740.00119 Council/12–2645

United States Delegation Minutes of an Informal Meeting, Conference of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, Spiridonovka, December 21, 1945, 2:30 p.m.

The Secretary Mr. Bevin Mr. Molotov
Ambassador Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vishinsky
Mr. Bohlen Sir A. Clark Kerr Ambassador Gusev
Mr. McAfee Mr. Pavlov
Subject: 1. German Military Units in the British Zone of Occupation in Germany.
2. Repatriation of Soviet Citizens from the Western Zones of Germany.
3. Removables for Reparations.
4. Division of the German Merchant Fleet.
5. Cancellation of the German Internal Debt.
6. German Assets in Austria.
7. Ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreement.
8. Korea.
9. Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan.
10. Regime of the Zumb Straits and the Greater and Little Belt Straits.
11. Allied Troops in Austria.
12. Preparation of the Peace Treaties.

The Secretary suggested that they first discuss the list of questions submitted by the Soviet Delegation the day before (copy attached83).

[Page 711]

1. German Military Units in the British Zone of Occupation in Germany

The first of these dealt with German military units in the British zone of occupation in Germany.

Mr. Bevin said that he had before him the report of Field Marshal Montgomery on this subject which had been read at a recent meeting of the Control Council in Germany.84 He said one of the factors in the situation was that in England there were a large number of Italian prisoners who were to be returned to Italy and they would be replaced by German prisoners from Germany. It was not desired to consider them as prisoners of war when they were sent to England since in that case the Geneva Convention would require certain norms as to rations which would cause trouble in England. He said the units in Germany which had not been dispersed were being held in order to send them to England to replace the Italians as soon as the latter could be moved. There were something over 100,000 Italians to be moved as soon as shipping could be made available. Mr. Bevin continued that there were certain Germans in England who were regarded as harmless Germans as distinct from ardent Nazis and it was likewise proposed to send the harmless ones back to Germany and replace them with others. Mr. Bevin said that he felt Field Marshal Montgomery’s report made it clear that there were no armed German units in the British zone and that he really hoped that the Soviet suspicions on this point had been removed. He said he felt we should always keep each other informed in order to avoid such suspicions in the future.

Mr. Molotov said that on the basis of information received, Marshal Zhukov had raised this question a month and a half ago in the Control Council but that no clear answer had been received.85 He said it was a question causing great concern to the Soviet Union. He had heard from Mr. Bevin the first time the problem relating to replacement of Italian prisoners by Germans. He pointed out that the Soviet request was not a new demand but merely called for the carrying out of the Berlin and surrender agreements concerning disarming of Germans. [Page 712] He said it was a matter of great concern to the Soviet Union that eight months after the surrender there were still units of the German armed forces in being, together with their staffs. In addition according to their information there were units of other enemy states who had fought against the United Nations—Hungarian, Latvian, and Lithuanian. He said the Soviet Government could not and would not ignore this situation.

Mr. Bevin stated that he felt that the Soviet suspicion was unjustified and that in effect Mr. Molotov was impugning the honor of Field Marshal Montgomery who in his report denied the accuracy of the Soviet information. He said Field Marshal Montgomery had proposed sending a commission to all four zones in order to check up on the disarming of German military units.

Mr. Molotov said no one desired to impugn the honor of Field Marshal Montgomery, but the fact remained that Marshal Zhukov a month and a half ago had proposed that a commission investigate the truth of the information received by the Soviet representatives.

Mr. Bevin replied that Field Marshal Montgomery had accepted this proposal but suggested that the commission go to all four zones. He read from Montgomery’s report figures which indicated that the Soviet figures as to undispersed Germans were greatly exaggerated, that, for example, instead of 1,000,000 in Schleswig-Holstein there were only 140,000 disarmed Germans. Furthermore, there were no headquarters groups anywhere in the British zone nor any armed tank detachments. The personnel of one panzer division were being held in concentration camps. He said it was ridiculous to assume that Great Britain which had fought two bloody wars against Germany for its national existence would have any ulterior desire to retain intact any German military units. He could not understand why it would not be reasonable to send a commission to all four zones as Field Marshal Montgomery had proposed on November 30. He said Great Britain was beginning to get the feeling that they were constantly being put in the dock by other nations and that the people of England were beginning to resent it.

