Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II

740.00119 Council/12–2645

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers³²

Moscow, December 23, 1945.

Present:	Generalissimo Stalin
	Mr. Molotov
	Mr. Pavlov
	Secretary Byrnes
	Ambassador Harriman
	Mr. Bohlen

Subjects:	1. Iran
	2. The Balkans
	3. Hungary
	4. Atomic Energy
	5. North China

After an exchange of amenities The Secretary accepted with pleasure the Generalissimo’s invitation to dinner December 24.³³

The Secretary said he had wished to talk again with the Generalissimo before his departure. He observed that it would be a very good Christmas present for the world if it were possible to announce agreement on the various points under discussion by the meeting of Foreign Ministers.

1. Iran

The Secretary said he wished to talk primarily about Iran. He was seriously disturbed that this question would be raised at the General Assembly of the World Organization in January. He had no information that it would be raised, but he thought that unless some measures could be taken they would be confronted with it at the General Assembly.

Stalin remarked that they were not afraid of its being raised at the General Assembly.

The Secretary continued that our connection with this matter arose from the Declaration of Iran signed by the three heads of Government at the Tehran Conference in the first paragraph of which appreciation was expressed for the cooperation of Iran in the war and particularly in the matter of supplies to the Soviet Union. The second paragraph bound the three Governments to respect the territorial integrity and independence of this small state. He said in view of this Declaration it would be difficult to take the position that Iran was hostile to the Soviet Union. He said the United States was sincerely desirous of avoiding this embarrassing position since it did not wish to take sides because of its close alliance with the Soviet Union during the war and now during the peace. He said that he understood Mr. Bevin had made some informal suggestions concerning joint action by the three powers in this matter, and he would like to know the Generalissimo’s opinion in regard to these.

Stalin replied that Mr. Bevin had presumably had in mind the conflict in Persian Azerbaijan and had pointed out that the Persian Constitution provided for the establishment of provincial councils in the various provinces. Mr. Bevin said it was his personal opinion and he had not consulted his Government. Mr. Bevin said the Persian Government had not carried out these provisions of the Constitution and inquired what would be the Generalissimo’s attitude if he put forward certain proposals.

The Generalissimo had said he was prepared to discuss it. He wished to assure Mr. Byrnes that in any agreement or discussion the United States would be brought in and that there would be no separate agreement with Great Britain without United States participation. The Generalissimo said in regard to the Declaration of Iran, the three Governments had agreed to respect the territorial integrity etc. of Iran and that was their obligation and not the obligation of Iran. This pledge still held good and would always hold good. There was no intention on the part of the Soviet Union to violate this pledge since that was not their practice and they would not tolerate any such views in the Soviet Government. In so far as the expressions of appreciation for Iran’s efforts, that had applied to the existing Government. Since then much water had flowed under the bridge. The present Iranian Government and the one before it had become hostile to the Soviet Union. He said the disadvantage in the Declaration had been that it contained no reference to the obligations of Persia to the three Allied Governments. The present Persian Government had taken advantage of this and had adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union. The Persian Government was now looking for people who could act against the Soviet Union. As to the pledge to assist Iran, this had been carried out and in 1943 the Soviet Government, not without difficulty to itself, had sent 25,000 tons of grain to Iran when famine threatened there. He said the Soviet Government continued to assist whenever possible. He concluded by stating that no one had any need to blush if this question was raised in the Assembly. All that was needed was that the Iranian Government should carry out its obligations and cease to be hostile to the Soviet Union.

The Secretary replied that he had felt it wise to raise this question again because in the press of the United States much had been written about the presence of foreign troops in Iran, and in order that there would be no grounds for suspicion of the United States, we had decided to remove the last remaining United States forces from Iran. These troops were not combat but service troops and even so would all be gone within one week.

Stalin replied that the Soviet Government had never asked the United States to remove its troops. They had no objection to their remaining or being withdrawn whichever the United States preferred.

The Secretary said he realized the difference in the positions between the United States and the Soviet Union. He said he had not seen Mr. Bevin’s proposals but believed that they related to some form of investigation by the three Governments in regard to the complaint of Iran. He concluded by saying that the desire of the United States was to avoid any embarrassing situation at the forthcoming General Assembly meeting.

