreed to this.
Mr. Bevin went on to say that the important point was that the draft should read “as soon as the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom are satisfied”, etc. He said that Mr. Byrnes’ draft met this requirement, safeguarding the position of the Governments. This was good wording.
[Page 793]Mr. Molotov said that no one could restrict the rights of a government. But there was no reason to write an agreement if governments were not going to be committed thereby to some action.
Mr. Byrnes suggested the wording “just as soon as we are satisfied that this friendly advice has been taken”, et cetera.
Mr. Molotov replied that it would be sufficiently definite to say “if this friendly advice is adopted” in accordance with the Soviet draft.
Mr. Byrnes suggested that the words might be used: “if this friendly advice has been accepted and acted upon”.
Mr. Molotov proposed the following wording: “If this friendly advice has been taken by the Bulgarian Government and after the said additional representatives have been included in the Bulgarian Government, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom will recognize the Government of Bulgaria.”
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that there would be no Commission in Bulgaria. He said that Mr. Molotov’s wording left open the possibility of future argument. He agreed that there was a moral obligation assumed in the appointing of the Commission. But there would be no Commission in Bulgaria. If the Soviet Government believed that its friendly advice had been accepted, it would expect immediate recognition of Bulgaria from the United States and Great Britain. However, if the United States Government did not believe this, it would not be in a position to recognize the Bulgarian Government. Therefore the line should read in accordance with the United States draft.
Mr. Byrnes said that he hoped that no such issue would arise. But he did not wish to do anything which might be a source of controversy between the governments.
Mr. Molotov said that Mr. Byrnes had not requested that a Commission function in Bulgaria. However, there was one way in which the proposed action in Bulgaria differed from that in Rumania. The Bulgarian solution involved the intervention of the Soviet Government by agreement with the other two Governments. The Soviet Government would accomplish in Bulgaria what the Commission would accomplish in Rumania. If this were accomplished, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom would be morally obliged to recognize the Bulgarian Government. Otherwise it would be embarrassing to both the Bulgarian and Soviet Governments. This is what Mr. Byrnes had proposed.
Mr. Byrnes stated that he had never made any such proposal. He had proposed that the Soviet Government should tender friendly advice to the Bulgarian Government, but he had not agreed that the United States Government would take action toward recognizing the [Page 794] Bulgarian Government on the basis of Soviet friendly advice in the same manner as it would act upon the work of the Commission in Rumania.
Mr. Molotov said that the two situations amounted to the same thing.
Mr. Byrnes said that there was no issue regarding the advice. The issue would be whether the Bulgarian Government accepted the advice.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet draft provided for this by the language “if this friendly advice is adopted”.
Mr. Byrnes inquired as to who would decide whether the Bulgarian Government had adopted the advice.
Mr. Molotov replied that only the United States Government could decide this.
Mr. Byrnes stated that this was all he had wished to register.
Mr. Molotov said that in signing an agreement to the effect that the advice had been accepted, the United States Government would be assuming a moral obligation as in Rumania.
Mr. Byrnes said that Generalissimo Stalin had said in his conversation that in view of the Bulgarian elections there was nothing which he could properly do beyond offering “friendly advice” to Bulgaria. Generalissimo Stalin had said that he would be willing to do this. Mr. Byrnes had expressed his full satisfaction. However, Mr. Molotov’s draft omitted the important point that the United States Government would have to determine for itself whether the Bulgarian Government had or had not accepted the advice, whether it had accepted it in toto or in part.
Mr. Molotov replied that the United States Government would recognize the Bulgarian Government provided the conditions of the agreement were fulfilled. Therefore what was the purpose of formulating this explicitly?
Mr. Byrnes replied that this very discussion showed the wisdom of doing so.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government could not permit itself to be in the position implied by Mr. Byrnes’ draft. He said that the tendering of friendly advice would not be a separate act on the part of the Soviet Government. The other Governments would also be involved in obligations. However, if the Bulgarian Government did not adopt the advice, then the United States Government would not face any commitments.
Mr. Bevin inquired whether it would be the Bulgarian Government which would satisfy the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom that the advice had been adopted.
[Page 795]Mr. Byrnes proposed to use the wording: “Whenever the Bulgarian Government has satisfied the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom that the advice has been adopted.”
Mr. Molotov said he could not accept this. It created a new condition in addition to what the Bulgarian Government was already expected to fulfill. He had not accepted a similar reservation in regard to Rumania.