Mr. Molotov replied that there were no grounds for any such impression and repeated that a month and a half ago Marshal Zhukov had raised the question frankly before the Control Council and had received no serious answer.

He said it was only a question of fact which the Soviet Union could not ignore. He repeated that there was no intention to question the honor of Field Marshal Montgomery. It was only a question of the carrying out of the surrender agreement and the Berlin decisions.

After further exchange on this subject it was finally agreed that a commission would be sent to all zones to check on the specific question [Page 713] of the manner in which the provisions relating to disarming and dispersal of German units were being carried out and that the Control Council should consider the desirability of further commissions to check on any complaints in regard to matters in the various zones. It was likewise agreed that France as a member of the Control Council should be informed of this decision and invited to join.

2. Repatriation of Soviet Citizens From the Western Zones of Germany

The meeting then considered the next question on the Soviet list, namely, the repatriation of Soviet citizens from the western zones of Germany.

The Secretary said in this connection that before he left Washington after much discussion a new directive on this subject to Generals McNarney86 and Clark had been agreed upon and he assumed although he had not checked it that it had been sent.87 He gave a copy of this new directive to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin. He said he hoped that this new directive would satisfy the Soviet complaint set forth in their memorandum.

Mr. Molotov said that according to their, information there were 200,000 Soviet citizens still held in the western zones of occupation and that Soviet officers were not allowed access to them.

The Secretary replied that according to our information there were only 20,000 Soviet citizens in our zone.

Mr. Bevin read from a list giving the status of repatriation of Soviet citizens from various theaters. 32,042 had been repatriated from England; 917,000 from Germany; 63,000, from Austria, with only 1,500 remaining; 49,000, from Italy, with 674 remaining; 84,000 from Norway, etc.88 He said his chief difficulty was with the Polish military, particularly those who came from east of the Curzon Line who took the position that when they left they were Polish citizens and still considered themselves to be Poles.

Mr. Molotov said there was no difficulty between Poland and the Soviet Union on this question and he did not see why there should be with Great Britain and America and that he felt this was a matter for [Page 714] Poland and the Soviet Union to decide and not for anyone else. He said the Soviet position was difficult since it was hard to explain why Soviet citizens were still not being returned to their homes and Soviet officials denied access to the camps where they were confined. If the positions were reversed and such conditions existed in the Soviet Union no one would understand it. This was particularly true when the only question was the return home of Soviet citizens.

The Secretary said that the United States only desired to clear this matter up and to get rid of these persons as soon as possible. He said as Mr. Molotov would see on the new directive, there were three categories of persons who would be returned by force if necessary, namely: (1) Soviet citizens in German uniform, (2) members of the armed forces, and (3) persons concerning whom there was evidence of treacherous activity against the Soviet Union. As to the other category of persons concerning whose citizenship there was doubt, Soviet officials were to be afforded full access to the camps where they were collected. He repeated that he hoped that the new directive would meet the Soviet desires in this matter.

3. Removables for Reparations

The next question on the list was that of the carrying out by the agreed date, namely, February 2, 1946, of the Berlin agreement concerning removables for reparations.

Mr. Molotov said that approximately five of the six months period had passed and the slowness of progress was causing great concern in the Soviet Union.

The Secretary replied that according to his information agreement had been reached with the Soviet representatives in Berlin concerning the first installment of the advanced delivery.

Mr. Molotov said that this first installment represented a very small amount and that the principal thing was to complete the arrangements on time.

The Secretary replied that according to his information even these advanced deliveries were more than could be transported on existing facilities.

Mr. Bevin said he felt the chief difficulty was that of determining how much production should be left for essential German peacetime needs.

Mr. Molotov agreed with Mr. Byrnes but said that the needs of Soviet industry were urgent since in many branches of industry such as fuel and metallurgy Soviet production was below pre-war level because of what had been destroyed during the war or by the Soviets themselves to keep it out of German hands; there was an insistent demand in the Soviet Union to speed up reconstruction and this was impossible [Page 715] unless German reparations were received in the near future. He inquired what answer he could give to the Soviet people on this point.

The Secretary said that they might be told that already they were getting more German equipment than could be transported.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether it could be said that the Berlin Agreement could be carried out in time.