Stalin said that they had not received any specific proposals in writing yet from Mr. Bevin.

2. The Balkans

[3. Hungary]

The Secretary said he would then like to discuss the Balkan situation. He said lie had had a difficult time with Mr. Molotov on this subject.

Stalin said with a smile that this was unexpected news.

The Secretary continued that this question had been pending for some time and that in his opinion it was terribly important to settle this matter and to proceed with the peace treaties with these countries and be in a position to render them essential economic assistance. He said he would not bother the Generalissimo with details but he merely wished to state that in the hope of finding a solution he had sent an outstanding American liberal known to be friendly to the Soviet Union to investigate the situation on the spot. He said he had told Mr. Ethridge to disregard all previous opinions on the subject and to make an impartial report. He asked the Generalissimo to believe him when he said that if Mr. Ethridge had indicated any grounds for recognizing the Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, he would have immediately done so. He said he had held up the report because he wished to show it first to Mr. Molotov but had promised the American public and the press to publish the report at some time. This he would have to do unless some solution could be found here.

Stalin replied that if he felt it necessary to publish the Ethridge report that he would ask Mr. Ehrenburg,³⁴ who was also an impartial man and had visited these countries, to publish his views.

The Secretary said that this would be unfortunate since the two reports would tend to separate rather than unite our countries on this question. He said in the case of Finland, Hungary, Austria, and added Yugoslavia, we had found it possible to agree on recognition and that only Rumania and Bulgaria remained. He said our whole position stems from the Yalta Declaration which provided for joint efforts to establish temporary governments broadly representative of the people. He said all our information indicated that the genuine representatives of the leading parties were not included in the Government and he asked in view of the greater Soviet interest in this, matter that the Generalissimo suggest some plan in order to give representation to these parties. If this could be done and arrangements for holding free elections could be made, we would be able to proceed to the recognition of these Governments. He said we had no intention of suggesting any members of these parties who were hostile to the Soviet Union, but that surely it would be possible to find persons who were both representative of these parties and at the same time friendly to the Soviet Union. He appealed to the Generalissimo for his help in this matter.

Stalin said that given a mutual desire to settle this matter some means could be found to do so. He said he wished to speak of certain accusations which he admitted Mr. Byrnes had not made but which had appeared in British and American newspapers, namely, that Soviet troops in the Balkans were exercising pressure on elections in those countries. He said this was not so, and, for example, in Hungary there were Soviet troops and in actual fact the Soviet Union could do pretty much what it wanted there, but that nevertheless the elections had resulted in a victory for a party other than the Communist party. This demonstrates that the Soviet Government was exercising no pressure through its troops in these countries. Such action would be regarded as unworthy of the Soviet Union and as interference in internal affairs. He said all the Soviet Union asks of these border states or states in proximity to the Soviet Union was that they should not be hostile. What parties should run these countries was a matter for the people themselves to decide. In the view of the Soviet Government other parties besides the Communist party could be friendly. He said this was a natural desire on the part of the Soviet Union since they had suffered much during the war from Finland, Hungary, and Rumania. Hungarian troops had reached the Don River and Rumanian troops the Volga. That is why the Soviet Government was interested in seeing friendly, loyal governments in these countries. Bulgaria although not actually a border state, during two wars had been a hotbed of German influence against Russia and the democratic countries. He said that at the end of the last war in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk³⁵ the German delegation had contained Bulgarian and Turkish representatives. In this war Bulgaria had not actually fought but had only been restrained by fear of her own people. Bulgaria, however, had afforded no less assistance than Rumania by affording bases for German submarines, naval vessels, and airplanes. All the Soviet Union asked was that the Government of Bulgaria should be loyal in its relation to the USSR.