Mr. Byrnes stated that the Bulgarian Government might appoint representatives who were not really representative of their own parties. The Bulgarian Government might say, however, that these appointments were truly representative. The United States Government might believe otherwise. Perhaps even the Soviet Government would believe otherwise. Would it be left wholly up to the Bulgarian Government to see that the advice had been adopted, with the three Governments having nothing to say about this?
Mr. Molotov proposed to pass on to the next question.
5. Iran
Mr. Bevin took up the Soviet proposed amendments (enclosure no. 2) to the British draft on Iran. He accepted the Soviet amendment no. 1, regarding the heading of the draft. Mr. Bevin wished, however, to amend the preamble as follows, taking the wording of the Soviet amendment no. 2 as the basis: “The Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and U.S.A. have agreed on the formation of a Tripartite Commission for Iranian questions and are submitting this agreement to the Iranian Government for their concurrence.” Mr. Bevin wished the draft to read in this way so as not to give rise to the impression that the three Governments were taking action over the head of the Iranian Government.
Mr. Bevin proposed to delete the phrase “as far as possible” from the second paragraph as formulated in the Soviet amendment no. 3. He further stated that he wished to insert the date at which it had been agreed that the Allied troops would be removed from Iran in order to eliminate the possibility of any misunderstanding on this score.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation considered the phrase “as far as possible” to be necessary. He said that it was now winter time. Mr. Molotov did not agree to the insertion of the date March 2 since this date had already been agreed upon.
Mr. Bevin consented to this but inquired why Mr. Molotov insisted upon the phrase “as far as possible.”
Mr. Molotov replied that this was owing to the winter season. He said that it would be up to the Commission to determine this point.
Mr. Bevin agreed.
[Page 796]Mr. Byrnes said that he would agree to leaving out the date March 2 but that in that event the phrase “as far as possible” should not be included.
Mr. Molotov said that the use of this phrase would avoid the impression that the troops might be removed in a period of two weeks.
Mr. Bevin stated that in any event there could be some troop removals.
Mr. Byrnes said that the phrase “as far as possible” was superfluous since the Commission would naturally accelerate the withdrawal of troops as far as possible.
Mr. Molotov said that the phrase was necessary in order to avoid false impressions.
Mr. Bevin suggested the phrase “maximum possible acceleration.”
Mr. Molotov inquired whether that meant that the troops would be withdrawn in five days.
Mr. Bevin said that probably some would be withdrawn in that time.
Mr. Molotov recalled the language of the United States draft regarding the withdrawal from China.80 He said that in Iran just as in China no impossible demands should be put forward.
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that there was no relation between the situation in China, where the Government had requested the Allies to remain, and Iran, where the Government had asked the Allies to withdraw.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Union had two treaties with Iran.
Mr. Byrnes replied that the Iranian Government was saying that the treaties were not being carried out.
Mr. Molotov said that the texts of these treaties were common knowledge.
Mr. Bevin had no objection to Soviet amendment no. 4 substituting “provinces” for “districts” in the second line of the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the British draft. However, Mr. Bevin objected to the phrase “free use” in Soviet amendment no. 5. He wished to use the language of the British draft on this point since the national language in Iran was Persian just as the national language in the Soviet Union was Russian. The wording of the Soviet amendment implied that the local languages ranked equally with the Persian national language.
Mr. Molotov said that Russian was not the national language of the U.S.S.R. Each Union Republic had its own national language.
Mr. Bevin said that he wished to safeguard Persia’s national position. He said it would be a mistake to refer to Iranian languages other than Persian as “national languages.” Mr. Bevin objected to [Page 797] the phrase “national minorities.” He suggested the wording “the use of racial or non-Persian languages” as a substitute for “free use of the languages of national minorities” as contained in the Soviet amendment no. 5. The concrete details could be decided by the Commission.
Mr. Molotov said that the phrase “free use” should be employed.
Mr. Bevin said that according to his information the wording of the Soviet draft at this point would cause trouble with the Persians. Mr. Bevin did not wish to submit a draft which would cause difficulties. He believed that the phrase “right to use non-Persian languages” solved the problem.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that such a phrase might be taken to mean the French or Russian languages, et cetera, which were also non-Persian languages.
Mr. Bevin said that it might read “local non-Persian languages.”
Mr. Byrnes suggested that the Russian text might read “national minorities” and the English text “minorities.”