The Secretary said he knew no reason why this should not be done and that he had several times impressed upon our representatives the need for speed and would continue to do so.

Mr. Bevin agreed and said he was doing likewise.

4. Division of the German Merchant Fleet

The next question was that of the division of the German merchant fleet.

Mr. Molotov said that they thought instructions should be issued to the Tri-partite Commission concerning the division of the German merchant fleet and that fishing boats and river shipping should be included among the categories to be divided.

The Secretary read point 4 of the Berlin Agreement on this point which stated that river and coastal shipping should be divided only after a determined amount had been left for German needs. He said he had not studied this question as it was the first time he had heard of it.

After some discussion it was agreed that a report as to the status of the matter should be requested from our representatives on the Tri-partite Commission.

5. Cancellation of the German Internal Debt

The next question on the Soviet list was the suggested cancellation of the German internal debt.

The Secretary said he was not informed about this question and it was difficult to discuss it until we know more as to what was involved. He said attached to the Control Council we had financial experts and they should be asked to give their opinion on this suggestion. He said for example it would be necessary to know who would be affected by the proposed cancellation.

Mr. Molotov said he had in mind cancellation of the claims of those who had helped finance the German war effort.

Mr. Bevin said that many firms including foreign firms had all their assets seized by the German Government under compulsion and that it might not be fair to cancel off this indebtedness.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether the suggestion could not be accepted in principle.

[Page 716]

Both The Secretary and Mr. Bevin, however, said this could not be accepted pending a full study of the factors involved in any such cancellation.

It was agreed to request the opinion of the Allied experts on this point.

6. German Assets in Austria

The Secretary then said that he had a whole series of questions that he could have raised at this meeting concerning the Control Councils in Austria and Germany, but he did not intend to raise many of them. There was one question, however, that he wished to take up. In Austria some difficulties had been encountered over the question as to the determination of what were German assets in the country and what were Austrian. He said according to our information the Soviet representative had said he had no instructions to discuss this question. Since only the people on the spot could discuss it, he said he hoped that the Soviet Government would authorize their representatives on the Allied Control Council in Austria to discuss with our representatives this matter of German assets.89

Mr. Molotov said he would look into the matter.

7. Ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreement

The Secretary said there was one other question that he wished to bring up, namely, the ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreement.90 He said that under our law ratifying this agreement it was provided that if 65 percent of the signing nations had not ratified by December 31 a new law would be required by Congress.91 He said, therefore, he hoped that if the Soviet Government, which had signed the agreement, still favored it, it would be possible to have the Soviet ratification before the end of the year and inquired whether this was constitutionally possible in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Molotov said that it would be, but he would have to look into the matter and would let the Secretary know.

8. Korea

The Secretary said that after examination of the Soviet proposals concerning Korea, he had found them acceptable to the United States Government with a few slight changes and he handed Mr. Molotov [Page 717] and Mr. Bevin a document embodying these changes (copy attached92). He pointed out that the changes were of a minor character and one was of a purely drafting nature.

Mr. Molotov expressed his gratification and said that he would examine the changes.

9. Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan

The meeting then took up the question of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government was prepared to accept the inclusion of India in the Far Eastern Commission in deference to Mr. Bevin’s wishes. He proposed that the document which was now agreed in substance be sent to the drafting committee.93

This was agreed.

In regard to the Allied Council Mr. Molotov said that they were prepared to drop the word “control” from their suggestion.94

Mr. Bevin said that since Australia was not acceptable as an additional member, he proposed a change in the paragraph related to the composition of the Council. Instead of “a member of the British Commonwealth” it should be stated that a member representing Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and India should be substituted.

This was accepted by The Secretary and Mr. Molotov.

Mr. Molotov then said he thought it would be better to drop the words “exigencies of the situation permitting” from paragraph 4.

The Secretary explained that this was only in case of extreme necessity when the Supreme Commander would not physically be able to consult first with his colleagues on the Council, but that obviously he intended to do so whenever it was physically possible.

Mr. Molotov said that it went without saying that if the Supreme Commander could act in cases of urgency then, therefore, it was unnecessary to say so.

Mr. Byrnes replied, however, that he thought it would be easier for the Supreme Commander if the provision was left in and relieve him of any possibility of a charge of violating the agreement.