Stalin said such were the basic facts and now what in a practical sense could be done about the situation. In Bulgaria elections had been held and overwhelming mass of the people had supported these elections. It was, therefore, difficult to exercise any pressure looking towards a reorganization of the Bulgarian Government. He continued that the Yalta Declaration did not provide that all parties should be represented in any given government but merely that they should have full freedom to participate in the election. He said in Bulgaria the opposition parties had chosen of their own will to boycott the election and, therefore, could not be regarded as a loyal opposition. In the United States when Dewey³⁶ had lost the election he had pledged the loyalty of his party to President Roosevelt during the war. The opposition in Bulgaria had abused its privilege. Members of a loyal opposition might be included in the Government, but how could disloyal elements be included? He said he hesitated to take any steps to interfere with the decisions of the Bulgarian parliament. The Soviet Union was already being accused of interference. Stalin said that perhaps the Bulgarian parliament could be advised to include some members of the loyal opposition in the new Government, that there could be no question of the reorganization of the Government, since the people in the elections had shown their confidence in the parliament; nor could there be any question of pressure but merely of advice. He said he thought that some move in this direction might satisfy Mr. Byrnes.

In the case of Rumania Stalin said that since no elections had been held, it might be possible to make some changes in the Government there which would satisfy Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin. He said Mr. Molotov had suggested that one or two non-party ministers be added. He said that in a pinch it might be possible to suggest to the Rumanian Government that two statesmen representing the National Peasant party and the Liberal party be included in the Government. He added, however, that they should not be Maniu³⁷ or Bratianu or Lupu³⁸ in any case but they should be loyal persons. Stalin pointed out that his suggestion in fact repeated what Mr. Byrnes had suggested. In so far as the Ministry of Interior was concerned he did not believe it would be possible to put in a non-party Minister or a commission. He said ministers were selected by agreement among the parties. For example, in Hungary the Minister of Interior had been Communist, but after the elections he had been replaced by a member of the Small Landholders party.³⁹ The same had happened in Austria.⁴⁰ Stalin concluded that on this point he felt that it was impossible to stick a boot in the face of the Rumanians. In any event, there were Vice-Ministers of Interior in Rumania who were not Communists.⁴¹

The Secretary said that he hoped the Generalissimo would understand that the United States did not wish to encourage the selection of persons hostile to the Soviet Union, but that he felt that the Generalissimo’s suggestion offered a means of giving representation to the parties not now adequately represented in the Government. He inquired how the Generalissimo thought his suggestion might be put into effect.

Stalin said that they could call Rumanian representatives here or send someone there or consult by telegram.

The Secretary said it would also be a good idea to have the enlarged Government make a statement concerning civil liberties and free elections.

Stalin replied that this had already been done.

After some discussion Stalin agreed that a commission composed of Mr. Vishinsky, Ambassador Harriman, and a British representative, possibly Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, be sent to Rumania to work out the details of the inclusion of the two additional Ministers.

The Secretary suggested in regard to Bulgaria that the Soviet Government might helpfully give the advice which the Generalissimo had suggested.

Stalin promised to do this.

Stalin requested the Secretary to discuss these proposals regarding Bulgaria and Rumania with Mr. Bevin.

The Secretary agreed and jokingly said that although they were supposed to have a bloc with England, he had even neglected to inform Mr. Bevin soon enough about the proposed meeting in Moscow.

Stalin replied that this was obviously only a cloak to hide the reality of the bloc.

4. Atomic Energy

The Secretary said that he felt that they were near agreement on the atomic energy question, but that he had had long discussions with Mr. Molotov concerning procedure.

Stalin said that the Soviet Government had accepted nine-tenths of the American proposal and had only proposed one-tenth for their side. He inquired what was wrong in putting the proposed commission under the Security Council.

The Secretary said that we had accepted the Soviet proposal that the commission report to the Security Council instead of to the Assembly. The difficulty was that there were other questions besides security involved in which the Assembly would have primary interest. He went on to say that as a matter of fact the commission really needed no direction since the Terms of Reference set forth clearly what it could do and what it could not do.

After some discussion it was agreed that there was little difference in substance between our positions and that The Secretary and Mr. Molotov could work out the drafting difficulties.

5. North China

The Secretary said he had talked at considerable length with Mr. Molotov concerning our troops in North China, but he felt that it was still not clear to the Soviet Government.

Stalin inquired why the United States did not wish to remove their troops from North China.

The Secretary replied that on the contrary, we would like to have them leave tomorrow if possible but that for the reasons he had explained to Mr. Molotov we had certain obligations and there were also certain circumstances which made that difficult.