Mr. Molotov said that the word “free” should remain.
Mr. Bevin returned to his proposal to use the wording “maximum possible acceleration.” He was afraid that Mr. Molotov’s wording would imply undue delay.
Mr. Byrnes said that he would accept Mr. Bevin’s wording on this point as a compromise.
Mr. Molotov said that he could not accept wording which would create a false impression. Winter continued to prevail in Persia. The Commission itself would consider this matter.
Mr. Bevin said that his wording implied that the troops would begin to move out, that Iranian sovereignty would function, and that the world would acquire new confidence. Mr. Bevin would like to dispel popular misgiving which had arisen concerning the situation in Iran.
Mr. Molotov suggested that the Iranian question be postponed. He pointed out that this question was not on the agenda.
Mr. Bevin said that if the question was not decided at the present conference, it might be raised at the meeting of the United Nations. Mr. Bevin was very anxious to resolve the question at this conference.
Mr. Molotov complained that Mr. Bevin wished his draft to be accepted without any alterations.
Mr. Byrnes suggested that the Iranian question be reexamined at tomorrow’s meeting.
Mr. Bevin, in response to a question from Mr. Molotov, said that he would circulate a British reply on Austria at tomorrow’s meeting. [Page 798] He said, however, that he could not discuss the question of the German fleet at the present conference. He did not have the particulars on the subject and would have to study it.
Mr. Molotov circulated papers on the German fleet and the repatriation of Soviet citizens (Enclosures No. 3 and No. 4).
[Page 800]- According to the United Kingdom delegation minutes of this meeting, the following additional persons were present: For the United States—Mr. Matthews; for the Soviet Union—Mr. Tsarapkin; for the United Kingdom—William G. Hayter, head of the Southern Department of the British Foreign Office.↩
- John H. Watson, Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Moscow.↩
- No copy of a revised United States delegation paper on Rumania has been found; for the last previous United States paper on Rumania, see enclosure 1 to the United States delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 24, 3:15 p.m., p. 770; for the Stalin–Byrnes discussion on Rumania, see memorandum of conversation by the United States delegation, December 23, p. 750.↩
- The text of the letter from Foreign Secretary Bevin to Ambassador Clark Kerr read as follows: “As you know, you have been appointed to the Commission to advise the King of Roumania on the reorganisation of the Roumanian Government. In that capacity, you should be aware that it was agreed at the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers that each Foreign Minister should instruct his respective representative on the Commission that, in selecting representatives of the National Peasant and Liberal Parties for inclusion in the Government, the names of MM. Maniu, Bratianu and Lupu should not be put forward. You should bear this in mind in the course of your discussions with your colleagues.” (740.00110 Council/1–2346) For text of the Secretary of State’s letter to Ambassador Harriman, December 26, see p. 801.↩
- Reference here is to the Soviet memorandum on Rumania, included as enclosure 6 to the United States delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 24, 3:15 p.m., p. 773.↩
- Marshal Ion Antonescu, Leader of the Rumanian State from September 14, 1940, until his overthrow on August 26, 1944.↩
- Rumanian Fascist movement.↩
- Nicolae Penescu, leader in the Rumanian National Peasant Party and Minister of Interior, August 1944 to March 1945.↩
- Reference here is to the tripartite agreement on the establishment of a Polish Commission, included as section VI of the Report of the Crimea Conference, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 973.↩
- Reference here is to the memorandum by the Soviet delegation included as enclosure 5 to the United States delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 24, 3:15 p.m., p. 772.↩
- Apparently reference is to the United States delegation memorandum regarding the American Marines in China, included as enclosure 5 to the United States delegation minutes of the First Formal Session, December 16, p. 628.↩
- Presumably reference here is to the memorandum by the United Kingdom delegation regarding suggested draft terms of reference for a tripartite commission on Iran, included as enclosure 3 to the United States delegation minutes of the Informal Meeting of December 24, 3:15 p.m., p. 771.↩
- For documentation regarding this subject, see vol. iii, pp. 1506 ff.↩
- For text of this directive, see the memorandum from the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State, December 21, 1945, vol. v, p. 1108.↩
- Reference here is to the Soviet memorandum regarding problems of the Allies in relation to Germany, included as subenclosure to enclosure 5 to the United States delegation minutes of the Fifth Formal Session of the Conference, December 20, p. 703.↩