Mr. Molotov said in that case he would withdraw his suggestion and the phrase could remain.

[Page 718]

The Secretary and Mr. Bevin accepted Mr. Molotov’s amendment to the addition of the word “individual” before the words “members of the cabinet” in the paragraph relating to questions which should be dealt with by unanimous agreement.

10. Regime of the Zumb Straits and the Greater and Little Belt Straits95

Mr. Molotov said to turn to another subject Generalissimo Stalin had asked their present meeting to consider the situation in relation to the regime of the Zumb Straits and the Greater and Little Belt Straits (Kattegug [Kattegat]). He said Generalissimo Stalin and President Roosevelt had informal discussion on this matter and the Generalissimo felt that the Ministers should exchange views on this subject.96 He said they would like to have information concerning the regime of these straits.

The Secretary and Mr. Bevin both replied that they had no knowledge of any such regime in regard to these straits but would be prepared to discuss the situation after they had looked into it.

11. Allied Troops in Austria

The Secretary then inquired whether Mr. Molotov had had time to consult his military advisers in regard to the reduction of Allied troops in Austria.

Mr. Molotov said they were still considering that, but he had an additional paper on Austria which he would distribute (copy attached97).

12. Preparation of the Peace Treaties

The meeting then turned to the consideration of the final text of the agreement concerning preparation of peace treaties.

After considerable discussion it was agreed to merge the language of the Soviet and U.S. drafts concerning paragraph 1 of the agreement.

The Secretary proposed that the conference be held in Paris and that the date be set not later than May 1, 1946. After some discussion this was accepted in principle.

There was prolonged discussion as to what states would have the right to sign the treaties when they had been finally drawn up by the states signatory to the armistice terms following the conference.

[Page 719]

It was finally agreed that: (1) In addition to the signatories to the armistice that all countries invited to the conference who were legally at war with any given enemy state should sign that treaty at the same time; (2) that other states legally at war with a given enemy state but not invited to the conference should be invited to adhere to the treaty at a later date; and (3) that the treaties enter into force upon their ratification by the countries signatory to the armistice terms. (Under the Berlin Agreement, France is regarded as a signatory to the Italian armistice.98)

The agreement regarding the preparation of peace treaties was referred to the drafting committee to be put into final form.

In regard to informing France and China of this decision Mr. Molotov inquired whether they should not be just simply informed.

Mr. Bevin stated he thought more than that was required and that they should be asked to agree.

Mr. Byrnes concurred in Mr. Bevin’s view that something more than mere information was required to these two countries but added that it should be presented in such manner as not to allow the whole agreement between the three Governments to be held up in the event of objection on the part of France or China.

It was agreed that France and China were to be informed and invited to agree to this decision by the Chairman, Mr. Byrnes.

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Concerning American Armed Forces in China

Up to the present time on the territory of China, according to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government, there are up to 500,000 non-disarmed Japanese troops with officer corps and staffs. This appears to be a violation of the terms of surrender approved by the Allied Powers.

In President Truman’s Declaration of December 15, 1945 on American policy with respect to China and in the memorandum of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, of December 16, 1945, it is stated that American troops and marines are in China.99 Along with this it is stated that American armed forces, brought to China for the purpose [Page 720] of disarming the Japanese troops, will remain there in order fully to eliminate Japanese influence and to bring about the stabilization of the internal situation in China. But the dates of disarmament of the Japanese troops and the evacuation from China of the armed forces of the USA are not indicated. At the same time, it is known that Japanese troops are being drawn into north China to participate in military operations on the side of the troops of the Chinese Government against non-government Chinese troops, and thus Japanese forces are being drawn into the struggle between different portions of the Chinese people.

The Soviet Government adheres to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China. It believes that the interference of foreign troops in the internal affairs of China is leading to an aggravation of the internal-political struggle and complicates the situation in China. Since this is a question of Japanese troops in a zone where the disarming of these troops, according to General MacArthur’s order no. 1, approved by the four powers, should be carried out by the troops of the Chinese Government, it is necessary that the Chinese Government urgently take appropriate measures. The task of disarming the Japanese troops in this zone should not be assigned to any other foreign troops.