Stalin replied that the Soviet Government would have no objection if the United States wished to leave its troops, but they would merely like to be told about it.

The Secretary said he recalled at Potsdam the Generalissimo had expressed his opinion to the press and to himself that Chiang Kai Shek’s was the only possible Government in China, that the Communists were not real Communist, and that the United States had been supporting Chiang Kai Shek in accordance with what he understood was the agreed policy of both countries.

Stalin said that they had a treaty to that effect with Chiang Kai Shek’s Government.

The Secretary explained the situation in North China and the difficulties caused by the weakness of the National Government forces and the presence of large numbers of armed Communists surrounding the area where the still armed Japanese forces remained. He explained that General Marshall was going to attempt to arrange a truce between these forces in order to permit the prompt disarming of the Japanese forces in that area. He assured the Generalissimo that the United States had no desire whatsoever to interfere in the Chinese internal struggle but that we did not wish to do anything which would worsen the situation of the Central Government which we had all agreed to support.

Stalin said that if the Chinese people became convinced that Chiang Kai Shek was depending on foreign troops, he would lose his influence. Chiang Kai Shek apparently does not understand this, but the three Governments should understand it for him. It would be much better for Chiang Kai Shek to rely on his own forces, but if we desired to help Chiang Kai Shek we should not give him help in such a manner as to destroy his authority with the Chinese people.

The Secretary explained that although General Marshall was prepared to make ships and even planes available in the event of necessity to have United States forces disarm the Japanese, he was not going to tell Chiang Kai Shek of these preparations since it would make him less desirous of reaching an understanding with the Communists.

Stalin said he thought that the size of the Communist forces had been greatly exaggerated by the Chinese Government. He said all Chinese were boastful and tended to exaggerate both the size of their own forces and those of their opponents. He inquired where the army of a million and a half was which Chiang Kai Shek was supposed to have.

The Secretary said we would like to know also, but according to our reports there were only 50,000 Nationalist troops in the North China area. He outlined the position of these troops in relation to the Japanese forces and the Communist forces along the railroads in North China.⁴²

Stalest said that in his view 50,000 troops were sufficient to disarm the Japanese. For example, 25 Soviet aviators had taken the surrender of two Japanese army corps in Mukden. He inquired as to the size of the Communist forces in the Tientsin area.

The Secretary replied that Mao⁴³ claimed to have 600,000.

Stalin laughed heartily and repeated his assertion that all Chinese were boasters.

In conclusion The Generalissimo expressed the greatest confidence that if any man could settle the situation it would be General Marshall whom he regarded as one of the few military men who was both statesman as well as soldier.

32. Meeting held at the Kremlin, December 23, 1945, 5 p.m.
33. No official record of the substance of the discussion at Stalin’s Christmas Eve dinner for the Secretary of State and Mr. Bevin has been found. The dinner is briefly described in Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 117–118, and Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, pp. 336–337.
34. Ilya Grigorevich Ehrenburg, Soviet publicist.
35. Treaty between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one band and Russia on the other, signed March 3, 1918. For translation of text, see Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. i, p. 442.
36. Thomas E. Dewey, Republican candidate for President in 1944.
37. Iuliu Maniu, President, Rumanian National Peasant Party.
38. Niculae Lupu, leader in the Rumanian National Peasant Party.
39. From December 1944 to November 1945 the Hungarian Minister of Interior was Ferenc Erdei, a leader of the Communist-oriented Peasant Party. In the new Hungarian government formed by Premier Zoltan Tildy following the November 4, 1945, national election, Imre Nagy, member of the Hungarian Communist Party, became the Minister of Interior. See telegram 916, November 15, from Budapest, vol. iv, p. 906.
40. In December 1945, following the Austrian national election, a new Austrian government under Chancellor Leopold Figl was formed, with Austrian Socialist Party leader Oskar Helmer succeeding Communist Franz Honner as Minister of Interior.
41. Gen. Virgil Stanescu, an independent, I. Burca, a Rumanian Social Democrat, and G. Vantu, a Liberal, served as Under Secretaries of State in the Rumanian Ministry of Interior under Premier Petru Groza.
42. According to the account in Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, p. 335, the Secretary of State indicated the relative locations of Japanese and American troops in North China with matches.
43. Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.