Supporting the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China, the Soviet Government rigidly limits the tasks and time of the presence of Soviet forces in Manchuria to the framework of the agreement which it has with China in regard to Manchuria. In accordance with this agreement Soviet troops in due time disarmed all the Japanese troops in Manchuria and evacuated them as war prisoners to Soviet territory, and in the month of November the evacuation of Soviet troops from Manchuria in accordance with the plan communicated to the Chinese Government was begun. Soviet troops had already been evacuated from southern Manchuria when the Chinese Government requested the Soviet Government to postpone for one month the evacuation of Soviet troops from Manchuria. The Soviet Government agreed to this, and halted the evacuation of the Soviet troops which had begun.

Since the United States of America also has its troops in China, the Soviet Government believes that it would be right for the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to arrive at an understanding between themselves on the simultaneous evacuation of their troops from China, this to be completed in any event no later than the middle of January 1946. As regards the internal problems of China, the Soviet Government believes that these tasks should be decided by the Chinese people itself and its Government without interference from other states.

[Page 721]
[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the United States Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

Korea—Suggested Rephrasing of Russian Proposal of December 20, 19451

With reference to the final sentence of paragraph 2, it is suggested that the sentence be rephrased to specify that the recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the four interested Governments. Final decision would, of course, rest with the Governments represented on the Joint Commission but it is believed desirable that the other two Governments, the United Kingdom and China, who also have a very large interest in the development of an independent Korea be given an opportunity to consider proposals for a government. The sentence might then read:

“The recommendations worked out by the Committee shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the U.S.S.R., China, the U.K. and the U.S.A. prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.”

In the second paragraph of numbered paragraph 3 it is suggested that the first sentence in that paragraph be altered to read:

“The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean government for the joint consideration of the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Great Britain and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.”

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

On German and Other Military Units in Austria

The agreement on the Control mechanism in Austria2 provides that one of the major tasks of the Allied Commission shall be to assure [Page 722] the fulfilment in Austria of the provisions of the declaration on the defeat of Germany.3 As is known, that Declaration states that all armed forces belonging to or under the control of Germany must be fully and completely disarmed and abolished. The abovementioned provisions are extended also to the Austrian army, since from 1938 on it was a part of the German armed forces and actively participated in the war on the side of Germany.

Facts have become known to the Soviet Government that German military units made up of Austrians exist in Austria and that attempts are being made to restore the Austrian army on the basis of them. The state military chancellery, under which a military administration similar in structure to the general staff has been created, has been restored without the knowledge of the Allies. Territorial military administrations are being formed in the provinces. In accordance with directives of the state military chancellery, the military administration in Styria has elaborated a plan of organizing an army, including armored units and air, forces, numbering 40,000 men. Measures are being taken to supply this army with military property and ammunition.

There is also information on the formation of Austrian military units in the British zone of occupation. Thus, for example, the British command has formed an “Austrian” brigade under the command of Lieutenant General Aldrian out of the 68th and 69th army corps and the “Noldechen” corps group of the former German army. At the present time this brigade contains 12 infantry regiments each headed by an officer of the former German army with ranks from major to colonel. According to instructions of the British command, all call-up points for Austrians previously organized by the German command have been restored in the British zone of occupation in Austria. These call-up points make a strict inventory of all military servicemen. The chiefs of the call-up points are appointed by the British command and are maintained at its expense. All military units formed in the British zone of occupation of Austria from the former German army are fully subordinated to the British military command and are supplied with all types of rations. There are arms in the units mentioned.

Apart from Austrian military units, non-disarmed military units formed by the Germans from citizens of other states who took active part with the German army in the war against the United Nations are being maintained in the British zone of occupation in Austria. For example, a Russian white guard infantry corps of Colonel Rogozhin, numbering up to 15,000 men, is deployed in the area of Klagenfurt. [Page 723] This corps was formed by the Germans in 1941 and took active part in battles against Allied troops. The whole structure of the corps with all staffs and services has been preserved by the British command and arms have been retained. Another Russian white guard unit under the command of Colonel Geltlyar, numbering 7,500 men, is located in the region of Andersdorf.

The Soviet Government considers the above-mentioned facts a violation of the Declaration on the defeat of Germany and the decisions of the Berlin Conference on the disarmament and abolition of the armed forces of Germany and other military units under its control. The existence in Austria of remnants of the German army under the appearance of national Austrian units cannot be permitted in view of the danger of preserving the cadres of the German army.

The Soviet Government therefore considers it necessary that appropriate instructions on the part of the British and other Allied governments be urgently issued to the British and other commanders-in-chief in Austria concerning the steadfast fulfilment of the agreement on the control mechanism in Austria, which provides for the disarming of the German army and of other military units under the control of the German command.

  1. According to the United Kingdom delegation minutes of this meeting, Benjamin V. Cohen and John Carter Vincenit were also present with the United States delegation, and Pierson J. Dixon and Sir Horace A. C. Rumbold were also present with the United Kingdom delegation.
  2. Reference here is presumably to the memorandum by the Soviet delegation included as enclosure 5 to the United States delegation minutes of the Fifth Formal Session of the Conference, December 20, p. 702.
  3. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, Military Governor of the British Zone of Occupation in Germany, presented a report on the presence of German armed units in the British zone in the course of the 13th meeting of the Allied Control Council for Germany, November 30, 1945; for the report of the transactions of that meeting, see telegram 1154, December 1, from Berlin, vol. iii, p. 854.
  4. At the 12th meeting of the Allied Control Council for Germany, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, circulated a note to the other Council members in which he protested against the alleged continued existence of German military units in the British zone of occupation; for a report on the events of the 12th Council meeting, see telegram 1066, November 21, from Berlin, ibid., p. 852.
  5. Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater.
  6. For text of the directive regarding the repatriation of Soviet citizens, see memorandum by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State, December 21, vol. v, p. 1108.
  7. In a memorandum communicated subsequently to Molotov and Byrnes, Bevin reviewed the repatriation of Soviet citizens from areas under British control in the following terms: United Kingdom, 32,044 repatriated, repatriation completed; Germany and Denmark, 917,000 repatriated, repatriation completed; Austria, 63,000 repatriated, 1,500 remaining to be repatriated (as of September); Italy, 40,994 repatriated, 674 remaining to be repatriated; Greece and Crete, 652 repatriated, repatriation completed; Norway, 84,000 repatriated, repatriation completed (740.00119 Council/1–2346).
  8. For the views of the United States Government regarding reparations claims against German assets in Austria, see telegram 10380, November 29, to London, vol. iii, p. 668.
  9. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series Nos. 1501 and 1502; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. ii, pp. 39 and 134; or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1401 and 1440, respectively. For documentation regarding United States participation in the Bretton Woods Conference, July 1–22, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, pp. 106 ff.
  10. For text of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Public Law 171, July 31, 1945, see 59 Stat. 512.
  11. Enclosure 2.
  12. Reference here is to the memorandum by the United States delegation, December 19, regarding the Far Eastern Commission, included as enclosure 2 to the minutes of the Fourth Formal Session of the Conference, December 19, p. 677.
  13. The proposal of the Soviet delegation for revisions of the original United States proposals regarding the Allied Council for Japan is included as enclosure 2a to the minutes of the Third Formal Session of the Conference, December 18, p. 661. For the revised version of the United States proposal on the Allied Council, see enclosure 3 to the minutes of the Fourth Formal Session, December 19, p. 679.
  14. The straits under consideration here are presumably the Great and Little Belts and the Sound (Öresund) linking the Baltic Sea and the Kattegat
  15. President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin discussed the question of free navigation in the approaches to the Baltic Sea in the course of a tripartite dinner meeting, November 28, 1943, at the Tehran Conference. See Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 510511.
  16. For text of the Soviet delegation’s memorandum on German and other military units in Austria, see enclosure 3 to these minutes, p. 721.
  17. According to the account in Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 114, Molotov informed Byrnes of the Soviet agreement to the proposed list of states to be invited to the peace conference following a telephone conversation with Stalin.
  18. The memorandum by the United States delegation regarding American marines in China is included as enclosure 5 to the minutes of the First Formal Session of the Conference, December 16, p. 628.
  19. For text of the Soviet delegation’s memorandum regarding Korea, see enclosure 1 to the minutes of the Fifth Formal Session of the Conference, December 20, p. 699.
  20. For text of the Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria, signed ad referendum on July 4, 1945, in London, at a meeting of the European Advisory Commission, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. i, p. 351.
  21. For text of declaration, signed at Berlin June 5, 1945, see Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, p. 1051.